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INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Matching problems occur in various situations. A classical example in our social
life is the marriage market. Here, we have a group of women on the one side and
a group of men on the other side. In general, women want to marry men and vice
versa. Each individual has his own ideas about his first choice, second choice and so
on. The main question now is: How should the women (men) be matched with the
men (women)? One possibility to solve this problem may be to determine marriages
randomly. But then we will have a lot of unhappy married couples and consequently
divorces after a short time for sure. Ergo, the random choice proves to be not very
reasonable. Obviously, the suggested matching does not respect the individuals’
expectations. For example, a marriage should satisfy a certain degree of happiness,
however this may be quantified from an economic point of view. The marriage mar-
ket is a typical one-to-one sided matching problem.
Another less social but rather economic example for a matching problem is the job
market. We have employers, offering jobs, on the one side and employees, searching
for jobs, on the other side. There are various reasons, why an employer prefers one
employee compared to another (skills, team abilities, flexibility a.s.o.). The same
holds for the employees. Comparing two firms, an employee always can state for
which one he prefers to work. The reasons for their choices may be interest in the
job, money or the work atmosphere. Again, the structure of the problem - and
hence the obvious question - is the same. How to match each other such that both
parties are satisfied? In this context we can face all kinds of matching problems. In
a one-to-one sided matching context, only one employee is working for one firm. In
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the many-to-one sided matching context several employees are working for one firm
and in the many-to-many sided matching problem an employee is hired by several
firms simultaneously.
In both scenarios durable solutions are required. This leads to a central desirable
property in matching markets: stability. If there are no two individuals, one from
each side of the market, who prefer to be matched instead of staying with their cur-
rent partners in the matching then we call the matching stable. This is the common
definition of a stable matching. Obviously one could imagine, there exist a lot of
further properties that point out one matching compared to another. If a society
agreed on the properties that a solution of a matching problem should satisfy, the
next fundamental question occurs. How can we get a matching that satisfies our
desired properties? One possibility is the use of procedures. Roughly speaking, given
the individuals’ preferences, a procedure selects matchings. Rules are defined such
that at some point the procedure stops. It consists of different rounds. Its design de-
pends on the purpose it serves. In general, it is desirable to focus on procedures that
are easy to understand, since this leads to a higher acceptance of its application. In
addition, its design is influenced by the outcome, we are interested in most, e.g. such
that its solution satisfies stability (For this, see Gale & Shapley’s (1962) deferred
acceptance procedure which is the basic reference in matching theory.). Hence, a
procedure is a matter of stepwise determination of a solution, whereas specific rules
define how to proceed at each step.
In connection with the allocation of internships for medical students which started
at the beginning of the twentieth century in the US, another problem arose. Some
pairs of students became couples during their education or even were couples be-
fore. Arriving on the internship market, they search for neighboring jobs. Using the
existing procedures causes instabilities.
An even more general similar problem is given on the many-to-one sided job market.
What about the fact, if employees do not only care about their employers but as
well about their colleagues? This is one of the main questions, we want to work on
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in this thesis. We think of this kind of question being of special interest, because
people spend a lot of time of their lives in offices, hospitals or other institutions,
interacting with their colleagues. Consequently, if they enjoy to work for the com-
pany but they do not like their colleagues, this will influence their work as well as
their personal life. Matching agents in a firm with colleagues, with whom they get
along well, is beneficial for both sides. Again in this context, we have to determine
the properties, judged mostly important to be fulfilled. Thereby, different aspects
may be taken into account. We can focus on the individuals’ interests, we can put
the main emphasis on welfaristic aspects or the practicability of a solution is judged
to be important.
Therefore, we have chosen several procedural approaches. We think of our proce-
dures being especially appropriate to select matchings, since the course of action
is always transparent, a solution will not “appear from nowhere”. The acteurs’ in-
terests are sometimes more, sometimes less taken into account, but they are never
completely ignored. On the one hand we will have several different procedures,
given a fixed set of acteurs. On the other hand we will vary the set of acteurs and
consequently the procedures have to be modified or new procedures are added.
It is also interesting to observe the influence, the selection of a procedure has on the
solution as well as the individuals’ behavior itself. The individuals, participating
in a procedure, should agree on the properties that should be satisfied by the solu-
tion. Another aspect by choosing a procedure is the fact that an individual often
can improve his situation by not telling the truth about his preferences. Thus, the
individuals or a central planner have to decide, how important it is that everyone
has no incentive to misrepresent his interests. These are the basic questions we will
answer in this thesis.
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The structure of the thesis is as follows:
The first chapter gives an overview of the existing literature which we divide into
different fields. One field illustrates the literature in economic theory, the other
focuses on literature in a more practical context of matching medical students to
internship places in hospitals. Finally, we range this thesis into the literature. The
second chapter of the thesis describes the model of a job market (for agents), in
general, explains the agents’ preference relations and their representation and gives
a precise definition of a matching. We introduce eligible properties of a matching and
a possible restriction on the preferences. Three different procedures are introduced,
two of them will be illustrated and formally described by graphs. The last section of
Chapter 2 introduces some aspects about strategic behavior and discusses incentive
compatibility. Chapter 3 provides and discusses results. We prove the existence of
the solutions of the different procedures. We discuss the quality of the procedural
solutions and the quality of the procedures itself. The fourth chapter focuses on
the firms’ preferences. In the first part of the chapter, we integrate the firms into
the basic model of Chapter 2, they are treated as if they were agents as well. We
get a job market for participants and then we restart our analysis. The second part
discusses another approach. In this job market, we assume that the agents have no
influence on the choice of their jobs, we only deal with the firms’ preferences. Again
we establish a specific model, similar to Chapter 2. Two procedures are introduced
and the properties of their solutions as well as the quality of the procedures are
discussed. In the last chapter we summarize our results and give various ideas to
extend the models, we have introduced in this thesis.
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Chapter 1
Survey of the Literature
The reader may be interested in the main contributions already made in the last
decades. Therefore, we provide a rough overview. This chapter falls into two main
sections. The first one deals with a general historical background. The second de-
limits the thesis from other research domains and embeds it in the literature relevant
for our issue.
The overview of the literature, given in this chapter, does not call for being a com-
plete description of the existing literature in two-sided matching theory. It should
be rather seen as a selection of subjectively most important results. In addition,
some papers are reviewed in corresponding sections of subsequent chapters.
1.1 Historical Background
We have divided this section into two main subsections. The theoretical evolution il-
luminates publications in mathematical and economic journals. In contrast to that,
the second subsection, practical evolution, discusses articles published in medical
journals. Health professionals analyze the annual internship allocation for postgrad-
uate medical students.
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This structure of the section seemed to be the most natural one. Independently
from each other, the theoretical as well as the “real” world developed procedures
to solve matching problems, which is the reason why we should give credit to both
approaches.
1.1.1 Theoretical Evolution
In the world of economic theory it is generally accepted that the “fathers” of two-
sided matching theory are Gale & Shapley (1962). The college admission problem,
they introduce in their work, is as follows. There are colleges on the one side and ap-
plicants on the other side. Colleges have preferences over applicants and vice versa.
Hence, many applicants are matched with one college. A special case of this model
is the marriage problem where one woman is matched with at most one man. Gale
& Shapley (1962) show for the marriage problem as well as for the college admission
problem the existence of a stable set of matchings. Stable means that no woman
and no man can obtain a more preferred matching by single or pairwise deviations.
The proof of the theorem is constructive and results in the deferred acceptance pro-
cedure1. Furthermore, this procedure yields a men (or women) optimal matching.
Although Gale & Shapley (1962) is the basic reference in economics, several mathe-
maticians worked on the marriage problem in the first half of the 20th century.2 In
his book Jacobs (1983, Chapter 2 §1) summarizes the exact genesis of the so called
marriage theorem, as it was termed by Weyl in 1949 and proven by Hall in 1935.
An equivalent version of this theorem already appeared as Ko¨nig’s theorem in 1916.
Several alternative proofs are given by various mathematicians.
Roughly, the content of the theorem is the following: We have two finite sets, called
women and men. A mapping from the set of women into the power set of men is
called a system of friendships. Each woman has a set of male friends. An injective
1For a short overview see Section B.0.1.
2Never mentioned in the economic literature of two-sided matching markets.
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mapping from the set of women into the set of men is called a marriage. Now, a
marriage is compatible with a system of friendships if each woman marries one of
her friends. Furthermore, the system of friendships satisfies the party condition if
for any subset of women, say D many, the number of corresponding male friends
exceeds D. Now the marriage theorem claims: There exists at least one compatible
marriage if and only if the party condition is satisfied.
What does this purely combinatorial theorem have to do with Gale & Shapley’s
(1962) marriage market? Men’s preferences are totally ignored and women’s pref-
erences only discriminate between friends and non-friends. Neither woman would
want to reject the partner assigned to her by a compatible marriage, as she can
marry one of her best choices (in terms of her preferences). Therefore, in the Gale
& Shapley (1962) context, there is no pair of man and woman who strictly prefers
to be matched to each other. In this spirit, one may find the origins of matching
theory in combinatorics.
Coming back to our literature overview, the question rose, whether incentive com-
patibility can be guaranteed. Dubins & Freedman (1981) show that on a college
admission market students cannot get a better college by misrepresenting their pref-
erences. A direct consequence of this result is given by Gale & Sotomayor (1985).
In the deferred acceptance procedure, it will almost always be better for a woman
not to state her true preferences if men are proposing. They analyze the strate-
gic possibilities for the women and describe their best competitive behavior. Roth
(1982) discusses the connection between stability and incentives. It turns out that
no matching procedure exists, which always yields a stable matching and which
does not give agents (e.g. women and men in the marriage market problem) in-
centives to misrepresent their true preferences. However, procedures do exist (e.g.
the deferred acceptance procedure) where we get stable matchings and the agents
on one side of the market have no incentives to misrepresent their preferences (see
Roth (1984b)). Furthermore, Roth (1984c) shows that a women (men)-optimal sta-
ble matching is the best stable matching for each woman (man) and the worst for
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each man (woman). A good overview of foundations and further results on strategic
behavior, incomplete information and other interesting research directions can be
found in Roth & Sotomayor (1990).
We want to mention some further research directions that became more and more
important. Based on Roth’s (1985) result that the college admission problem is not
equivalent to the marriage market problem, as asserted before, more recent works
may be categorized by the type of a matching problem that is analyzed. For the
college admission problem Roth & Sotomayor (1989) discuss the specific proper-
ties of the set of stable outcomes. So¨nmez (1996), Sotomayor (2000), Alcade &
Romero-Medina (2000) and Abdulkadiroglu & So¨nmez (2003) discuss in different
ways strategy-proofness and mechanism design issues.
Roth & Sotomayor (1990) also dedicate several chapters to a cooperative game theo-
retic approach using assignment games3, first discussed in Shapley & Shubik (1972).
The paper fills the gap that salaries were not considered for jobs, yet. This model is
not directly related to our work, but it plays an important role in the literature, and
therefore is worth being briefly mentioned. Agents on both sides of the market want
to exchange one unit of an indivisible commodity4, one side supplies the good, the
other demands. It is exchanged for money, consequently we are looking for suitable
assignments of buyers and sellers. Shapley & Shubik (1972) show that the outcomes
in the core of an assignment game are the solution of a linear programming problem,
which is dual to the optimal assignment problem. Furthermore, every core outcome
is competitive. About ten years later, Crawford & Knoer (1981) study competitive
adjustment processes in labor market models. As usual, there are heterogeneous
but perfectly informed firms and workers. It is also shown that the selected equi-
librium is the most preferred by the agents who made the offers. Kelso & Crawford
(1982) provide existence results for equilibria, obtained by competitive adjustment
problems and they show that an equilibrium in such markets is stable, provided that
3The marriage problem is a special case of the assignment game without side-payments.
4e.g. a car or a house
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workers are gross substitutes from the firms’ point of view. The agents who make
the offers are always favored. This is also generalized in their paper. Demange &
Gale (1985) discuss the problem of non-uniqueness of equilibria and the problem
of manipulability for two-sided matching markets (with monetary transfers) using
the Walrasian mechanism. A lot more publications follow. To get a nice overview,
we refer the interested reader to Roth & Sotomayor (1990, Section 8.6) and for the
current literature to the bibliography of two-sided matching on Roth’s web page5.
Another type of matching model is the so-called roommate problem, which was also
introduced by Gale & Shapley (1962). Just one set of agents is involved, let us
say students. Each student is looking for a roommate in a dormitory. They have
preferences over each other. Therefore, the marriage problem where women (men)
only have preferences over members of the opposite sex can be viewed as a specific
case of the roommate problem. A stable matching may not always exist in this
context (shown by Gale & Shapley (1962)). Irving (1984) describes an algorithm
that determines whether a stable matching exists and if so, the algorithm will find
such a matching. Then, Tan (1991) shows the existence of a stable matching for
strict preferences and Chung (2000) guarantees the existence even in the case of
weak preferences, by introducing a particular condition.
1.1.2 Practical Evolution
At the beginning of the twentieth century internships for postgraduate medical stu-
dents were compulsory for the first time. This opportunity was beneficial for both
sides of the market. Students gained experience in medical education and hospitals
got cheap labor. From the beginning on, the number of positions available exceeded
the number of graduates.6 A direct consequence was a considerable competition
among the hospitals. Each hospital made appointments with the students earlier
5http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/ aroth/alroth.html
6For partial evidence see also Graettinger (1976).
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and earlier in the year. This led to an unsatisfactory situation for the students as
well as for the hospitals. The students’ school year was interrupted by interviews and
the hospitals now invited students without knowing their grades. In 1926, Darrach
(1927, published) informed the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC)
that “It has been decided to defer the appointments of interns at the Presbyterian
Hospital in the City of New York until some time in April.” But this commitment
was not maintained in the long run. About ten years later, Fitz (1939) suggested
schools, which were members of the AAMC, should agree on not to release informa-
tion before a fixed date. Furthermore, hospitals should wait for a date given by the
AAMC, before they start to make appointments with candidates. These ideas were
never applied for unknown reasons. Next, Turner (1945) formulated several con-
ditions to resolve the problem of selecting interns. In particular, he again claimed
fixed dates for medical schools to release information about the students and for
the hospitals to require a firm acceptance of an offered internship. Furthermore, for
successful implementation, it was necessary that Turner’s instructions were followed
nationwide. Indeed, these rules caused appointments to take place later in the senior
year. But now another problem arose. The time period between a hospital’s offer
of an internship and the student’s acceptance of the position was extended, because
students waited for possible offers of more preferred hospitals in their ranking list.
From 1945-1951 this problem resulted in a permanent absurd time reduction from
the time when the offer was made to the requirement of acceptance. Therefore,
Mullin (1950) and Mullin & Stalnaker (1951) introduced a procedure with a central
clearing agency to eliminate the failures of the previous one7 and to insure a fair
principle of distribution. Students and hospitals announced their rankings of each
other to a central institution, which in return arranges a matching according to some
specific rules. A trial run was decided and executed in 1950-1951. But before the
procedure was implemented to the real market, again another failure emerged. If
7e.g. unfair pressure on students to make early commitments, incoming telegraph offers at
different points of time and so on.
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students misrepresented their true rankings, they probably would be matched with
a more preferred hospital. A slight modification, discussed by Mullin & Stalnaker
(1952), called the NIMP8 algorithm was finally implemented. The algorithm was
very successful and remains in use until these days.
Only ten years after Gale & Shapley’s (1962) publication, the authors heard about
the NIMP procedure and detected that in order to prove the existence of a sta-
ble matching they had developed a much simpler procedure than proposed by the
NIMP. It is an astonishing observation, both the practical and the theoretical world
independently achieved the same result.
Over the years, the number of couples among the students increased. Getting intern-
ships in neighboring hospitals, given the NIMP algorithm, is difficult. Therefore, in
the 1970s more and more couples negotiated directly with the hospitals. The ques-
tion of a “couple mechanism” arose. In a mechanism used until 1983, each couple
submits a ranking-order list for each spouse and assigned one priority in the match.
Elias & Elias (1980) discussed the drawbacks of this description of couples’ prefer-
ences and proposed that each couple should submit a ranking-order list expressing
their preferences over pairs of positions. In spite of these suggestions of improve-
ment, the problem of unstable matchings persisted. In the theoretical world this is
shown by Roth (1984a). The set of stable matchings may be empty in a market,
in which the set of agents exhibits couples. Furthermore in this paper, the author
related the evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents with the
given results in game theory.
Recent publications on practical issues are nicely summarized in a paper of Roth
(2003) to which we refer for further reading. For instance, he reviews the article
of Roth & Peranson (1997) who propose a newly designed applicant-proposing al-
gorithm and compare it with the existing NRMP algorithm. It turns out that the
8National Intern Matching Program. In 1968 it was renamed the National Intern and Resident
Matching Program (NIRMP), and in 1978 renamed the National Resident Matching Program
(NRMP), to reflect changes in the structure of postgraduate medical training.
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differences are very small. The authors conclude both algorithms perform similarly.
Medical internship allocation is still a good example for matching market theory.
Theory and practice are closely related, although they pursue different paths.
1.2 The Thesis and the Literature
In this section we contrast our work with the existing literature that is closely related
to the topics in this work and we search for similarities of recently published (or even
not yet published) papers.
As already mentioned in Subsection 1.1.2, Roth (1984a) first showed that in the
hospital-intern problem with couples, the set of stable matchings may be empty.
Aldershof & Carducci (1996) examine several results for the stable marriage prob-
lem and show that they do not hold, if some interns are couples who express their
preferences over pairs of hospitals. In the following year an article by Dutta & Masso
(1997) is published. They study the consequences for stability in standard two-sided
matchings, when the composition of a worker’s colleagues can affect the preferences
over firms. They introduce different preference restrictions for agents and for firms.
First the set of agents may consist of single agents and couples. Workers who are
singles have the classical9 strict preferences. Couples’ preferences fulfill the prop-
erty of togetherness and firms satisfy group substitutability, which guarantees that
there are no complementarities among agents.10 If such a preference structure is
given, the authors describe a modified deferred acceptance procedure, the so called
multi-stage deferred acceptance algorithm11. Its outcome is a matching and their
first theorem claims that this matching is in the core of any market with couples.
Next they show, if individuals have F-lexicographic12 preferences over firm-colleague
9like in the marriage market described by Gale & Shapley (1962)
10For detailed definitions see Dutta & Masso (1997).
11For a brief overview see Section B.0.3.
12One firm together with a subset of agents is strictly preferred by one agent to another firm
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pairs and firms have substitutable13 preferences, then the set of matchings in the core
is nonempty, because the set of not weakly blocked matchings is a subset of the core.
The remaining two results of Dutta & Masso (1997) are less relevant in our context,
because we do not deal with their further introduced preference restrictions. The
work of Dutta & Masso (1997) is closest to the context of our thesis. Nevertheless,
our model exhibits a number of differences. They will be discussed more detailed in
the corresponding sections of Chapter 2, once we have introduced the model.
Klaus & Klijn (2005) introduce weakly responsive preferences14 and then show that
this notion of preferences guarantees stability, if couples are looking for jobs in some
labor market. In subsequent works Klaus & Klijn (2004b) focus on paths to stability
for matching markets with couples given weakly responsive preferences for couples,
as well as Klaus & Klijn (2004a) discuss a fair and efficient stable matching, when
couples’ preferences are responsive. In Klaus, Klijn & Masso (2003) the authors
show that the NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even if
couples’ preferences are responsive.
Finally, all papers deal with two-sided matchings where couples are present, i.e. a
student or an intern does not only care about where to study or in which hospital
he will work but he also cares about to which university or hospital his partner is
matched. This extension of the agents’ preferences is similar to the structure in our
thesis but we will take a step further. Agents will care about the colleagues they
will have to work with in a firm.
Before we start to introduce the basic model, we want to delimit it from another
research field. The concept of hedonic coalitions was first introduced by Dre`ze &
Greenberg (1980). In their model an agent’s utility depends not only on his con-
together with another subset of agents if and only if he strictly prefers the firm to the other firm.
(We introduce a formal definition in Chapter 2 later or see also Dutta & Masso (1997).)
13A firm regards agents as substitutes rather than complements since it continues to want to
employ an agent even if some of the others become unavailable.
14For a detailed definition see Klaus & Klijn (2005).
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sumption bundle but also on the members of the coalition which he belongs to.
More precisely, the authors refer to private and public goods, whereas the public
good depends upon the coalition. In particular, they study stability of coalition
structures in their model. They show, under which conditions a coalition structure
is individually stable15 and prove that such an “individual stable equilibrium” may
fail to exist. Next they introduce contractual individual stability16. Now, if transfers
among coalitions are allowed the existence of “individually stable contractual equi-
libria” can be guaranteed.
A more recent work of Bogomolnaia & Jackson (2002) gives new insights in hedonic
settings. They consider only purely hedonic settings in the sense that an agent’s
utility only depends on the members of his coalition. If the agents’ preferences are
restricted to (additively) separable and symmetric preferences, then the set of indi-
vidually stable coalition partitions is nonempty.
We observe the following similarities and differences to our work. Both have in
common that the agents’ preferences depend on the members of their coalition or in
other words on the colleagues with whom they will work. In our context an agent’s
utility depends on a firm and colleagues. If we interpret the firm as a “discrete con-
sumption good”, then our scenario becomes similar to Dre`ze & Greenberg (1980).
Nevertheless, we have problems to motivate Dre`ze & Greenberg’s (1980) assump-
tion that the utility function is strictly increasing in the private good in our model.
There is no obvious explanation for an assumption that an agent’s utility arises if he
would work for more than one firm. Rather the opposite assumption may be more
intuitive. Next, the size of coalitions is not fixed in Dre`ze & Greenberg (1980) and
Bogomolnaia & Jackson (2002). By moving from one coalition to another, agents
reduce and enlarge coalitions. In this context their notions of stability make sense.
15A coalition partition is individually stable if no single individual has incentives and opportuni-
ties to change the coalition.
16An individual can only change a coalition, if his move is beneficial to himself, to all members
of the coalition which he joins and also to all members of the coalition he leaves.
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In our context, the size of a coalition, respectively the number of agents who can
work for a firm, is fixed in advance. Thus, neither the notion of individual stability
nor contractual individual stability is applicable in our context. Hedonic settings
are not the context we deal with in our model. The idea to embed the thesis in this
field seems to be rather artificial than natural.17
Many things are different in this thesis compared to the existing literature. First, we
establish two models only focusing on one side of the market; agents’ preferences on
bundles consist of a firm and colleagues. Furthermore, concerning the preferences
in general only few restrictions are made. Only one model comprises both sides’
preferences simultaneously. Furthermore, except of Pareto efficiency, none of the
properties, we will introduce, are made in this context, yet. Of course, the main
ideas may not be completely unfamiliar. For instance, another notion of stabil-
ity is introduced. We give three different procedural approaches to select a set of
matchings. A new (formal) graph theoretic representation is given for some of the
procedures, which leads to new questions and already well known questions, e.g.
incentive compatibility. Roughly, these are some of the main differences compared
to the existing literature.
17I would like to thank Professor Matthew O. Jackson for helpful comments and hints during
my stay at Caltech in 2004.
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Chapter 2
The Basic Model
The basic model is a many-to-one matching model which means that many agents
on the one side are matched with one agent on the other side. In particular, we
interpret the many agents as employees and the one agent on the other side as a
firm. Hence, we identify our matching model with a job market. Traditionally, in
job market models agents have preferences over firms and firms have preferences
over agents. In our model agents also have preferences over their colleagues, a fact
rarely discussed in the literature. Agents spend a lot of time per week at their place
of employment which stands to reason that they do not only care about the firm
they work for, but they also care about with whom they have to work. We neglect
the firms’ preferences in this chapter, because first we entirely want to concentrate
on the agents’ concerns. In Chapter 4 we will reintegrate the firms’ interests in
different manners.
Once the agents are allocated to a job and colleagues, natural questions arise con-
cerning the quality of this matching and as well of the quality of the way how we
got this matching. One may ask whether some agents prefer another job and col-
leagues. Another important question is whether we can distinguish between some
allocations. Are their allocations that are “more fair or just” than others? Or are
20
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agents able to influence the results by cheating? A lot of different questions that
we are not able to answer straight away. Therefore, we introduce definitions and
techniques, in short the tools to have a basis for our analysis.
In the first section we introduce the model of a job market where agents are matched
with colleagues and firms. Next we define properties of matchings such that we are
able to distinguish between matchings. Before we start to develop procedures to
select matchings, we restrict the agents’ preferences in a natural way, motivated by
the real market. A graph theoretic construction is given to facilitate illustrations
and to enable a formal description for some procedures. We define three different
procedures. The last section of the chapter focuses on the agents’ strategic behavior,
mechanisms and the introduction of incentive compatibility.
2.1 The Framework
On the one side, we have agents looking for a job in a firm. On the other side, each
firm seeks for employees. The number of jobs may be different for all firms. Once
an agent got a job and colleagues as well, he can precisely state whether he got his
first best choice, his second best choice and so on. This section provides a basis to
permit further analysis. The model is described by the following quantities. Let
• H be the set of firms, |H| = m
• S be the set of agents, |S| = n.
Define two bijections h, s by:
h : {1, . . . , m} → H whereas k 7→ hk ,
s : {1, . . . , n} → H whereas i 7→ si .
We order H and S by
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hk > hk′ ⇔ k > k
′ ,
si > si′ ⇔ i > i
′ ,
and restrict ourselves to use the indices k, l or k′, l′ exclusively for firms and i, j or
i′, j ′ for agents. We use the simpler notation, k for a firm and i for an agent, whenever
misunderstandings are impossible. In examples we use the notation hk, hk′ and si, si′
to facilitate the identification of firms and agents, if confusions are possible.1 Let
• κk ∈ N be the number of jobs in firm k ∈ H.
2 Each firm may have a different
number of jobs to fill. Adding κ1, . . . , κm, we get the total number of available
jobs,
∑m
k=1 κk = κ. The total number of jobs equals the total number of
agents, κ = n.
We suppose that the total number of jobs and the total number of agents is equal
to concentrate on the main objectives and to facilitate the analysis. All jobs will be
filled, and all participating firms have at least one open job. Let
• Cq := {C ⊆ S | |C| = q} with 0 ≤ q ≤ |S| be the set of subsets of S with q
agents. Each C ∈ Cq is called a q-clique. We simply use the term clique, if we
do not specify the size of the subsets.
• C−iq−1 := {C ⊆ S | |C| = q − 1, i /∈ C} be the set of subsets with q − 1 agents
and without agent i ∈ S. We call C ∈ C−iq−1 colleagues of agent i. For q = 1,
we have C−iq−1 = {∅}.
• bi := (k, C) with k ∈ H and C ∈ C
−i
κk−1
be a bundle of agent i and BSi :=
∪mk=1{(k, C) | C ∈ C
−i
κk−1
} be the set of all bundles of agent i with bi ∈ B
S
i .
• every agent i have a strict preference relation Si on B
S
i induced by 
S
i , that
is transitive and total3 (if bi 6= b
′
i then either bi 
S
i b
′
i or b
′
i 
S
i bi, but not
1This mainly occurs in Chapter 4.
2We use N = {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
3which implies completeness
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both). Si is sometimes called linear ordering. We write 
S = (S1 , . . . ,
S
n)
as preference profile, PSi denotes the set of all possible preference profiles of
agent i, for all i ∈ S. And we denote the set of all possible preference profiles
with PS = PS1 × . . .× P
S
n .
• the firms be indifferent about their future employees.
Any κk-clique can work for firm k. But if κl = κk, for l, k ∈ H, a κk-clique can
work for firm l as well. Only the size of the cliques is important. There are
(
n
q
)
different q-cliques. A firm can only employ as many agents as it has disposable jobs.
Consequently, all cliques of size q can work for firms that offer q jobs.
The agents’ preference ordering is restricted to the bundles consisting of a firm and of
colleagues. We cannot derive the agents’ preferences over bundles from preferences
over firms on the one hand or from preferences over colleagues on the other hand.
The reason for that is dependency between the components of the bundles, a firm
and the colleagues. What do we mean by dependency? If an agent preferred a
bundle with firm k to a bundle with firm l irrespective of the colleagues within the
bundles, then we could partly derive the strict preferences over the bundles from the
preferences over the firms.4 Obviously, these considerations tend to a lexicographic
structure, but first we have chosen a more general case. Agents have preferences over
bundles. No restrictions are made. Nevertheless, we will later discuss lexicographic
preferences, as well for which a detailed justification is given in the corresponding
Subsection 2.2.2.
Agents face a set of different firms and the diversification even increases, if the firms
are combined with colleagues. On the other hand, we assume firms to be indifferent.
One possible interpretation of this scenario is the following. A firm simply “takes
who it gets”. We have exactly one job for each agent. So, if finally an agent is the
4The same would be true, if an agent preferred the bundle with clique C to the bundle with
clique C ′ irrespective of the firms within the bundles.
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only candidate for a job, he gets it. Implicitly, we assume that it is always better
for a firm to have a job filled no matter with whom.
Specific situations lead to other interpretations of this model given in the following.5
Agents are identified with citizens looking forward to live in a city together with
other citizens. The capacity of housing in each city is limited, κk for city k. Now,
agents have preferences over the cities, they would like to live in, and over the agents
(neighbors), they would like to live with in the city. However, the cities themselves
are indifferent between all possible groups of citizens.
Thirdly, we have a number of different projects in a firm and a set of employees,
having preferences over the projects and the colleagues they will work with in the
project.6 Again projects are indifferent in respect of the agents’ composition.
These are only three possible scenarios, we have in mind with our model. To facilitate
formulations and with regard to the extensions of the model, we will only use the
firm-agent interpretation which is the most common one in economic literature.
Remark 2.1.1
If κk = 1 for each k ∈ H, agents do not have preferences over colleagues because each
firm only has one job to fill. We are in the classical one-to-one matching context and
we can apply the classical results as discussed, for example in Roth & Sotomayor
(1990).
To collect the components, we have established until now, we describe our job market
(for agents) by the tuple
ΥS = (H, S, (κk)k∈H ,
S).
Next, we give some simple examples for how the agents’ preferences look like. In
the first example, all firms have the same amount of jobs to fill. Then we construct
5The author would like to thank Mark J. Machina and other participants of the First Illinois
Workshop on Economic Theory 2003 for helpful comments.
6The author thanks Matthias G. Raith for pointing to this interpretation.
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an example which brings us back to a classical one-to-one matching model. The
third example describes the most general case. Each firm offers a different number
of jobs.
Example 2.1.2
Let H = {h1, h2} with κ1 = κ2 = 2 and S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}. The agents’ preferences
can be described in the following way.
(h1, {s2}) 
S
1 (h1, {s3}) 
S
1 (h2, {s2}) 
S
1 (h1, {s4}) 
S
1 (h2, {s3}) 
S
1 (h2, {s4})
(h2, {s4}) 
S
2 (h2, {s1}) 
S
2 (h1, {s4}) 
S
2 (h2, {s3}) 
S
2 (h1, {s1}) 
S
2 (h1, {s3})
(h2, {s4}) 
S
3 (h2, {s2}) 
S
3 (h2, {s1}) 
S
3 (h1, {s2}) 
S
3 (h1, {s1}) 
S
3 (h1, {s4})
(h2, {s3}) 
S
4 (h2, {s2}) 
S
4 (h2, {s1}) 
S
4 (h1, {s3}) 
S
4 (h1, {s2}) 
S
4 (h1, {s1}). 2
Example 2.1.3
H = {h1, h2, h3, h4}, κk = 1 for all k ∈ H, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}. Agents have strict
preferences over firms. Each firm only has one job to fill. This leads to the former
context of the classical marriage market problem and can be easily resolved by the
deferred acceptance procedure given in Gale & Shapley (1962). 2
Example 2.1.4
Let H = {h1, h2} with κ1 = 1, κ2 = 3 and S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}. The agents’ prefer-
ences are given by:
(h2, {s2, s3}) 
S
1 (h2, {s3, s4}) 
S
1 (h1, ∅) 
S
1 (h2, {s2, s4})
(h2, {s1, s4}) 
S
2 (h1, ∅) 
S
2 (h2, {s3, s4}) 
S
2 (h2, {s1, s3})
(h2, {s1, s4}) 
S
3 (h2, {s2, s4}) 
S
3 (h1, ∅) 
S
3 (h2, {s1, s2})
(h1, ∅) 
S
4 (h2, {s2, s3}) 
S
4 (h2, {s1, s2}) 
S
4 (h2, {s1, s3}). 2
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Definition 2.1.5 (Matching)
A mapping µ : S → H is called a matching, if for all k ∈ H we have µ−1(k) ∈ Cκk .
7
Therefore, we define Cµ,k := µ
−1(k) as the κk-clique under µ for firm k ∈ H. An
alternative description of the matching µ is Mµ = (Cµ,1, . . . , Cµ,m). All matchings
are given by M := {Mµ | µ is a matching}. Respectively, we define C
−i
κµ(i)−1
3
C−i
µ,µ(i) := Cµ,µ(i) \ {i}.
Each agent i is assigned to exactly one firm k. There exists a job for each agent,
because κ = n and each agent can only work for one firm. The mapping µ is
surjective. Only if each firm has one job to fill, hence κk = 1 for all k ∈ H, we get
a bijective mapping. If so, we have m = n. A matching generates a partition of
S. The pre-image of each firm k contains exactly as many agents as the firm has
available jobs, namely κk.
If we have cliques (C1, . . . , Cm) with the properties
Ck ∈ Cκk ∀ k ∈ H ,(2.1)
Ck ∩ Cl = ∅ ∀ k, l ∈ H, k 6= l ,(2.2)
then this also describes a matching µ (which is implicitly given by Ck = µ
−1(k))
Clearly for any job market a matching exists. One possible matching is given by
C1 = {s1, . . . , sκ1}, . . . , Cm = {s(Pm−1
k=1 κk)+1
, . . . , s(Pm−1
k=1 κk)+κm
}.
One may wonder why we have not chosen the more common definition of many-to-
one matchings given in Roth & Sotomayor (1990). The simple answer is, it does
not precisely fit into our model. Their definition of a matching describes a function
from the set H ∪ S into the set of unordered families of elements of H ∪ S. We
mainly focus on the fact that agents are matched to firms. Of course, firms are
also matched to agents, but we neglect this aspect in the basic model, because as
already mentioned we are more interested on the agents’ side, first. Furthermore,
7With a slight abuse of notation, we write µ−1(k) instead of µ−1({k}) as µ−1 is defined on
subsets of H .
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the traditional definition of matchings admits that an agent may not get a job and a
firms’ position may remain unfilled. Up to now, we have excluded these alternatives.
We do not admit unfilled positions, if there are still agents without a job on the
market.
Remark 2.1.6
Given our strict preference relation Si on B
S
i , we can deduce (weak) preferences
over matchings M, M ′ ∈ M. A matching M is strictly preferred to M ′ by agent i, if
and only if agent i strictly prefers the firm and the colleagues, he is matched with in
M . But agent i is indifferent between two matchings, if he always works in the same
firm together with the same colleagues, regardless of which matching, M or M ′,
is given. The formal description is: Let M(Si ) be the preference relation derived
from the agents’ preferences Si on B
S
i by M MP (
S
i ) M
′ if and only if bi 
S
i b
′
i and
M MI(
S
i ) M
′ if and only if bi = b
′
i. Denote by MP (
S
i ) and MI(
S
i ) its strict and
indifferent component. Agent i gets the bundle bi if we face the matching M .
8 We
write bi = (µ(i), C
−i
µ,µ(i)) where µ is another description of M .
Next, we discuss how the agents’ preferences can be represented. We do not follow
the usual description of utility functions, even if the concept of ordinality holds in our
description as well. Our interest mainly focuses on the positions of the bundles. We
want to know whether a bundle is the first, the second or the tenth most preferred
one. Therefore, we introduce a ranking function for agents. The motivation for this
becomes completely evident when we introduce desirable properties of matchings in
Section 2.2.
Definition 2.1.7 (Agents’ Ranking Function)
A mapping vSi : B
S
i → {1, . . . , |B
S
i |} with v
S
i (bi) > v
S
i (b
′
i), if and only if bi 
S
i b
′
i,
is an agent’s ranking function for each i ∈ S. vSi (bi) is called the rank of bi with
bi ∈ B
S
i .
8b′i if we face the matching M
′.
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Given the agents’ preferences, we assume a decreasing order of bundles. The number
of different bundles is the same for all agents. Each agent faces
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
bundles.
Now, the agents’ ranking function assigns downward counting. The most preferred
bundle of each agent, denoted by b
(1)
i , is assigned to
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
= |BSi |, the second
most, b
(2)
i , to
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
− 1 = |BSi | − 1 and so on. The least preferred bundle,
b
(|BSi |)
i , is assigned to 1. Therefore, all agents have exactly the same codomain. We
deal with a joint normalization. Typically, the agents’ ranking functions themselves
are not identical.
Thus, the basic model is described. Firms have a given number of jobs to fill. Agents
have preferences over bundles, each consisting of a firm and colleagues. Groups of
agents, working for firms, are defined, and matchings deliver job distributions.
The reader may also suspect that some matchings are “better” than others. In this
context, better may be measured in ranks. If an agent’s ranking function maps all
agents’ bundles onto their highest rank, hence their most preferred bundle, this is
for sure a ”better” matching for all agents than a matching where all agents get
their lowest rank. But this is only a first vague trial to distinguish matchings. In
the next section, we introduce a couple of desirable properties for matchings in more
detail.
2.2 Properties
Given the set of all matchings, some may appear to be ”better” or ”more desirable”
than others. However, this is a vague description, hard to quantify or analyze.
Therefore in this section, we introduce several properties which seem to be reasonable
requirements to qualify a matching ”more desirable” than one which does not satisfy
one of these properties at all. After having defined a property, we check its existence
as well. The ”most plausible” property becomes questionable, if there is no matching
satisfying it.
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In the second subsection, we focus on agents’ preferences. Having a short look on
a real job market, agents first take their choice, concerning a firm for which they
would like to work. Then they care about their potential colleagues. Therefore,
we introduce lexicographic preferences.9 A consequence of this natural restriction is
that we get an appealing existence result.
2.2.1 Properties of Matchings
Definition 2.2.1 (Pareto Efficiency)
A matching M ∈ M is Pareto efficient, if there is no other matching M ′ ∈ M, in
which no agent is worse off and at least one agent is strictly better off in the sense
of Remark 2.1.6.
This is the standard definition of Pareto efficiency. Consider a Pareto efficient
matching. If an agent i ∈ S resigns from his job in firm k ∈ H and he accepts a
job in another firm l ∈ H, the only reason to do this is with prospect of a higher
rank. The action has two consequences. First, another agent j ∈ S in firm l ∈ H
will lose his job. And second, the cliques in firm k ∈ H and l ∈ H are changing.
We assume the jobless agent may take the unfilled job in firm k ∈ H. Anyway, it is
the only job still available on the market. Since we deal with a matching, satisfying
Pareto efficiency, either one of the agents in the clique of firm l or in the clique of
firm l, except agent i, will get a lower rank than he had before. Thus, agent i ∈ S
deteriorated at least one other agent’s rank, by improving its own one. This holds
for all agents who deviate from a Pareto efficient matching.
Note that the definition of Pareto efficiency is a notion of ”agent Pareto efficiency”,
since the firms’ preferences do not enter the model for the moment.
Theorem 2.2.2
There always exists a Pareto efficient matching M ∈ M.
9Dutta & Masso (1997) already describe this restriction on preferences in their paper.
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Proof: The number of matchings on the job market for agents is finite. So, the num-
ber of possible Pareto improvements is also finite, consequently, a Pareto efficient
matching always exists. 2
Pareto efficiency is often an essential requirement for economic outcomes. It basically
provides an indication of the desirability of an outcome. Given a Pareto efficient
outcome (in our context a matching), we do not waste resources (ranks).
Definition 2.2.3 (Agent-max-min)
A matching M¯ ∈ M fulfills the agent-max-min property, if
M¯ ∈ argmax
Mµ∈M
min
i∈S
vSi (µ(i), C
−i
µ,µ(i)).
We take an arbitrary matching. Within this matching, we take the minimal rank
of all agents’ ranks vSi (µ(i), C
−i
µ,µ(i)). An agent i ∈ S with the lowest rank gets a
less preferred bundle, compared to what the others get. Now, we determine the
minimal rank for all matchings. Hence we get a set, consisting of all minimal ranks
of all matchings. From this, we take the maximal rank10. This maximal rank
corresponds to the set of matchings, which possess the agent-max-min property. In
other words, the set of matchings, satisfying the agent-max-min property, contains
those matchings, in which the agents with the worst position get the best position,
compared to all other agents who get the worst position in the remaining matchings.
Therefore, the assumption that all agents face the same range of the ranking function
is crucial. The agent-max-min property requires that interpersonal comparisons of
preferences are possible. The most preferred bundle is assigned to the same rank
by all agents, the second most preferred and so on. The agent-max-min property
becomes meaningless, if agents have the same rank e.g. for one’s most preferred and
one’s least preferred bundle. Basically, what we intend to compare is not the rank
itself, it is the fact whether an agent gets his first second and so on most preferred
10The solution does not have to be unique. Of course, the same holds for the minimal rank.
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bundle.
The motivation for this property is to treat agents as equal as possible, regarding the
ranks they get. For this concept see also Rawls’s (1999) theory of justice. Assume
in a matching M ∈ M agents in some cliques get their highest rank whereas others
get their lowest rank. At the same time in another matching M ′ ∈ M all agents
get their second most preferred bundle. Then the matching M ′ is ”better” than
the matching M , according to the agent-max-min property, because the agents with
their worst rank in M ′ get a higher rank than the agents with the worst rank in M .
One may think within a matching, the agent-max-min property searches to minimize
the gap between the “best and the worst”, but this is not the case. We take two
matchings, M˜ and M¯ , whereas in M˜ all agents are matched with their most preferred
firm and agents and in M¯ all agents are matched with their less preferred firm and
colleagues. In both matchings the gap, regarding the agents’ rank, is zero. Thus, we
can not state a difference, regarding this. But taking the agent-max-min property
into account, we can clearly determine that M˜ is “better” than M¯ .
We can restrict the agent-max-min property to cliques as well, therefore it becomes a
local property. Here, we only focus on cliques in any firm. This is formally described
by the next definition.
Definition 2.2.4 (Clique-max-min)
A κk-clique C¯ ∈ Cκk fulfills the clique-max-min property for firm k ∈ H, if
C¯ ∈ argmax
C∈Cκk
min
i∈C
vSi (k, C \ {i}).
We take an arbitrary clique C ∈ Cκk . Within this κk-clique, we take the minimal
rank over all agents’ ranks who are elements/members of the clique. This has to be
done for all cliques of size κk. Hence, we get a set of ranks consisting of all minimal
ranks of all κk-cliques. Now, we take the maximal rank over the minimal ranks.
That maximal rank corresponds to a set of κk-cliques
11. This set of κk-cliques for
11Obviously, this set of κk-cliques may consist of one element only.
31
2.2. PROPERTIES THE BASIC MODEL
firm k ∈ H fulfills the clique-max-min property. Thus, the agents with the worst
position in a κk-clique for firm k ∈ H get the best position, compared to all other
agents who get the worst position in the remaining κk-cliques.
Another observation is that the same clique may correspond to different matchings,
hence Cµ,k = Cµˆ,k. This does not matter for the determination of the set of cliques
satisfying the clique-max-min property for a firm k. If two firms offer the same
number of jobs, then they face the same cliques as well. Thus, the set of cliques,
satisfying the clique-max-min property, will also be identical.
Comparing the agent-max-min property with the clique-max-min property, we note
that the first one is a condition for matchings, it focuses on all firms. The second
one is a condition for cliques, it focuses on one firm only. Take a matching where
all agents get their highest rank. It satisfies the agent-max-min property as well as
the clique-max-min property for each clique in the matching. But the next example
shows that neither the agent-max-min property nor the clique-max-min property
has to imply the satisfaction of the other.
Example 2.2.5
Let H = {h1, h2} with κ1 = κ2 = 2 and S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}. The agents’ preferences
can be described in the following way.
(h1, {s2}) 
S
1 (h2, {s3}) 
S
1 (h1, {s4}) 
S
1 (h1, {s3}) 
S
1 (h2, {s2}) 
S
1 (h2, {s4})
(h1, {s1}) 
S
2 (h1, {s4}) 
S
2 (h2, {s3}) 
S
2 (h2, {s1}) 
S
2 (h1, {s3}) 
S
2 (h2, {s4})
(h2, {s4}) 
S
3 (h2, {s1}) 
S
3 (h2, {s2}) 
S
3 (h1, {s4}) 
S
3 (h1, {s1}) 
S
3 (h1, {s2})
(h1, {s3}) 
S
4 (h2, {s1}) 
S
4 (h1, {s1}) 
S
4 (h2, {s3}) 
S
4 (h1, {s2}) 
S
4 (h2, {s2}).
The matching M = ({s1, s4}, {s2, s3}) satisfies the agent-max-min property. Fur-
thermore, let µ˜ and µˆ be two other matchings, whereas the cliques Cµ˜,1 = {s1, s2}
and Cµˆ,2 = {s1, s3} satisfy the clique-max-min property for firm 1 and firm 2, re-
spectively. The cliques do not have to be disjoint, because they belong to different
matchings.
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Comparing both, we observe that the agents in matching M , satisfying the agent-
max-min property, have lower ranks than the agents in the cliques, Cµ˜,1 and Cµˆ,2,
satisfying the clique-max-min property. Furthermore, the agent-max-min property
and the clique-max-min property are not satisfied simultaneously. The cliques, satis-
fying the clique-max-min property, correspond to the matchings, Mµ˜ and Mµˆ which
are both different compared to M . 2
Our next property, stability, is often discussed in different contexts of matching
models. We will analyze the notion of stability more precisely. Gale & Shapley
(1962) proved the existence of a stable matching for every marriage market. In
their context, a matching is stable if it is not blocked12 by any individual or any
pair of agents (a man and a woman). However, this notion of stability is no longer
appropriate in our context for several reasons. First of all, we have only taken the
agents side into account so far. Firms do not play an active role at the moment, in
the sense that our notion of blocking will only deal with pairs of agents. Then, in
the marriage market model, women only have preferences over men. In our model
agents have preferences over firms and colleagues. Therefore, we consider another,
more appropriate notion of stability which also seems to be more intuitive in our
framework.
Consider a matching M ∈ M, otherwise described by µ. A matching is ta-blocked
- blocked by trade among agents - by two agents (i, j) with i ∈ Cµ,k and j ∈ Cµ,l,
if both get a higher rank by exchanging their jobs. So, agent i prefers to work
in firm l together with the remaining agents13 as well as agent j prefers to work
with the remaining agents in firm k. In exchanging their jobs, they both improve
their situations, i.e. they get a higher rank. This should be excluded in ta-stable
matchings.
12Consider two disjoint sets (same size), e.g. set of women and a set of men and a matching. If
a woman and a man are not matched to one another in this matching, but they prefer each other
to their assignments, they will block the matching (see also Roth & Sotomayor (1990), p. 21).
13Agent j does not have a job in firm l any longer.
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Definition 2.2.6 (ta-Stability)
A matching is ta-stable, if it is not ta-blocked by any pair of two agents working in
different firms14.
ta-stability seems to be an intuitive requirement. A matching does not persist very
long, if two agents can improve their ranks by deviating, i.e. by forming a ta-blocking
coalition.
The concept of ta-stability only focuses on the ta-blocking coalition. If two agents
exchange their jobs on the one hand another matching is generated and on the
other hand, they influence the other agents’ outcomes working in the two firms.
Consequently, there may be again two agents who will ta-block the matching. This
may continue infinitely often, of course the same matchings will reappear again and
again, because of the finiteness of the set of matchings. This observation leads us
to the next theorem.
Theorem 2.2.7
For any preference profile S∈ PS there does not always exist a ta-stable matching.
The proof of Theorem 2.2.7 is given by Example 2.2.8. Furthermore, we use the
opportunity to illustrate the matchings satisfying Pareto efficiency.15
Example 2.2.8
Let H = {h1, h2} with κ1 = κ2 = 2 and S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} with their preferences.
(h1, {s3}) 
S
1 (h2, {s4}) 
S
1 (h2, {s3}) 
S
1 (h1, {s4}) 
S
1 (h1, {s2}) 
S
1 (h2, {s2})
(h2, {s4}) 
S
2 (h1, {s3}) 
S
2 (h1, {s4}) 
S
2 (h2, {s3}) 
S
2 (h1, {s1}) 
S
2 (h2, {s1})
(h2, {s2}) 
S
3 (h1, {s1}) 
S
3 (h1, {s2}) 
S
3 (h2, {s1}) 
S
3 (h2, {s4}) 
S
3 (h1, {s4})
(h1, {s1}) 
S
4 (h2, {s2}) 
S
4 (h2, {s1}) 
S
4 (h1, {s2}) 
S
4 (h2, {s3}) 
S
4 (h1, {s3}).
We start with an arbitrary matching, let us say M1 = ({s1, s4}, {s2, s3}). This
14Of course, exchanging jobs in the same firm does not change their ranks at all.
15We already illustrated the max-min properties in the former example.
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will be ta-blocked by the agents (s1, s2), agent s1 prefers the bundle (h2, {s3}) and
agent s2 prefers the bundle (h1, {s4}) they will exchange their positions. We obtain
the matching M2 = ({s2, s4}, {s1, s3}) which again will be ta-blocked (this time, by
(s3, s4)) and we get M3 = ({s2, s3}, {s1, s4}). Now, this matching is not ta-stable
because the pair of agents (s1, s2) will deviate, and we get M4 = ({s1, s3}, {s2, s4}).
Finally, we come back to M1, since (s3, s4) will ta-block. We created a cycle that
certainly does not contain a ta-stable matching. We still have to verify the two
remaining matchings. M5 = ({s1, s2}, {s3, s4}) and M6 = ({s3, s4}, {s1, s2}). Both
will be ta-blocked. For the first one the agents (s1, s4) can profitably deviate and
for the second one (s1, s3) will exchange their positions. This is an example for
non-existence of a ta-stable matching.
Nevertheless, we have two Pareto efficient matchings, viz M1, M4. 2
Let us summarize our results. We have introduced several useful properties which
allow us to differentiate between matchings such that we can e.g. say: This matching
satisfies this or that property. We still have some problems with ta-stability, because
we cannot guarantee existence, yet. In this context, the next question arises. Do
we deal with a realistic assumption, if two agents can exchange their positions as
often as they like, because of the general structure of the preferences? The answer
is clearly, no, because no firm will hire and dismiss employees ten times, on the one
hand. On the other hand, there exist possible restrictions on preferences that can
be justified. These considerations are discussed in the next subsection.
2.2.2 Lexicographic Preferences
It may be more significant to deal with results based on the most general form of
preferences. But on the other hand one may ask whether this general form is an
appropriate representation in our model. In the real world first of all, each agent
cares about getting a job and then about the colleagues, he will be matched with.
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Nobody will reject a job in his most preferred firm, because of his future colleagues.
We take Dutta & Masso’s (1997) restriction on the agents’ preferences. They call
the agents’ preferences lexicographic, if it is possible to extract preferences over the
set of firms.
Definition 2.2.9 (Lexicographic Preferences)
Agent i’s preference relation Si ∈ P
S
i is called lexicographic, if there is a strict
ordering H(Si ) on H such that for all (k, C) ∈ H ×C
−i
κk−1
, (l, C ′) ∈ H ×C−iκl−1,
(k, C) Si (l, C
′) ⇔ k H(Si ) l (k 6= l).
We now have strict lexicographic preferences. The agents’ priority lies on the choice
of the firms, only then they focus on their future colleagues. There is his most
preferred firm, his second most preferred firm and so on. Within a firm, agents can
state as well, which of two bundles they prefer, because of the underlying preference
structure on BSi . Note, that in different firms an agent may rank the bundles with
the same cliques differently.
Let P lexi denote the set of all possible lexicographic preference profiles of agent i, for
all i ∈ S. And we denote the set of all possible lexicographic preference profiles with
P lex = P lex1 × . . .× P
lex
n .
One consequence of lexicographic preferences now is that, if two agents ta-block a
matching, each one leaves the firm and starts to work in another one, no one will ever
reapply in the former one, because all combinations of bundles containing the former
firm, he originally worked for, will be a deterioration for the agent. Therefore, we
restart our analysis of existence of ta-stability, given the assumption of lexicographic
preferences.
Theorem 2.2.10
If all agents have lexicographic preferences, then a ta-stable matching exists.
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Proof: Assume each matching M ∈ M is ta-blocked. Since the set of matchings is
finite, there exists a cycle such that ta-blocking never ends. We denote the set of
matchings generating a cycle by Z. Let M, M ′, M ′′ ∈ Z be the matchings in the
cycle. Now, i is an agent who ta-blocks M together with another one. We get a
matching M ′, whereas M ′ MP (
S
i ) M . In analyzing M
′, we get either i is again an
element of the blocking pair, then M ′′ MP (
S
i )M
′ MP (
S
i ) M or i is no element of
the blocking pair, nevertheless, M ′′ MP (
S
i ) M . Because of the lexicographic prefer-
ences, each matching in the sequence will improve agent i (at least not deteriorate).
Since M ∈ Z, we come back to M after finitely many steps. So M MP (
S
i ) M . This
is a contradiction. Consequently, there always exists a ta-stable matching. 2
In this section, we have introduced an intuitive restriction to the agents’ preferences.
And given this restriction, ta-stability can always be guaranteed. In the next section
we give a precise description of the construction of a set of matchings.
2.3 Selection of Matchings
In this section, we develop a new graph theoretic representation, how to determine
a set of matchings in our specific framework after finitely many steps. The basic
motivation clearly is the fact that we are looking for a distinct illustration of the
procedures, which we introduce in the second subsection. A graph theoretic repre-
sentation seems to be a natural one.
Knuth (1976) introduced the analysis of algorithms on the basis of the formation of
stable matchings. Balinski & Ratier (1997) and Balinski & Ratier (1998) first had
the idea to illustrate the marriage problem in form of directed graphs. The main
purpose of their papers is to propose another approach via directed graphs. For
a short informal introduction in their reduction algorithm see Section B.0.2. The
authors also compare the reduction algorithm with the deferred acceptance proce-
dure (for a brief introduction see this time Section B.0.1). Therefore, we refer the
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interested reader to Balinski & Ratier (1997).
Our construction of graphs does not possess many similarities unless the fact that
preferences are indicated by directed edges. They only face one directed graph,
whereas we will construct several directed graphs in each firm. They deal with
men’s (women’s) preferences over women (men). Our agents do not only have pref-
erences over firms, but also over other agents. This will be also taken into account
in the graph theoretic representation. Furthermore, we only take the men’s prefer-
ences into account. There are many other differences. Therefore, we think it is more
appropriate to construct our own formal representation.
Before we enter into the subsections, we want to explain our comprehension of pro-
cedures. The notion is not well defined in the literature, yet. In the model we
search for matchings. In a procedure this will be done iteratively, round by round.
Depending on the given rules of a procedure, agents act in each round. Between
two rounds a central planner checks, whether the procedure stops or continues. We
face a progression of rounds that stops, if a matching is reached. But this is only
a more or less technical description, it still does not explain why an agent should
prefer to participate on the determination of matchings via our procedures instead
of any other way to be matched with a firm and colleagues. The main motivation
is the fact that in each step the agents’ interests are kept. We can state even more,
a step is determined by the agents’ belongings. Next at any time it is easy for each
agent to understand, why the procedure continues or stops. For two of our three
procedures in this chapter, we even have a graph theoretic representation which
further illuminates the course of action.
In the first subsection, we introduce the definitions and the general constructions of
our directed graphs. The second subsection introduces three different procedures to
determine a set of matchings. According to the former graph theoretic description,
we now define when and in which order the edges emerge in the graphs for the first
and the second procedure. Therefore, the agents’ preferences come into play. One
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may think of a central planer who collects all the information and, according to the
rules of the procedure, a set of matchings is selected. First, we focus more on the
technical description of the procedures, but an economic motivation follows.
2.3.1 Graph Theoretic Representation
Before we enter into the formal description, we want to give an informal introduction
to the main idea of our graph theoretic representation.
For each firm we construct directed graphs. The vertices are subsets of the set of
agents. Roughly, the edges in a firm correspond to the agents’ bundles. What does
this mean? One could imagine all agents assembled in one room, they talk to each
other. According to different bundles, within these conversations each agent asks
other agents whether they would like to work with him in this or that firm. These
informal invitations for joint work will be reflected in directed graphs by directed
edges. A bundle contains the information in which firm which edges are given.
Definition 2.3.1 (Directed Graph)
A directed graph is a pair G = (V, E) of (finite) sets. V represents the set of vertices
and E ⊆ V × V is the set of directed edges.
Each edge (v, v′) = e ∈ E has a starting vertex in V and an ending vertex in V . A
directed edge with the same starting and ending vertex is called a loop. Formally,
the set of loops is given by DV := {(v, v) | v ∈ V }.
Definition 2.3.2 (Complete)
A directed graph G = (V, E) is called complete with or without loops, if E = V ×V
or E = V × V \DV , respectively.
This is the most general description of directed graphs, loops and completeness.
Coming back to our basic model, we identify a set of vertices in a directed graph G
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with the agents in a κk-clique, hence, V = C ∈ Cκk. The set of edges is given by
Ek,C ⊆ C×C. Since each edge reveals an agent’s informal invitation for joint work,
Ek,C = C×C implies all possible informal invitations in a κk-clique C ∈ Cκk . Thus,
we summarize a directed graph in firm k by Gk,C = (C, Ek,C). The vertices in a
directed graph in firm k are always fix. Only the set of edges Ek,C is flexible in each
directed graph. One combinatorial remark, we have
(
n
κk
)
different directed graphs
in a firm k. Note that a directed edge corresponds to different directed graphs. An
agent may have the same colleague in different κk-cliques. We continue with some
more notation. Gk = (Gk,C)C∈Cκk with k ∈ H is a collection of directed graphs in
firm k and Gk is the set of all such collections of directed graphs in firm k. And
finally, G = (G1, . . . , Gm) ∈ G is one family of directed graphs. We denote by G the
set of all such families of directed graphs.
Now, we have directed graphs on the one hand and bundles on the other hand.
Formally, we have to introduce how bundles are transformed into edges in the cor-
responding firms. This will be done in the next two definitions and illustrated in
an example. Furthermore, we will explain in more detail the idea of an informal
invitation.
Definition 2.3.3 (Transformation)
Let Eik,C = {(v, v
′) ∈ Ek,C | v = i} be the set of edges in firm k and in graph
Gk,C = (C, Ek,C), C ∈ Cκk with the initial vertex i. A mapping
16
tri : H ×C
−i
κk−1
→ H × PEik,C
(k, C) 7→ tri(k, C) = (k, {(i, i1), . . . , (i, iκk−1)}) i ∈ S
transforms a bundle bi (with C = {i1, . . . , iκk−1}) into edges in the corresponding
directed graph.
16PEik,C denotes the power set of E
i
k,C .
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There exists only one directed graph in firm k with the edges (i, i1), . . . , (i, iκk−1).
The order of the edges in the image of the mapping does not matter.
Definition 2.3.4 (Projection)
Let proj : H × PEik,C → PE
i
k,C with tri(k, C) 7→ proj (tri(k, C)) =
{(i, i1), . . . , (i, iκk−1)} (with C = {i1, . . . , iκk−1}) be the projection on PE
i
k,C which
“cuts” H.
So, we are now able to represent each bundle of any agent in a corresponding directed
graph in form of directed edges. The next example illustrates this representation of
bundles.
Example 2.3.5
Firm 1 has four open jobs to fill. We take the following bundles of four agents17,
b1 = (1, {2, 3, 4}), b2 = (1, {1, 3, 4}), b3 = (1, {1, 2, 4}) b4 = (1, {1, 2, 3}) and we
apply the transformation function and the projection function:
tr1(1, {2, 3, 4}) = (1, {(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4)})
tr2(1, {1, 3, 4}) = (1, {(2, 1), (2, 3), (2, 4)})
tr3(1, {1, 2, 4}) = (1, {(3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 4)})
tr4(1, {1, 2, 3}) = (1, {(4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3)})
proj(tr1(1, {2, 3, 4})) = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4)}
proj(tr2(1, {1, 3, 4})) = {(2, 1), (2, 3), (2, 4)}
proj(tr3(1, {1, 2, 4})) = {(3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 4)}
proj(tr4(1, {1, 2, 3})) = {(4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3)}.
The corresponding directed graph
in firm 1 is: G1,{1,2,3,4}
1 2
3 4
Each agent’s bundle is illustrated in the graph. We face a complete directed graph
without loops in firm 1. 2
17We neglect the complete representation of the agents’ preferences, the total number of firms
and so on, because they are not relevant for the purpose of the example.
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As we already indicated at the beginning of this subsection, agents approach each
other and distribute informal invitations for joint work. They signal with whom
they would like to constitute a κk-clique. No affirmative nor negative answer is
expected. Agents simply reveal their interest for joint work with others. Therefore,
we introduce questions and offers before we continue with the next subsection.
A Question
We identify each directed edge (i, ij) with a question of agent i for joint work. Agent
i asks agent ij whether he would like to work with him in the corresponding κk-clique
C ∈ Cκk . The same question may belong to different cliques. It is ambiguous. If
κk − 1 = 0, then the firm k only has one open job. An agent can only ask trivially
himself for joint work. Hence, a directed edge (i, i) is a loop. In Example 2.3.5 we
see that e.g. agent 2 asks agent 1, agent 3 and agent 4 for joint work in firm 1.
An Offer
Given one agent’s bundle bi which we transform into edges, we identify all these
directed edges with an offer of agent i. An offer is the union of agent i’s κk − 1
single questions for joint work in firm k. If κk − 1 = 0 or κk − 1 = 1 questioning
himself or questioning only one other agent coincides with an offer. One and the
same question belongs to different offers, if κk − 1 ≥ 2. Thus, the same colleague
can be asked more than once for joint work.
We have introduced a number of new definitions and terms, but until now, the
reader may miss the connection between one another. What does complete graphs
have to do with questions or offers? Let us take a firm and let Gk,C = (C, Ek,C) be
a complete graph. Focusing on any agent within this graph, each edge (i, ·) ∈ Ek,C
can be interpreted as a question. Agent i can only ask κk − 1 agents for joint work.
These κk− 1 questions form an offer, and we have a κk-clique in firm k, if all agents
within this clique made their offers in this κk-clique in firm k. Thus, each agent
asked his κk − 1 questions and he got exactly κk − 1 counter questions, one for each
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question he asked. Hence, a bundle is interpreted as an offer and all offers in a
complete directed graph in a firm k constitute a κk-clique.
We have introduced some basic graph theoretic terminology. Furthermore, we have
established a graph theoretic representation of the bundles on the one hand and the
meaning of directed edges on the other hand. Thus, we now have the basic tools to
deliver a formal description of two of our three procedures in the next subsection.
2.3.2 The Procedures
This subsection focuses on a description of three procedures. We assume each agent
knows the procedure that will be applied and agrees on participating.
We identify a procedure with an outcome correspondence (for agents). More pre-
cisely, we have g : PS ⇒M with (S1 , . . . ,
S
n) 7−→ g(
S
1 , . . . ,
S
n). The correspon-
dence g selects for each vector of n agents’ preferences a set of matchings. This set
will be called the solution of a procedure. We describe the course of action from a
given preference profile to obtaining a matching as a sequence of families of directed
graphs in the first procedure and in the second procedure. As we have seen in the
former subsection, each element Gk ∈ G of a family of directed graphs, G ∈ G,
contains a collection of directed graphs in a firm k. Roughly speaking, each family
of directed graphs is identified with a round r in the procedure and the family of
directed graphs in round r is related to the family of directed graphs in round r +1.
However, the graph theoretic representation is not appropriate for the third one,
but we also face different rounds, before the solution is established.
For each procedure, except the third one, we first deliver an intuitive and then a
formal description. The third procedure goes without much formalism equally well.
Each procedure selects cliques for the m firms in a different manner and, conse-
quently, the solutions of the procedures may be different, too. Furthermore, the
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point of time18, at which the procedures stop may also be different. Each procedure
stops, if a set of matchings is selected. We also show that each procedure leads to a
solution.
Procedure 1a (P1a)
1. All agents, i ∈ S, state their preferences Si ∈ P
S
i on B
S
i .
2. Each agent i takes his most preferred bundle b
(r)
i , k ∈ H, C ∈ C
−i
κk−1
among
those, he has not selected, yet, and makes an offer in C, i.e. asks the agents
j ∈ C for joint work in firm k. The offers are transformed in the corresponding
firm graphs to edges.
3. The following situations may appear after a round:
• Given the edges of this round and the former ones, no complete directed
graph is created in any firm k, i.e. no additional κk-clique emerged in
any firm k.
⇒ The offers of this round and the former rounds remain valid. We go
back to step 2.
• One or several additional κk-clique(s) emerge(s) in the same or in different
firms. It may be the first emerging κk-clique(s). Two cases have to be
distinguished.
– Together with the former κk-cliques, it does not constitute a match-
ing, i.e. equations (2.1) and (2.2) are not satisfied.
⇒ The offers of the former rounds remain valid. Already constructed
κk-cliques are still potential candidates for a matching. We go back
to step 2.
18If we take time as a discrete parameter, one could identify round one with point of time one,
round two with point of time two and so on.
44
2.3. SELECTION OF MATCHINGS THE BASIC MODEL
– It constitutes a matching, i.e. equations (2.1) and (2.2) are satisfied.
⇒ The procedure stops.
The solution of P1a may not be unique. We denote the corresponding outcome cor-
respondence by gP1a. It delivers for each given preference profile a set of matchings.
Only if the procedure stops after the first round, the solution has to be unique.
This is our intuitive description how P1a works. But as already announced, we also
have a formal representation in mind. This will be given next.
Formal Representation of P1a
We construct a sequence of families of directed graphs G0, G1, G2, · · · ∈ G, each
element Gr = (Gr1, . . . , G
r
m) is identified with a round.
19 The vertices in all directed
graphs are fixed, but the edges vary. In G0, the set of edges E
(0)
k,C = ∅ for all k ∈ H
and for all C ∈ Cκk . The procedure starts with G
0
k,C = (C, E
(0)
k,C) for all k ∈ H and
for all C ∈ Cκk .
1. All agents, i ∈ S, state their preferences Si ∈ P
S
i on B
S
i .
2. Now in each round r, all agents make their offers, one offer per agent.20 The
function tri transforms each bundle b
(r)
i of round r into the edges in the cor-
responding firm. Applying the projection function, we get the corresponding
edges E
(r)
k,C for all k ∈ H and for all C ∈ Cκk . Facing any directed graph in
e.g. Grk, we now have G
r
k,C = (C, E
r
k,C) with E
r
k,C := ∪
r
t=1E
(t)
k,C. Each G
r
k, with
k ∈ H collects all edges up to round r.
3. After each round, we have to check whether complete directed graphs were
constructed, i.e. for each k ∈ H directed graphs Grk,C such that E
r
k,C =
C×C \DC , if C consists of more than one agent and E
r
k,C = C×C, if |C| = 1.
Each complete directed graph (with or without loops) is a κk-clique in the
19G is a family of directed graphs. For a more detailed description see Subsection 2.3.1.
20The agents’ first offers correspond to their most preferred bundles, the second to the second
and so on (Therefore, see Definition 2.1.7 and below.).
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corresponding firm k. In case that there are complete directed graphs, i.e.
κk-cliques
21, we have to check validity of the equations (2.1) and (2.2). If a
matching occurs, the procedure stops, if not, it continues.
Remark 2.3.6
To detect a matching, we first check equation (2.1). If there exists at least one clique
in each firm, the validity of equation (2.2) still has to be shown. We take two cliques
in different firms, occurring in step 3 of the formal representation of the procedure
and check whether their intersection is empty. If so, we take another clique in a
third firm into account and intersect the union of the former two with the third one.
If this intersection is again empty, we continue in the same way. This goes on until
we included a clique in the last firm. If the intersection between the first two cliques
is not empty and only one clique occurred in each firm, so far, a matching is not
given, yet. If there are several cliques in one of the two first firms or in both, we
have to check the pairwise emptiness of the union of all combinations of cliques in
the different firms. If one is empty, take another clique in a third firm into account.
We restart to check the emptiness of unions. If we have an empty intersection over
all firms, equation (2.2) is satisfied as well. We got a matching, the procedure stops.
In P1a all agents make offers, round per round, as long as a set of matchings occurs.
Then the procedure stops. The sequence of graphs is finite22, because there exist
only finitely many bundles for each agent. Non-emptiness of the solution of P1a
will be proved in the next theorem.
Theorem 2.3.7
The procedure P1a always selects a set of matchings.
Proof: The proof is divided into two parts. i) P1a generated a set of matchings be-
fore all agents made their last offer. ii) P1a did not generate a set of matchings before
21There may occur more than one in the same round in the same firm or in different firms.
22If r =
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
, we face the last round.
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all agents made their last offer. Then all agents make their last offer. Consequently,
all directed graphs in all firms, corresponding to all cliques in all firms, are now com-
plete directed graphs. One possible combination of κk-cliques, generated by P1a,
is Cµ,1, . . . , Cµ,m, with Cµ,1 = {s1, . . . , sκ1}, Cµ,2 = {sκ1+1, . . . , sκ1+κ2}, . . . , Cµ,m =
{sPm−1
l=1 κl
, . . . , sPm
l=1 κl
}. All these cliques together satisfy the conditions (2.1) and
(2.2). Therefore, the procedure P1a stops and generated a set of matchings at least
containing the matching M = {Cµ,1, . . . , Cµ,m}. 2
Before we pass into the next procedures, we briefly want to give an example to
illustrate the course of action of our first procedure.
Example 2.3.8 (Example 2.1.4 cont.)
Each agent reveals his preferences. Therefore see Example 2.1.4. In the first family
of directed graphs G0, the set of edges E
(0)
k,C = ∅ is empty for all k ∈ H and for all
C ∈ Cκk . This is illustrated in the first figure. We face four possible cliques in each
firm. In firm h1 a κ1-clique consists of one agent, in firm h2 a κ2-clique consists of
three agents.
s1 s2 s2
s3
s1
s1 s2 s3
s3 s4
s4 s4
Firm : h2
s1 s2
s3 s4
Firm : h1
Now, in the first round r = 1, all agents make their offers, consisting of their
most preferred bundles b
(1)
i , i.e. b
(1)
1 = (h2, {s2, s3}), b
(1)
2 = (h2, {s1, s4}), b
(1)
3 =
(h2, {s1, s4}), b
(1)
4 = (h1, {∅)}. These bundles are transformed into edges, and we
get: E
(1)
2,{1,2,3} = {(1, 2), (1, 3)}, E
(1)
2,{1,2,4} = {(2, 1), (2, 4)}, E
(1)
2,{1,3,4} = {(3, 1), (3, 4)},
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E
(1)
1,{4} = {(4, 4)}. The next figure shows the directed graphs in the firms after the
first round.
s1 s2 s2
s3
s1
s1 s2 s3
s3 s4
s4 s4
Firm : h2
s1 s2
s3 s4
Firm : h1
We observe one κ1-clique in firm h1, namely C = {4}. Thus, no matching oc-
curred after the first round. The offers remain valid, and we enter the second
round. Here, the edges E
(2)
2,{1,3,4} = {(1, 3), (1, 4)}, E
(2)
1,{2} = {(2, 2)}, E
(2)
2,{2,3,4} =
{(3, 2), (3, 4), (4, 2), (4, 3)} accrue.23 We get the next figure.
s1 s2 s2
s3
s1
s1 s2 s3
s3 s4
s4 s4
Firm : h2
s1 s2
s3 s4
Firm : h1
We now have two complete directed graphs in firm h1, C = {4} and C
′ = {2},
but still no one in firm h2. Therefore, we enter the third round. The offers, trans-
formed in edges are: E
(3)
1,{1} = {(1, 1)}, E
(3)
2,{2,3,4} = {(2, 3), (2, 4)}, E
(3)
1,{3} = {(3, 3)},
23The transformations of b
(2)
3 and b
(2)
4 are summarized in E2,{2,3,4}, because both agents make
an offer in the same firm h2 and the same κ2-clique C˜ = {2, 3, 4}.
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E
(3)
2,{1,2,4} = {(4, 1), (4, 2)}. Again we supplement the directed graphs by the edges
given in round 3.
s1 s2 s2
s3
s1
s1 s2 s3
s3 s4
s4 s4
Firm : h2
s1 s2
s3 s4
Firm : h1
Now we face four complete directed graphs, C = {4}, C ′ = {2}, C ′′ = {1}, C ′′′ = {3}
in firm h1, and one in firm h2, C˜ = {2, 3, 4}. Equation (2.1) is satisfied, we face at
least one clique in each firm. Equation (2.2) also holds. The only empty intersection
is C ′′ ∩ C˜ = ∅ and |C ′′|+ |C˜| = 4. Hence, after the third round, we get a matching,
the procedure stops. 2
Before we continue to describe the second and the third procedure, we have to make
some additional comments. In the following, we restrict the set of preference
profiles to lexicographic preferences. We already motivated this restriction in
Subsection 2.2.2, it is a natural assumption that an agent first cares about the firm,
for which he will work, and then about his colleagues. In this framework we apply
the procedures P2 and P3a. Furthermore, we need the next lemma to guarantee
the operability of the procedures.
Lemma 2.3.9
Let {i ∈ S | k H(Si ) l, ∀ l ∈ H \ {k}} =: Sk be the set of agents who mostly
prefer firm k. For any lexicographic preference profile S∈ P lex there always exists
at least one firm k for which |Sk| ≥ κk.
49
2.3. SELECTION OF MATCHINGS THE BASIC MODEL
Proof: Assume for all firms k ∈ H, we only have (κk − 1) agents who mostly prefer
firm k, i.e. |Sk| < κk for all k ∈ H. Consequently, the total number of agents who
can make (κk − 1) offers to each firm is
∑m
k=1(κk − 1). But this is smaller than∑m
k=1 κk = n. So, the assumption was wrong. It always exists at least one firm k
with |Sk| ≥ κk. 2
Remark 2.3.10
The Lemma 2.3.9 also holds for preference profiles S∈ RS , but we are only inter-
ested in lexicographic preference profiles.
Given these preliminary remarks, we now can pass into the detailed description
of the procedures, restricted to lexicographic preference profiles. We start with an
intuitive description of procedure P2 and it follows a graph theoretic representation.
In the following we talk about selecting firms and agents. The idea is to consider
selected firms and agents separately.
Again we face different rounds, but now in any round r, some agents are ”active”,
whereas others are not. With active we mean, they will make their offers, i.e.
they question other agents in the room for joint work. The remaining agents are
”inactive” in the sense that they are only standing in the room without participating,
because they were not selected before.
Procedure 2 (P2)
1. All agents, i ∈ S, state their lexicographic preferences Si ∈ P
lex
i on B
S
i .
2. First among all firms still on the market, we select those, for which Lemma
2.3.9 holds. We also take all agents i ∈ |Sk| ≥ κk of these selected firms.
3. We only focus on the selected firms and the corresponding agents. Each se-
lected agent i takes his most preferred bundle b
(r)
i = (k, C), k ∈ H, C ∈ C
−i
κk−1
among those, he has not taken, yet and which only consists of a selected firm
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and selected agents. He makes an offer in C, i.e. questions the agents j ∈ C
for joint work in firm k. The offers are transformed into edges. Agents make
offers until (a) κk-clique(s) emerges.
4. The agents in such a κk-clique are matched with the firm and all together leave
the market. We get a reduced job market for agents. We restart with step 2
given the reduced job market, if there are still firms and agents on the market,
otherwise we got a matching, and the procedure stops.
From an economic point of view what happens is the following. First the agents
apply for a job in a firm. Then the procedure only focuses on the firms, which
have more applicants than positions available. A clique is chosen, for which all its
agents make their offers first. In other words, the agents of this clique revealed their
willingness for joint work first. Why do we not match the agents first to the firms,
in which the number of applicants is smaller than the number of available positions?
Because we are interested in treating agents as equal as possible. This will definitely
become more obvious, if we discuss the “quality” of our solution. We ask the reader
to be patient.
Before we continue with the formal description of the procedure, we introduce some
notational simplifications to facilitate the reading. The new terms are basically used
in the formal representation of P2. They describe the status quo at the beginning
of the procedure as well as it provides us with precise definitions of the transitions
from one round into the next one.
Notation 2.3.11
For each Si ∈ P
lex
i and t ≥ 0 define
• H0 := H, S0 := S
• Stk := {i ∈ S
t | k H(Si ) l, ∀ l ∈ H
t \ {k}} (k ∈ H t)
• Ht := {k ∈ H t | |Stk| ≥ κk}
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• H t+1 := H t \ Ht.
Generally, we are not able to define the set of agents S t, (t ≥ 1), participating in
a specific round, in advance since this set depends on the course of the procedure
itself. Hence, we describe the set of agents S t+1 in the formal representation of P2.
Formal Representation of P2
1. All agents, i ∈ S, state their lexicographic preferences Si ∈ P
lex
i on B
S
i .
2. Taking the (reduced) job market for agents ΥtS = (H
t, St, (κk)k∈Ht,
St|Ht),
we select the set of firms Ht. At the beginning of the procedure, t = 0, we
start with the job market for agents ΥS = (H, S, (κk)k∈H,
S) with H = H0,
S = S0 and ΥS = Υ
0
S.
3. We treat the firms k ∈ Ht separately. In each firm k ∈ Ht we construct a
sequence in Gtk 3 G
(t)0
k , G
(t)1
k , . . . of collections of directed graphs as follows.
24 In
G
(t)0
k , the set of edges is given by E
((t)0)
k,Ck
= ∅ for all k ∈ Ht and for all Ck ∈ Cκk .
So, we have G
(t)0
k,Ck
= (Ck, E
((t)0)
k,Ck
) for all k ∈ Ht and for all Ck ∈ Cκk. Now
in each round (t)r, all agents in S
t
k make their offers, one offer per agent.
25
Applying the transformation function tri and the projection function proj,
we get for each bundle b
((t)r)
i the corresponding set of edges E
((t)r)
k,Ck
in firm
k ∈ Ht for Ck ∈ Cκk . Facing any directed graph in e.g. G
(t)r
k , we now have
G
(t)r
k,Ck
= (Ck, E
(t)r
k,Ck
), where E
(t)r
k,Ck
= ∪rq=0E
((t)q)
k,Ck
. It collects all edges up to round
(t)r. After each round (t)r, we have to check, whether complete directed graphs
are constructed in all k ∈ Ht. After finitely many rounds there occurs at least
one such complete directed graph, corresponding to, say C tk (k ∈ H
t).26 All
24The upper index (t)· of a collection of directed graphs in firm k, G
(t)
·
k , illustrates that we only
face selected firms and agents of the reduced job market ΥtS . Within these firms we may face
several rounds, hence a sequence of collections of directed graphs.
25The agents’ first offers correspond to their most preferred bundles in firm k, the second to the
second given Υ0S and so on.
26In case there are more than one, we may choose arbitrarily.
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firms k ∈ Ht and agents i ∈ ∪k∈HtC
t
k leave the job market. We are now able
to define the set of agents. We get St+1 := St \ ∪k∈HtC
t
k. We enter the next
step.
4. If there are still firms and agents on the job market, we define the next reduced
job market for agents Υt+1S and restart with step 2. If there do not remain
firms and agents on the market, the procedure stops. Equation (2.1) and (2.2)
are satisfied.
We denote the outcome correspondence by P2. The solution does not have to be
unique, several matchings can be selected. We denote the corresponding outcome
correspondence by gP2. During the course of action of P2, it may happen that
two complete directed graphs (κk-cliques) are simultaneously determined in a firm
k. Then the procedure follows different ”paths”, because both cliques belong to
different matchings. We continue two separated courses of action, each time starting
at the point where one of the two simultaneously determined κk-cliques (together
with the firm k) leaves the market.
A collection of directed graphs Gk contains all possible directed graphs for firm k.
We could have restricted a collection of directed graphs to those directed graphs that
only consist of agents in Sk, but in favor of the simplicity of the formal representation,
we have taken all directed graphs in a firm. Some of them will always consist of
an empty set of edges. On the other hand in favor of a better overview, we will
neglect the directed graphs in a graph theoretic representation, whenever the agents
in these graphs are not selected.
Selected agents, not matched to a firm k ∈ Ht, do not leave the market. They
restart to make offers in other firms which are still on the market. They will be
selected again and after finitely many selections they are also matched and then
they leave the market.
A solution of the procedure is always reached. Taking a selected firm and the
corresponding selected agents, a clique is always generated after finitely many offers,
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because there are more applicants than jobs available. This holds for all selected
sets. Since the number of agents and firms is finite, the procedure stops after finitely
many steps. This will be confirmed by the next theorem.
Theorem 2.3.12
The procedure P2 always selects a set of matchings.
Proof: The proof is divided into two parts. i) P2 generated a κk-clique in a firm
k ∈ Ht, before all agents made their last offer in firm k. ii) P2 did not generate a
κk-clique before all agents in k ∈ H
t made their last offer. Then all agents in firm
k ∈ Ht make their last offer. All directed graphs in firm k ∈ Ht are now complete
directed graphs, since |S tk| ≥ κk. A κk-clique is generated.
This argumentation holds for all selected firms and agents, and because the set of
firms and agents is finite, we always get a matching. 2
Again we want to give an example, after having introduced different versions to
describe P2. The graph theoretic representation shows how easy it is to apply P2
and how obviously a complete directed graph can be located.
Example 2.3.13
Let H = {h1, h2} with κ1 = κ2 = 2 and S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}. We assume that the
agents have lexicographic preferences.
(h1, {s2}) 
S
1 (h1, {s4}) 
S
1 (h1, {s3}) 
S
1 (h2, {s3}) 
S
1 (h2, {s2}) 
S
1 (h2, {s4})
(h2, {s1}) 
S
2 (h2, {s3}) 
S
2 (h2, {s4}) 
S
2 (h1, {s1}) 
S
2 (h1, {s4}) 
S
2 (h1, {s3})
(h1, {s1}) 
S
3 (h1, {s2}) 
S
3 (h1, {s4}) 
S
3 (h2, {s4}) 
S
3 (h2, {s1}) 
S
3 (h2, {s2})
(h1, {s2}) 
S
4 (h1, {s1}) 
S
4 (h1, {s3}) 
S
4 (h2, {s3}) 
S
4 (h2, {s2}) 
S
4 (h2, {s1}).
Each agent reveals his preferences. Next we select the set of of firms with |S0k | ≥ κk,
namely H0 = {1}. A graph theoretic representation for the selected firm h1, before
the agents start to make their offers is given by the next figure.
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s1 s2
s3s1
s1 s4
s2 s3
s2 s4
s3 s4
Firm : h1
We have six directed graphs, whereas the set of edges is still empty. S01 = {1, 3, 4}
is the set of agents who mostly prefer firm 1. Since only agents in S01 will make
offers, we neglect - as already mentioned - all directed graphs containing agent 2.
Formally, we have to take them into account each round as well.
Now, in the first round (t)r = 10, all selected agents make their offers, consisting
of their most preferred bundles in firm 1, i.e. b
(00)
1 = (h1, {s4}), b
(00)
3 = (h1, {s1}),
b
(00)
4 = (h1, {s1}). These bundles are transformed into edges and we get E
(00)
1,{1,4} =
{(1, 4), (4, 1)} and E
(00)
1,{1,3} = {(3, 1)}. The next figure illustrates the selected firm
and agents after the first round.
s3s1
s1 s4 s3 s4
Firm : h1
We observe a complete directed graph, a κ1-clique, namely C = {1, 4}. Firm h1
and the agents s1, s4 leave the market. We get a reduced job market for agents,
Υ1S = {H \ {1}, S \ {1, 4}, κ2,
S\{1,4}|2}. We restart with step 2. H
1 = {2},
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S12 = {2, 3}. In the second round (t)r = 20 the bundles, b
(10)
2 = (h2, {s3}) and
b
(10)
3 = (h2, {s2}) are transformed into E
(10)
2,{2,3} = {(2, 3), (2, 3)}. Hence we get the
complete directed graph C ′ = {2, 3} in firm h2.
s2 s3
Firm : h2
No firm and agents remain on the job market. Equation (2.1) and (2.2) are satisfied
as well. Hence, after the second round, we get a matching, the procedure stops. 2
Now, we introduce the last procedure. Roth & Sotomayor (1990) propose in their
Example 4.3 an alternative procedure to the deferred acceptance algorithm to match
men with women. Our next procedure is similar to this one. We adjusted it to our
framework.
Procedure 3a (P3a)
1. All agents, i ∈ S, state their lexicographic preferences Si ∈ P
lex
i on B
S
i .
2. The order of the n given agents is fixed with an equal distribution. The chosen
order enters the procedure.
3. First we check for each firm, which is still on the market, whether Lemma 2.3.9
is satisfied. This has to be the case for at least one firm. In the following, the
procedure only focuses on these selected firms and agents.
4. In a selected firm we choose the agent with the lowest index, according to
the order determined in step 2. The agent then chooses his most preferred
κk−1 future colleagues among those who were also selected for the same firm.
These κk agents together with the firm leave the market. The set of bundles
is reduced by these agents and firms. P3a goes back to step 3.
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5. The procedure stops if one firm remains, hence, the number of agents equals
the number of offered jobs. The remaining clique together with the already
selected ones fulfill the conditions (2.1) and (2.2).
Remark 2.3.14
At the beginning of P3a, each agent is assigned to a number with the same proba-
bility. Therefore, we can talk about treating the agents equally. Each agent will be
with the same probability the one who chooses his colleagues. Each solution occurs
with the same probability. Strictly speaking, the range of the outcome function gP3a
is not the set of matchings, but a probability distribution on the set of matchings.
Thus, each matching occurs with a specific probability. It is easy to see that the
procedure P3a always generates a matching. We do the analysis without further
probabilistic formalism, simply to avoid notation. But the reader should have in
mind that particularity of the third procedure.
We pass on a formal representation of P3a. First of all it does not fit into our graph
theoretic framework. Complete directed graphs are not constructed, because only
one agent determines a clique and second it is also easy to understand the procedure
with the intuitive description.
These are the procedures, we will analyze in the following in respect of its solutions
and themselves. Their criteria for selecting a set of matchings is always different.
P1a waits until all offers, belonging to a matching, are made. P2 does the same, but
only for a subset of agents. Instead of that, P3a determines with equal probability
only one agent who selects the clique, in which he will work for a firm. Nevertheless,
all procedures have in common that the set of matchings is constructed stepwise
and the agents are always treated equally.
Before we enter the next section, we briefly want to come back to a literature ref-
erence, because now we are able to make comparisons in more detail. As already
mentioned in Chapter 1 the publication of Dutta & Masso (1997) is closest to the
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context of our thesis. Nevertheless, there exist a lot of differences. Firms do not
play an active role in our model, yet. In Dutta & Masso’s (1997) work firms always
can reject or accept workers. In addition, the size of groups of colleagues is not
exogenously given as it is in Dutta & Masso (1997). Properties like Pareto efficiency
and the agent-(clique-)max-min property neither occur in their paper. And we de-
fine a new notion of stability. Furthermore, their multi-stage deferred acceptance
algorithm can be interpreted as an extension of the classical deferred-acceptance
algorithm. Our procedures do not bear a lot of resemblance to both of them. Offers
are only made on one side of the market, an offer cannot be rejected. In P2 for each
firm a clique is only established, if all agents within this clique asked the others for
joint work. In P3a not even all agents can actively participate on the determination
of the cliques.
2.4 Strategic Behavior
Until now, we took the agents’ preferences as given, no strategic behavior was as-
sumed. As from now, agents behave strategically. This is a realistic assumption,
because it provides the opportunity that agents may take advantage of situations.
The structure of procedures, the fact that agents interact and act strategically has
a profound influence on the solution of the procedures. Mechanism design studies
the institutions, through which agents are interacting and their strategic behavior.
The design of an institution, e.g. an election procedure, may have a crucial influ-
ence on the outcome of the procedure and on the agents’ strategic behavior. Our
main interest centers on incentive compatibility. We want to analyze whether our
procedures prompt the agents to report their preferences truthfully or whether they
can take advantage of lying.
In this section we briefly want to introduce some basics of this broad research field.
It is far from giving a complete introduction of the topic. It will rather provide us
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with the basic tools to answer the question we are interested in most. For more
detailed surveys of this research field see e.g. Jackson (2000), Jackson (2001) or
Osborne & Rubinstein (1994).
2.4.1 The Mechanism
Initially, we have to discuss the information structure within our setting. We again
take the image, already introduced in Subsection 2.3.1. All agents are assembled
in one room. They talk to each other and during these conversations each agent
finds out the other agents’ preferences. We assume that each agent gets to know the
others’ true preferences. Next, the agents will have to report their preferences to
the central planner. This is, where strategic behavior comes into play. Not stating
the true preferences may be advantageous for an agent.
But first we want to introduce the notion of a mechanism. In Subsection 2.3.2 we
described our outcome correspondence (for agents), g : PS ⇒ M.27 Each vector
of n agents’ preferences is mapped to a set of matchings. Now, strategically acting
agents have to know the consequences of their behavior. Hence, a correspondence is
not precise enough in specifying an outcome, given a preference profile. Therefore,
we analyze strategic behavior along selections of g, i.e along an outcome function
g˜ : PS →M with g˜(S) ∈ g(S). Each preference profile is assigned to exactly one
matching. This crucial detail allows agents to anticipate the consequences of their
strategic behavior.
Definition 2.4.1 (Direct Mechanism)
A direct mechanism is a pair (S, g˜), where S is a set of agents and g˜ : PS →M is an
outcome function. Each strategy profile, here each preference profile, is associated
with a matching.
27This is the general description of our outcome correspondences. Certainly, each procedure has
its own outcome correspondence, gP1a, gP2, gP3a.
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The mechanism is called direct, because an agent has to report his preference rela-
tion. We only treat direct mechanisms, therefore, we sometimes neglect the word
direct to shorten descriptions.
Now, any pair (M(S), g˜) with S∈ PS induces a noncooperative game, given by
Γ(M(S), g˜) = (PS1 , . . . ,P
S
n , M(
S
1 ) ◦ g˜, . . . , M(
S
n) ◦ g˜). 
S, and consequently
M(S) describes the agents’ true preferences over matchings, with which the im-
age of the outcome function g˜ is assessed. This leads to the above used expression
M(S1 ) ◦ g˜, . . . , M(
S
n) ◦ g˜.
The next definition determines how to represent an agent’s preference relation.
Definition 2.4.2 (Utility Function)
An agent’s true preference relation M(Si ) over matchings with 
S
i ∈ P
S
i is repre-
sented by a utility function uSi : M→ R.
M(Si )◦ g˜ reflects agent i’s true preference relation over strategy profiles. If M(
S
i )
is represented by uSi : M→ R, then u
S ◦ g˜ represents M(Si ) ◦ g˜ and, therefore, can
be seen as payoff functions in Γ(M(S), g˜).
To facilitate distinction and to simplify further representation in this section, we de-
note in the following an element of the set of all strategy profiles with (RS1 , . . . , R
S
n) ∈
PS and if we write (S1 , . . . ,
S
n) ∈ P
S , we want to refer to the agents’ underlying
true preferences.
2.4.2 Incentive Compatibility
Before we define incentive compatibility, we have to describe the agents’ strategic
behavior more detailed. Each agent i announces his strategy RSi ∈ P
S
i . We get a
vector (RS1 , . . . , R
S
n) ∈ P
S . In the following, we sometimes want to focus only on one
agent’s strategy of the whole strategy profile. Therefore, we write (RS1 , . . . , R
S
n) =
(RS−i, R
S
i ). R
S
i is agent i’s strategy and R
S
−i are the strategies of the remaining n−1
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agents.
The problem with multi-person decisions is that no agent knows which strategies
the others will play. Once one strategy of agent i will be a better response to the
other agents’ strategies and once another one. Agent i’s outcome not only depends
on his own strategy but also on the others’ strategies. These interdependencies
are a fundamental property of noncooperative games. Nevertheless, it may happen
that there is a strategy profile R¯Si such that for each agent i, R¯
S
i is the best (most
preferred) strategy choice, given all other agents report the strategies R¯S−i. This
leads to the next definition.
Definition 2.4.3 (Nash Equilibrium)
A strategy R¯S ∈ PS is called a Nash equilibrium in Γ(M(S), g˜), if
g˜(R¯S1 , . . . , R¯
S
n) M(
S
i ) g˜(R¯
S
−i, R
S
i ) ∀ R
S
i ∈ P
S
i .
Agents act through the mechanism, they choose a strategy and the outcome function
determines their colleagues and the firm. Each chosen strategy is based on the
agents’ true preferences. Whether an agent’s reported preference coincides with his
true preferences depends on the design of the mechanism. There may be situations,
in which lying is a better strategy than telling the truth, simply because some agents
are matched with a more preferred bundle of colleagues and a firm than by stating
their true preferences. But there may also exist mechanisms where agents have
no incentive to lie. All agents report their true preferences as if they are their best
strategy, given all others report truthfully, too. Therefore, we get the next definition.
Definition 2.4.4 (Incentive Compatibility)
A mechanism (S, g˜) is incentive compatible, if S∈ PS is a Nash equilibrium in
Γ(M(S), g˜) for each S∈ PS.
This section was only a short introduction in some aspects of mechanism design. Of
course, the research field includes many more interesting directions. We took this
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choice, because incentive compatibility is the property, we are interested in most. In
the next chapter we will analyze which of our mechanisms are incentive compatible.
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Chapter 3
Results
In this chapter, we will state various results for our basic model. The first section
is divided into two subsections. In Subsection 3.1.1 we focus on the solutions (out-
come correspondences) which we obtain in applying our procedures. We investigate
whether solutions of the procedures satisfy the properties or at least some of them,
introduced in a former section. The second subsection contrasts the solutions of the
three different procedures. The second section is again divided into two subsections.
In the first, we discuss incentive compatibility and in the second we compare our re-
sults given the three mechanisms. We conclude the chapter with a discussion about
the procedures versus the solutions.
3.1 Properties of Procedural Solutions
The first procedure is defined for a general domain of preference profiles. A direct
comparison with the other two procedures is only possible if we restrict the first
procedure on lexicographic preferences, because P2 and P3a are inapplicable to
the general case of preference relations. We can foreclose that the solutions of
the procedures will fulfill different properties. This is an appealing result, because
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according to the properties a society judges as most important, it only has to choose
the appropriate procedure.
3.1.1 Outcome Correspondences
In this subsection, we discuss the different outcome correspondences of the proce-
dures by means of our properties. We will analyze the “quality” of each solution.
Of course, we are not able to classify the solutions of the different procedures, such
that we can say “one is better than another one”. At best, we can state the more
properties are satisfied the better. In case this classification is impossible, it depends
on where we put the main emphasis on. Mainly, we distinguish between welfare as-
pects and practicability aspects. Welfare aspects consider solutions that work out
advantageously for the society. Obviously, this is a broad description, but this is on
purpose. Different societies may judge different properties as the most important
one. Practicability aspects deal with the simple fact how easy it is to establish a
solution.
Theorem 3.1.1
For any preference profile S∈ PS the solution gP1a(S)
1. coincides with the set of matchings that fulfill the agent-max-min property
and
2. contains at least one Pareto efficient matching.
Proof: 1. This proof is divided into two parts.
“⇒” If M ∈ gP1a(S), then it fulfills the agent-max-min property.
P1a stops after round r. The worst rank an agent gets in a matching M ∈ gP1a(S)
is the one corresponding to round r. If these matchings do not fulfill the agent-
max-min property, P1a would have stopped in an earlier round. Consequently,
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M ∈ gP1a(S) satisfies the agent-max-min property.
“⇐” If M /∈ gP1a(S), then it does not fulfill the agent-max-min property.
The agent with the lowest rank in M gets a lower rank than those who get the
lowest rank in the set of matchings selected by P1a. Thus, M does not fulfill the
agent-max-min property.
2. Assume there does not exist a Pareto efficient matching in the solution of P1a.
It follows that all M ∈ gP1a(S) are Pareto dominated. Let M ′ ∈ M be a Pareto
efficient matching that Pareto dominates some matching M ′′ ∈ gP1a(S). Together
with the first statement of this theorem this means that the worst rank in M ′ is the
same as the worst rank in M ′′, which implies M ′ ∈ gP1a(S). 2
In the last chapter we have shown that a solution of P1a always exists. In addition,
we have proved that the solution always includes a Pareto efficient matching and it
satisfies the agent-max-min property. Now, before we start the interpretation of the
solution gP1a(S) we want to discuss the property of ta-stability.
We have already shown that a ta-stable matching does not always exist in the gen-
eral case. If non-existence is given, it is, of course, needless to check whether the
solution of P1a fulfills the ta-stability property. However, even if there are ta-stable
matchings, P1a may not find such a matching as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 3.1.2
Let S∈ PS be a preference profile such that a ta-stable matching M ∈ M exists.
Then, M need not be an element of gP1a(S).
Proof: The proof is given by an example.1 Let H = {h1, h2} with κ1 = κ2 = 2 and
S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}. Preferences are given by:
(h2, {s3}) 
S
1 (h1, {s4}) 
S
1 (h2, {s4}) 
S
1 (h1, {s3}) 
S
1 (h2, {s2}) 
S
1 (h1, {s2})
1In colors highlighted matchings are the solution of the procedure or matchings by means of
which we want to illustrate specific issues. Bold faced and colored bundles indicate the rank a pair
of agents gets, if they ta-block the corresponding colored matching.
65
3.1. PROPERTIES OF PROCEDURAL SOLUTIONS RESULTS
(h1, {s1}) 
S
2 (h2, {s3}) 
S
2 (h1, {s3}) 
S
2 (h1, {s4}) 
S
2 (h2, {s4}) 
S
2 (h2, {s1})
(h1, {s1}) 
S
3 (h2, {s2}) 
S
3 (h1, {s2}) 
S
3 (h2, {s1}) 
S
3 (h1, {s4}) 
S
3 (h2, {s4})
(h2, {s3}) 
S
4 (h1, {s1}) 
S
4 (h2, {s1}) 
S
4 (h2, {s2}) 
S
4 (h1, {s3}) 
S
4 (h1, {s2}).
The P1a only yields the matching M = ({s1, s4}, {s2, s3}), which is ta-blocked by
the pair (s2, s4). The agents exchange their jobs in the different firms h1 and
h2 and, consequently, each one is matched with a strictly more preferred firm
and colleague. Another matching, not selected by the procedure, is the following:
M ′ = ({s2, s3}, {s1, s4}). This matching is ta-stable, because there does not exist a
pair of agents, such that by exchanging their jobs (and therefore colleagues as well)
both get a higher rank. 2
In this given example, the procedure P1a selects a matching that is not ta-stable,
although at least one ta-stable matching exists. Our last attempt to get ta-stability
in applying P1a is to restrict the agents’ preferences on lexicographic preferences.
But again a simple example will disprove the conjecture. This result is stated in the
next theorem.
Theorem 3.1.3
For any lexicographic preference profile S∈ P lex the solution gP1a(S) does not
have to contain an element, which is ta-stable.
Proof: With lexicographic preferences, we can guarantee existence of a ta-stable
matching, (see Theorem 2.2.10). Again, an example (already introduced in Exam-
ple 2.3.13) proves the theorem.
We repeat the setting to facilitate the illustration of matchings. Let H = {h1, h2}
with κ1 = κ2 = 2 and S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}. We assume that the agents have lexico-
graphic preferences.
(h1, {s2}) 
S
1 (h1, {s4}) 
S
1 (h1, {s3}) 
S
1 (h2, {s3}) 
S
1 (h2, {s2}) 
S
1 (h2, {s4})
(h2, {s1}) 
S
2 (h2, {s3}) 
S
2 (h2, {s4}) 
S
2 (h1, {s1}) 
S
2 (h1, {s4}) 
S
2 (h1, {s3})
(h1, {s1}) 
S
3 (h1, {s2}) 
S
3 (h1, {s4}) 
S
3 (h2, {s4}) 
S
3 (h2, {s1}) 
S
3 (h2, {s2})
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(h1, {s2}) 
S
4 (h1, {s1}) 
S
4 (h1, {s3}) 
S
4 (h2, {s3}) 
S
4 (h2, {s2}) 
S
4 (h2, {s1}).
The matching M = ({s1, s2}), {s3, s4}) is the unique solution of P1a. But this
matching is not ta-stable, because both agents in the pair (s2, s3) can ameliorate
their ranks by exchanging their jobs. Hence, they will ta-block the solution of P1a.
The matching M ′ = ({s1, s4}, {s2, s3}) is ta-stable. 2
Now, let us come to the classification of our solution. We start to discuss the welfare
aspects. Pareto efficiency clearly is a welfaristic property. If a matching is Pareto
efficient no one can get a higher rank without making someone worse off. Thus, it is
optimal for the society as a whole, we maximize some of the ranks over all matchings.
Unfortunately, the solution of P1a contains Pareto efficient as well as non Pareto
efficient matchings, hence, this welfaristic property cannot be guaranteed.
The agent-max-min property focuses on another aspect of welfare. According to
Rawls principle of distributive justice (see Rawls (1999)) it favors the agent with
the worst rank in a matching who gets the highest rank over all lowest ranks of all
matchings. This fact can be interpreted as a fairness aspect. It favors the “weaker”
or it supports the “less favored”. If fairness is one of the societies’ goals, then it is
appropriate to choose procedure P1a, since it always generates a solution satisfying
the agent-max-min property.
Let us come to the aspects of practicability. One basic assumption is the existence of
a matching. This is guaranteed with Theorem 2.3.7. But the solution does not have
to be unique. Therefore, if there are several matchings in the solution, the problem
arises, which one to select. Another lack is the fact that, in general, the solution is
not ta-stable. We view ta-stability as a practicability aspect as well. There are often
pairs of agents who will ta-block the solution. These are two reasons that make the
solution of P1a less practicable.
To summarize, using P1a we get a solution that always contains Pareto efficient
matchings and that fulfills the agent-max-min property, given the most general
form of preference profiles. It does not necessarily fulfill ta-stability. There always
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exists a solution, but it does not have to be unique. To facilitate practicability, one
could always select the set of Pareto efficient matchings within the solution of the
procedure P1a. This would at least reduce the number of matchings be considered
for a selection.
From now on, we restrict the preference profiles to lexicographic preferences (see
Definition 2.2.9). We start to analyze the outcome correspondence of procedure P2.
Recall that P2 first selects the firms and agents for which the number of applicants
is greater or equal to the number of available jobs. Then the procedure selects
cliques among the selected agents in the selected firms. Agents and firms abandon
the market, the procedure restarts until one firm and a set of agents remain. Again
we investigate what kind of properties are satisfied given the solution of P2.
Theorem 3.1.4
For any lexicographic preference profile S∈ P lex each set of cliques of any matching
in the solution gP2(S), determined on ΥtS with t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., satisfies the clique-
max-min property on ΥtS.
Proof: This proof is divided into two parts.
“⇒” If C is a clique appearing in M ∈ gP2(S), then it fulfills the clique-max-min
property on ΥtS, where it was determined.
After round
(
|St
k
|−1
κk−1
)
no further offers are made in firm k ∈ Ht.2 The worst rank an
agent gets in a clique C is the one corresponding to round
(
|St
k
|−1
κk−1
)
. If this set of
cliques does not fulfill the clique-max-min property, a complete directed graph would
have been constructed for firm k in an earlier round. Consequently, all established
complete graphs C in firm k satisfy the clique-max-min property. This holds for all
firms k ∈ Ht.
“⇐” If C is a clique not appearing in M ∈ gP2(S), then it does not fulfill the
2
(
|St
k
|
κk
)
is the number κk-cliques which can be established. Consequently,
(
|St
k
|−1
κk−1
)
is the number
of offers each selected agent can make.
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clique-max-min property on ΥtS, where it was determined.
The agent with the lowest rank in C gets a lower rank than those who get the
lowest rank in the set of cliques selected by P2 given ΥtS. Thus, C does not fulfill
the clique-max-min property. 2
Theorem 3.1.5
For any lexicographic preference profile S∈ P lex any matching in the solution
gP2(S) is
1. Pareto efficient and
2. ta-stable.
Proof: 1. Assume there is a matching M ∈ gP2(S) that is not Pareto efficient.
Then, there exists another matching M ′ ∈ M such that no agent in M ′ is worse off
and at least one agent is strictly better off. Thus, at least one agent gets a better
rank either in the same firm or in another one. If he gets a better rank in the
same firm in another clique C ′, the other agents in this clique C ′ will have to get a
better rank as well, since we assume strict preferences. But then this clique would
already have been chosen by the procedure P2 in an earlier round, consequently
M /∈ gP2(S). The same argumentation holds, if the agent gets a better rank in
another firm, and again we get M /∈ gP2(S). Thus, all M ∈ gP2(S) are Pareto
efficient.
2. According to Lemma 2.3.9, there always exists at least one firm k with |Sk| ≥ κk.
The procedure P2 starts and selects a κk-clique C ∈ Cκk in this firm. No agent i ∈ C
will be a member of a ta-blocking coalition, because there is no firm l ∈ H \{k} such
that agent i gets a higher rank in a firm l in another clique C¯ ∈ Cκl. We restart with
a reduced job market for agents. Again Lemma 2.3.9 holds for at least one firm k ′.
The procedure selects a κk′-clique C
′ ∈ Cκk′ in this firm. No agent in this κk′-clique
will find a ta-blocking partner (The only ta-blocking partner, they are interested in,
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are working in firm l, if firm k′ is their second most preferred firm.). But agents
in the former constructed κk-clique C ∈ Cκk can only deteriorate their rank. This
argumentation goes on until the last clique is formed. Thus, any M ∈ gP2(S) is
ta-stable. 2
Again we want to classify the solution of P2. We start the discussion in the same
order, first the welfare aspects. The solution of P2 always satisfies Pareto efficiency.
It selects the matchings where no agent can get a higher rank without deteriorating
someone else’s rank. The agent-max-min property is not satisfied. For this, see Ex-
ample A.0.5 (setting 1.) in Appendix A and compare the outcome correspondences
gP1a(S) and gP2(S), given the preferences in setting 1. But each selected clique,
determined on ΥtS, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . in the job market for agents satisfy the clique-max-
min property on ΥtS. This local aspect is very interesting. In general, agents are less
concerned about global3 issues than about what is going on in the firm they would
like to work for. It is likely that agents are content if they know that their firm tries
to favor the best among the worst workers. This property is advantageous for the
daily situations at work. Often the global aspect is of less interest for the agents.
Only from the society’s point of view we could favor the agent-max-min property,
because it selects the agent with the highest rank among all agents who ever get the
worst rank in a matching.
Coming to the practicability aspect, existence of the solution is guaranteed by The-
orem 2.3.12. But again it does not have to be unique. The selection problem among
the matchings in the solution exists again. On the other hand the solution is always
ta-stable, which is an important result. Once we have determined the solution, we
know for sure, that no pair of agents will ever have an incentive to ta-block the
solution. It is very practicable in the sense that it persists.
3The term global in this context is related to the agent-max-min property, because it takes all
agents’ preferences into account.
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To summarize, the solution P2 is Pareto efficient, satisfies the clique-max-min prop-
erty for all cliques on the corresponding reduced job market, it always exists, but
does not have to be unique, and it is ta-stable.
Before we want to compare the solutions, we analyze the last procedure P3a.
Theorem 3.1.6
Let S∈ P lex be a lexicographic preference profile and fix an order of the agents.
Then the solution gP3a(S) w.r.t. to this order4 is
1. a singleton,
2. Pareto efficient and
3. ta-stable.
Proof: 1. This statement is obvious. In each firm there is only one agent who
selects his colleagues. Hence, m agents are selecting their
∑m
k=1 κk − 1 colleagues.
Altogether exactly the n agents are matched.
2. Assume (C1, . . . , Cm) = M ∈ g
P3a(S) is not Pareto efficient. Then there exists
another matching (C ′1, . . . , C
′
m) = M
′ ∈ M such that no agent is worse off and at
least one is strictly better off. W.l.o.g let C1 be a clique chosen first by the agent
with the lowest index i in the set of agents who applied for a job in this firm (see
Lemma 2.3.9, there always exists a k such that |Sk| ≥ κk). Then C1 = C
′
1, because
if C1 6= C
′
1 agent i will be worse off. The job market for agents is reduced by C1.
W.l.o.g let C2 be a clique chosen first by the agents with the lowest index j in the
set of agents who applied for a job in this firm. Then C2 = C
′
2, because if C2 6= C
′
2
agent j would be worse off in a clique in the same firm 2. He only would be strictly
better off in firm 1, if 1 H(Sj ) 2, but then agent i would be strictly worse off. This
argumentation goes on until all cliques are checked. It follows M = M ′, hence,
M ∈ gP3a(S) is Pareto efficient.
4See discussion in Subsection 2.3.2.
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3. According to Lemma 2.3.9, there always exists at least one firm k with |S tk| ≥ κk.
In P3a the agent with the lowest index selects a κk-clique C ∈ Cκk in this firm. No
agent i ∈ C will be a member of a ta-blocking coalition, because there is no firm
l ∈ H \ {k} such that agent i gets a higher rank in firm l and in another firm in a
clique C¯ ∈ Cκl than in the former one. We restart with a reduced job market for
agents. Again Lemma 2.3.9 holds for at least one firm k′ (|St+1k′ | ≥ κ
′
k). The agent
with the lowest index in the firm k′ selects a κk′-clique C
′ ∈ Cκk′ in this firm. No
agent in this κk′-clique will find a ta-blocking partner either. Agents in the former
constructed κk-clique C ∈ Cκk can only deteriorate their rank. This argumentation
goes on until the last clique is formed. Thus, M ∈ gP3a(S) is ta-stable. 2
The welfare aspects of the solution of P3a are characterized by Pareto efficiency.
It is needless to analyze max-min properties, because in each firm only one agent
determines the clique. For all other members of a clique, selected by this agent, it
may be the worst rank within the firm.
The practicability aspect is supported by ta-stability and uniqueness - a property
we have not found in one of the previous solutions, yet. Uniqueness makes a lot of
things easier. We do not have to think of, which matching to select if we face several
matchings. Needless to say that this is an appealing result.
3.1.2 Comparisons
All procedures are distinguished by the fact that their solutions satisfy a different
set of properties. To make comparisons easier, we give in Appendix A an Example
A.0.5 with lexicographic preferences (setting 1.). We apply the procedures P1a
and P2 to this example and get different solutions. For the third procedure, we
do not need an example, because once a fixed order of agents is given, the agent
with the lowest index in a selected firm will choose his most preferred bundle and
the procedure continues until a matching is reached. There does not exist a graph
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theoretic illustration. The next table gives an overview of our results.
gP1a(H(S)) gP2(H(S)) gP3a(H(S))
welfare ⊃ Pareto efficiency = Pareto efficiency = Pareto efficiency
aspects agent-max-min clique-max-min on ΥtS
practicability existence existence existence
aspects uniqueness
ta-stability ta-stability
In the table we can see, a lot of properties are satisfied simultaneously. They are
not in opposition to one another, e.g. Pareto efficiency to agent-max-min property
or Pareto efficiency to ta-stability. But it is outstanding that the agent-max-min
property and ta-stability do not appear in the same solution. We want to analyze
this observation in more detail.
A simple thought experiment shows that this does not imperatively have to be the
case. If we face a preference profile such that, independently whether we apply P1a,
P2 or P3a, all agents are always matched with their most preferred firm and their
most preferred colleagues, then the solution satisfies the agent-max-min property
as well as ta-stability. Hence, both properties can be fulfilled by the same solution.
Nevertheless, the “later” a matching with the agent-max-min property is detected
by P1a the more likely it is not ta-stable, because more and more possibilities to
ta-block appear for the agents.
Another interesting aspect is the selection of a matching in gP1a(S) and gP2(S).
Both solutions do not have to be unique. In gP1a(S) a central planner will have
to select a matching to get rid of the dilemma. In the second case, one could also
think of a central planner who chooses for a selected firm a clique if their appears
more than one during the procedure is running. Each time he may decide by what
is best for one firm, not for all firms at the same time. On the one hand this clearly
solves the problem, which matching to choose, if the solution is not unique. But on
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the other hand, it creates the problem that the central planner gets the ”power”,
and it rises the question, how he should choose among matchings or cliques. An-
other approach could be, once the solution of P1a is determined, all firms come
together and choose a matching. Or in P2, if there occur two cliques in one firm,
the firm can determine its future group of employees and the not chosen agents go
back on the market. But by giving decision power to the firms, occurs another prob-
lem. Applying P1a how should e.g. two firms agree on a matching, if one prefers
M ∈ gP1a(S) and the other M ′ ∈ gP1a(S)? The same problem appears, given
P2. If two firms together with agents are selected and if after round r in both two
cliques are determined, e.g C1, C2 in firm hk and C
3, C4 in firm hl, with C
1∩C3 = ∅
and C2 ∩ C4 = ∅ and firm hk prefers C
1 whereas firm hl prefers C
4. Then it is
unclear how the parties should agree on two cliques as well. If there is only one
firm in round r which has to select between two or more cliques, this problem is
not given at all. But all this is a thought experiment, since we assumed in Chapter
2 that firms are indifferent about the agents (or cliques) that will fill their vacant
jobs.
If we focus on the practicability aspect, the third procedure P3a is outstanding.
But beside of this positive feature, there are only m agents involved in the process
of determining m cliques. Of course, the underlying probability process makes it
equally likely for all agents to be one of these m agents, but this justification is prob-
ably difficult to understand for agents on the real market, if they were not chosen
and now have to work with their less preferred colleagues in a firm.
We can summarize, depending on whether a society judges welfare aspects or prac-
ticability aspects as more important, it chooses the appropriate procedure to get a
set of matchings. And in more detail, if specific properties have to be satisfied, the
procedure should be chosen according to these.
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3.2 The Mechanisms and Strategic Behavior
In this section we focus on incentive compatibility introduced in Subsection 2.4.2.
For this, we check whether telling the truth is always the best strategy. In advance,
we can state that we only get one positive result. In the second subsection we
try to relate properties of the solution with incentive compatibility to get a better
understanding whether these properties are mutual exclusive or complementary.
3.2.1 Incentive Compatibility
To analyze incentive compatibility, we simply take Example A.0.1 (setting 1.) for
P1a and Example A.0.2 (setting 1.) in Appendix A for P2. Again, we have chosen
lexicographic preferences to facilitate further comparisons.
We discuss the mechanisms in the same order they were introduced. Checking
incentive compatibility of P1a in Example A.0.1 (setting 1.) we see that agent s5
can take advantage of the mechanism M1a in misrepresenting his preferences. If he
announces a different ranking order in firm h2, he is matched with firm h1 instead
of with firm h2. Hence taking M1a, agents may have an incentive not to state their
true preferences. Lying may finally lead to a higher rank than telling the truth.
This is a typical example where incentive compatibility is not satisfied.
Taking P2 (Example A.0.2 (setting 1.)) the analysis of the second mechanism
M2 is similar. Again we find an agent, this time agent s5 who will not represent
his true preferences and, therefore improves his rank. Hence, we have shown that
neither M1a nor M2 is incentive compatible. Therefore, we now focus on our last
mechanism M3a. We can foreclose that this time we get a positive result.
Theorem 3.2.1
The mechanism M3a is incentive compatible, given a fixed order of agents.
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Proof: Each agent whenever he is determined by the procedure P3a to be the
one who can choose his colleagues, can select his most preferred bundle in his most
preferred firm among those which are still on the market. So, there does not exist an
incentive to misrepresent preferences. If he is not the one who chooses his colleagues,
a modification in his preference ranking will have no influence on the cliques which
will be selected by the procedure. So, again the agent cannot benefit from not telling
the truth. Therefore, the procedure is incentive compatible. 2
We may interpret incentive compatibility as a practicability property. A mechanism
that can be manipulated by not stating the true preferences is, obviously less at-
tractive, because agents can take advantage of lying. Consequently, from this point
of view mechanism M3a is more attractive than M1a and M2.
3.2.2 Comparisons
Comparing the mechanisms, the question arises whether there exists a correlation
between the lack of incentive compatibility and the properties of the solutions. We
neglect Pareto efficiency, since it holds more or less for all solutions. The question of
a correlation is answered easily, if we focus on ta-stability, because the solutions of
the second and the third procedures are both ta-stable, but M2 is not incentive com-
patible whereas M3a is. Hence, there cannot be a correlation between ta-stability
and incentive compatibility. It remains to take a closer look on the max-min prop-
erties.
Procedure P1a does not stop before the last complete graph, e.g. w.l.o.g. Cm
in firm m, belonging to a matching, is determined. Consequently, in other firms
several complete graphs are already given. Let us assume that only one constella-
tion C1, . . . , Cm−1 together with Cm constitutes a matching and the constellation
C1, . . . , Cm−1 is less preferred by all its members than another constellation of, dur-
ing the procedure already constructed, cliques C ′1, . . . , C
′
m−1. This is exactly the
76
3.3. THE PROCEDURES VERSUS THE SOLUTIONS RESULTS
point, where lying becomes interesting. Agents can extend the number of rounds
such that, by misrepresenting their preferences, they anticipate the matching, P1a
would have selected, given the true preferences and at the same time they take
advantage of, because they now will become members of more preferred cliques.
Hence a matching, satisfying agents-max-min property and incentive compatibility
is rather an exception. The same argumentation holds for the procedure P2, it only
has to be reduced on cliques and the clique-max-min property.
In procedure P3a we leave the choice of cliques within a firm to only one agent.
Definitely, the agent will choose his most preferred colleagues who are still on the
market no matter how he is ranked by the colleagues. The selection of one agent
who will determine his colleagues in a firm is the reason for incentive compatibility5
and at the same time the reason for the lack of max-min properties. Finally, we can
state, in general incentive compatibility and max-min properties are not satisfied
simultaneously.
3.3 The Procedures versus the Solutions
All procedures are easy to apply on the job market for agents. In P1a all agents
make their offers until a set of offers constitutes a set of matchings. In P2 cliques
are selected stepwise, again only if in a clique all agents made the corresponding
offers. The procedure stops if all cliques together constitute a set of matchings. In
P3a only one agent per firm determines a clique. This is done in all firms, therefore
we also get a matching.
We observe in the first two procedures all agents are integrated in the selection
process of a set of matchings whereas in P3a only m agents are engaged in this
process. Different perspectives lead to different interpretations of this phenomenon.
One could state, we should favor P3a because it is the easiest way - given the three
5Therefore, see also the proof of Theorem 3.2.1.
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procedures - to select a set of matchings. The agents are still treated equally, since
the order of the agents and hence the ones who will select a clique are determined
by an equal distribution. Nevertheless, some criticism arises immediately. Once the
agent is chosen he acts like a dictator. No matter of the interests of the other agents
who applied for this firm, he chooses his most preferred clique. After being matched,
the other agents may be dissatisfied because now they probably have to work with
less preferred colleagues in this firm.
This aspect is taken into account by the first and the second procedure and is re-
flected in welfare aspects of the solution, namely the max-min properties. These
procedures take all agents’ preferences into account. Thereby, P2 is more competi-
tive in the sense that first cliques are determined in those firms, in which there are
more applicants are given than jobs available. Both procedures only stop if in P1a
all agents made their offers in a matching or in P2 all agents in all firms made their
offers in different cliques. Hence, both procedures put more weight on all agents’
interests than P3 does.
If we now face the solutions versus the procedures, it turns out that the solution of
P1a is not ta-stable, but satisfies the agent-max-min property. A bit “more com-
petition” leads in P2 to a ta-stable matching and still the clique-max-min property
on reduced job markets for agents can be guaranteed. P3a guarantees ta-stability
and uniqueness. One could argue, we should favor P2 and P3a according to the
solutions, since ta-stability is a crucial property as well as Pareto efficiency (only a
subset of the solution of P1a). But choosing between these two procedures depends
on whether the society attaches importance to either some sort of clique-max-min
property or uniqueness. Instead of that if we take the fact into account that the
mechanism M3a is incentive compatible, it becomes easier to justify that we favor
P3a.
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Chapter 4
The Basic Model and the Firms
Until now, we only focused on the agents’ preferences to get a better understanding
of their preferences over firms and colleagues. But nevertheless, the assumption that
firms do not care about whom to hire, is fairly unrealistic. Therefore, we want to
take the firms’ preferences into account in this chapter.
We discuss two different approaches to model the firms’ preferences. Both of them
do not appear in the literature, yet. The first one is basically an extension of the
model in Chapter 2. In the past, agents had preferences over bundles consisting of
one firm and a subset of colleagues. Each agent was assigned to a firm together with
colleagues. Now we extend the model. Roughly speaking, we embed the firms in
the basic model of Chapter 2, as if they were agents. We call the union of agents
and firms participants. Each participant is assigned to a firm together with other
participants. Two obvious motivations, a technical and an economic one, cause this
extension. First, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide everything to incorporate the
firms in such a manner, it simply seems to be a natural next step. And second,
it is common fact that firms are working for other firms. A well known example
is the car industry. Several firms are employed by a firm to deliver different parts
of a car. And the employing firm employs agents and itself as well to finalize the
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car. Since we want to stay as close as possible to our first model where a clique of
agents worked for one firm we restrict the extension to a model where the only firm
employed by a firm is itself. The remaining participants working for the firm are
agents. After having adjusted the terminology, we are again able to apply suitable
modifications of the procedures P1a, P2, P3a. In fact, we will modify P3a slightly.
This new version will be called P3b. We then check which properties are satisfied
and we also discuss incentive compatibility. The second last subsection compares
the results given in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 by means of examples.
The second approach is a contraposition to the model in Chapter 2. It may be
seen as a more classical approach due to other many-to-one sided matchings. We
have agents on the one side and firms on the other. Here, we only focus on the
firms’ preferences over groups of agents they want to hire. No further restrictions
are made on the preferences. We introduce another notion of stability, which we
will call tf -stability and two new procedures. Again we discuss the outcomes of the
procedures. Within this section we often face the results with those of the former
chapters to get a better understanding of the different structures of the models.
4.1 Participants
We want to integrate the firms in the agents’ settings. Therefore, we enlarge the
set of agents by the firms, such that we get a set of participants. So, on the one
side we now have the participants and on the other side there are the firms they
have to be matched with, no matter the fact that firms are present on both sides
now. We adjust the terminology of cliques, number of job offerings and preferences.
In this extension of the model given in Chapter 2, we want to stay close to our
original question, how to model a job market, if agents do not only care about their
future colleagues. A lack of description in Chapter 2 clearly is the fact that firms’
preferences are not taken into account at all. Therefore, in this section we want to
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drop this assumption. For not changing to many issues at the same time, we restrict
the participants’ set of preferences to admissible preferences, we want to assume, a
firm can only be matched with itself and the remaining open positions have to be
filled exclusively with agents.1 So, for the first time we are able to analyze the
agents’ as well as the firms’ interests.
The example of the car industry is a further extension where more than one firm can
be employed by another firm. We will not further discuss this kind of job market
here.
4.1.1 The Framework
First, we introduce the slightly different notation of the model. The order of the
presentation is the same as in Chapter 2. The notation, introduced there, remains
valid and will also be used in this section. Let
• P = S ∪H be the set of participants with p, p′ ∈ P representing participants
who could either be an agent or a firm.
• κ˜k = κk + 1 be the number of offered jobs per firm k ∈ H. Adding κ˜1, . . . , κ˜m,
we get the total number of jobs,
∑m
k=1 κ˜k = κ˜ = m + n.
• Dq+1 = {D ⊆ P | |D| = q +1} with 0 ≤ q +1 ≤ |P | be the set of subsets with
q + 1 participants. Each D ∈ Dq+1 is called a q + 1-clique.
• D−pq = {D ⊆ P | |D| = q, p /∈ D} be the set of subsets with q colleagues (for
participant p).2
1For sure this restriction may be easily released, since it is quite common in a century of
outsourcing that firms are employed by other firms. What kind of impact this would have on the
model, is indeed a more challenging question which we will not investigate in this thesis.
2In this section, colleagues include agents as well as firms.
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• ∪mk=1{(k, D) | D ∈ D
−p
κk
} =: BPp be the set of all bundles of participant p with
bp ∈ B
P
p .
• Every participant p has a strict preference relation Pp on B
P
p . 
P
p is a linear
ordering. We write P = (P1 , . . . ,
P
m+n) as preference profile, P
P
p denotes
the set of all possible preferences of participant p, for all p ∈ P . And we denote
the set of all possible preference profiles with PP = PP1 × . . .× P
P
m+n.
Remark 4.1.1
Dq+1 is the analogon to Cq of Chapter 2. D
−p
q is the analogon to C
−i
q−1. But the
subsets now consist of agents and firms and in both sets the subsets consist of one
additional element. An element of D ∈ D−pq has the same number of elements as an
element C ∈ Cq, and C ∈ D
−p
q but not necessarily D ∈ Cq.
Analogous to Chapter 2, if q + 1 = κ˜k = κ˜l holds, then the q + 1-clique can work for
firm k as well as for firm l. Nevertheless, we observe several differences compared to
the former model. First, the possible q + 1-cliques consist of participants, hence of
agents and firms. Second, the participants now have preferences over bundles (k, D),
whereas D ∈ D−pq . Every participant has preferences over a bundle consisting of one
firm, and a subset of agents and firms, namely κk colleagues. Furthermore, the firms
now have preferences, too. Another difference is the number of jobs on the market.
Each subset D ∈ D−pq consists of q colleagues (= participants). In the first model
the agents have preferences over q − 1 colleagues (= agents). Consequently, each
firm has one more vacant job. Therefore, we now have m + n jobs on the market.
To summarize the components we have established until now, we describe our job
market (for participants) by the tuple
ΥP = (H, P, (κ˜k)k∈H ,
P ).
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This is the most general form of the model. The structure of the job market for
participants ΥP is the same as for agents, ΥP = ΥS∪H . No restrictions are given for
the ratio between firms and agents in a q +1-clique, yet. But, as already mentioned
in the introduction of this section, we are more interested in q + 1-cliques with one
firm k and κk agents. Especially, we want to focus on the case, where κk agents
are working for firm k and firm k is employed by itself. Thus, we face the same
structure as in Chapter 2, except that we integrate each firm as an employee in its
own firm.
Definition 4.1.2 (Admissible)
1. A bundle (l, D) ∈ BPk consisting of a firm l and of κl colleagues is called
admissible for firm k, if l = k and D ∈ Cκk holds.
2. A bundle (l, D) ∈ BPi consisting of a firm l and of κl colleagues is called
admissible for agent i, if D ∈ D−iκl and D ∩H = {l} holds.
A bundle (k, D) is admissible for a firm k ∈ P , if D only consists of agents. Each
firm k ∈ P will have preferences over κk colleagues only consisting of agents. But
in fact, each firm offers κ˜k = κk + 1 jobs. It counts itself as well as an employee.
3
A bundle (k, D) is admissible for an agent i ∈ P , if D contains exactly one firm,
more precisely the one for which the κk colleagues including agent i will work, and
as a direct consequence it consists of κk − 1 agents. Hence, an agent will only work
for one firm together with the firm.
This clearly technical definition is necessary to remain in the context of the former
model (Chapter 2). We still want to match agents with firms, including the firms
preferences, now. If one is looking for an interpretation of Definition 4.1.2, we can
think of firms who do not want to hire other firms except themselves and agents
who only want to work for one firm.
3This is analogous to Chapter 2. There, each agent only has preferences over his κk−1 colleagues
in a firm, since he applies for the κkth job.
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Remark 4.1.3
1. For each k ∈ H the number of admissible bundles is
(
n
κk
)
.
2. For each i ∈ S the number of admissible bundles is
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
.
3. For each p ∈ P the number of all bundles is |BPp | =
∑m
k=1
(
m+n−1
κk
)
.
The number of admissible bundles for firms differ, if they have different κk’s, i.e.
if they offer a different number of jobs. The number of admissible bundles is for
all agents the same, because the number of possible combinations of colleagues
per firm is for all agents the same as well as the number of firms. The different
number of possible admissible bundles for firms and for agents results from the
different structure of the set of admissible bundles. A firm k focuses on all possible
combinations of κk agents out of the set of all agents n. However, an agent focuses
on all possible combinations of κk−1 agents out of the set of n−1 agents, given each
firm k. Either the number of admissible bundles for agents is greater or equal to the
number of admissible bundles for firms or vice versa, both scenarios may appear.4
Now, we come to a subclass of preferences introduced in this section.
Definition 4.1.4 (Admissible Preferences)
A participants’ p ∈ P strict preference relation Pp over bundles is called admissible,
if for all admissible bundles (k, D) and non-admissible bundles (k′, D′) the property
(k, D) Pp (k
′, D′) holds. We denote the set of all admissible preference profiles with
Padm = Padm1 × . . .× P
adm
m .
Now, before we define an admissible matching, we have to describe the corresponding
set Dk of admissible κ˜k-cliques. Each element of this set consists of κk agents and
of firm k. Hence, we have
Dk = {D ⊆ P | |D| = κ˜k, D ∩H = {k}}.
4This will be proved in Lemma 4.1.9.
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Definition 4.1.5 ((Admissible) Matching)
A mapping µ˜ : P → H is called an (admissible) matching (for the job market ΥP ), if
for all k ∈ H we have µ˜−1(k) ∈ Dk. Therefore, we define Dµ˜,k := µ˜
−1(k) as the κ˜k-
clique under µ˜ for each firm k ∈ H. An alternative description of the (admissible)
matching µ˜ is Mµ˜ := (Dµ˜,1, . . . , Dµ˜,m). All (admissible) matchings are given by
M˜ := {Mµ˜ | µ˜ is an (admissible) matching}.
This is the definition of a matching introduced in Chapter 2 applied to the extended
model. If we have cliques (D1, . . . , Dm) with the properties
Dk ∈ D
k ∀ k ∈ H,(4.1)
Dk ∩Dl = ∅ ∀ k, l ∈ H,(4.2)
then this also describes an admissible matching µ˜ (which is implicitly given by
Dk = µ˜
−1(k)).
Definition 4.1.6 (Participants’ Ranking Function)
A mapping vPp : B
P
p → {1, . . . , |B
P
p |} with v
P
p (bp) > v
P
p (b
′
p), if and only if bp 
P
p b
′
p is
a ranking function for each p ∈ P . vPp (bp) is called the rank of bp.
Analogous to Chapter 2, we get an ordering such that b
(1)
p is the most preferred
bundle of participant p ∈ P , b
(2)
p the second most and finally b
(|BPp |)
p his least preferred
bundle. Again our ranking functions are assigning downward counting. |BPp | is the
rank of p’s most preferred bundle b
(1)
p , |BPp |−1 the rank of his second most preferred
bundle b
(2)
p and finally 1 is the rank of his least preferred bundle b
(|BPp |)
p .
This is the general description. Even if we still can distinguish between agents and
firms in the set of participants, in the new model they are treated in the same
manner. The basic structure stays the same, if we focus on admissible matchings.
In the next subsection we want to modify the procedures introduced in Chapter 2
and we again want to discuss their solutions. Therefore, we first briefly revise the
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properties introduced in Subsection 2.2.1.
Because the structure of a job market for agents and for participants is the same,
the definitions for Pareto efficiency and the max-min properties in ΥP (we call the
agent-max-min property now participant-max-min property) also remain the same as
in ΥS, see Subsection 2.2.1. The same holds for ta-stability whereas in particular the
firm never ta-block, because in admissible κ˜k-cliques D ∈ D
k a firm always employs
itself and at the same time is his most preferred ”employer”. Furthermore, if a firm
is part of a ta-blocking pair, this leads to a non-admissible matching.
4.1.2 P1a, P2, P3b and their Outcomes
After having established the new framework, we will now investigate the results
we get if the participants announce their preferences and we apply our procedures
P1a, P2,P3b. The difference between P3a and P3b will also be introduced in this
subsection. Comparisons and interpretations are given in the next subsection. At
the moment, we focus on the procedures and their outcomes. We always assume
admissible preferences. We keep the order and start with P1a.
P1a is applied in the same way as before. We construct the same structure of graphs
in each firm. The only difference now is that firms also make offers to the agents
and the agents do not only ask other agents but also firms for joint work. Thus, we
roughly have to exchange the word “agents” by “participants” in the description of
P1a.5 Furthermore, each directed graph in each firm consists of one more vertex.
The procedure stops, if the equations (4.1) and (4.2) are satisfied. Clearly, we get a
theorem analogous to Theorem 3.1.1 for the solution correspondence gP1a.
5The same has to be done for the other procedures, discussed in this subsection.
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Theorem 4.1.7
For any admissible preference profile, P∈ Padm, the solution of gP1a(P )
1. coincides with the set of matchings that satisfy the participant-max-min prop-
erty and
2. contains at least one Pareto efficient matching.
The basic structure of the participants’ preferences is the same with respect to the
fact that the number of participants in each clique increased by one. Therefore,
the proof of Theorem 4.1.7 is the same as the one of Theorem 3.1.1. The solution
always includes a Pareto efficient matching. It also satisfies the participant-max-
min property, because in all other matchings the agent with the fewest rank will
get again less compared to the one given by the procedure. However it is not clear
whether P1a produces an admissible matching. Consequently, before we start to
discuss the next procedure, we want to show when a solution of P1a only consisting
of admissible matchings can be guaranteed.
Theorem 4.1.8
Given an admissible preference profileP∈ Padm and let maxk∈H
(
n
κk
)
≤
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
,
then the solution gP1a(P ) is a set of admissible matchings.
Proof: After r¯ = |
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
| rounds all offers consisting of admissible bundles are
made by all participants. The proof is divided into two parts. 1.) P1a generated a set
of matchings before all participants made their last offer consisting of an admissible
bundle. 2.) P1a did not generate a set of matchings before all participants made
their last offer consisting of an admissible bundle. Then all participants make the last
offer. Consequently, all cliques consisting of one firm and κk agents (admissible κ˜k-
cliques) in all firms are now complete directed graphs. Among others P1a generated
the admissible matchings (Dµ˜,1, . . . , Dµ˜,m) with Dµ˜,1 = {s1, . . . , sκ1, h1}, Dµ˜,2 =
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{sκ1+1, . . . , sκ1+κ2, h2}, . . . , Dµ˜,m = {sPm−1
l=1 κl+1
, . . . , sPm−1
l=1 κl+κm
, hm}. Therefore,
the procedure P1a stops and generated a set of matchings at least consisting of
M = ({s1, . . . , sκ1, h1}, . . . , {sPm−1
l=1 κl+1
, . . . , sPm−1
l=1 κ1+κm
, hm}). 2
Of course it immediately arises the natural question, under which circumstances the
unequation maxk∈H
(
n
κk
)
≤
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
is satisfied. The answer is given by the next
Lemma.
Lemma 4.1.9
1. If m = 2, then maxk∈H
(
n
κk
)
=
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
.
2. If m > 2, κk = κl =: κ¯ for all k, l ∈ H, then maxk∈H
(
n
κk
)
=
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
.
3. If m > 2, κk = κl =: κ¯ for all k, l ∈ H \ {k
′} with κk′ =: κˆ, κ¯ 6= κˆ, then
maxk∈H
(
n
κk
)
>
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
.
Proof: 1. W.l.o.g. we let maxk=1,2(
(
n
κ1
)(
n
κ2
)
) =
(
n
κ1
)
for the left side of the equation.
then the right side is given by
(
n− 1
κ1 − 1
)
+
(
n− 1
κ2 − 1
)
=
(
n− 1
κ1 − 1
)
+
(
n− 1
n− κ1 − 1
)
.(4.3)
It is well known (here applied to the left side) that
(
n
κ1
)
=
(
n− 1
κ1
)
+
(
n− 1
κ1 − 1
)
.(4.4)
Equating (4.3) with (4.4), we have to show
(
n− 1
κ1
)
+
(
n− 1
κ1 − 1
)
=
(
n− 1
κ1 − 1
)
+
(
n− 1
n− κ1 − 1
)
⇔
(
n− 1
κ1
)
=
(
n− 1
n− κ1 − 1
)
⇔
(n− 1)!
(n− 1− κ1)!κ1!
=
(n− 1)!
((n− κ1 − 1)− (n− 1))!(n− κ1 − 1)!
⇔
(n− 1)!
(n− 1− κ1)!κ1!
=
(n− 1)!
κ1!(n− κ1 − 1)!
.
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2. We have maxk∈H
(
n
κk
)
=
(
n
κ¯
)
for the left side of the equation. Since κk = κl =: κ¯
for all k, l ∈ H, it follows for the right side of the equation that,
m∑
k=1
(
n− 1
κk − 1
)
= m
(
n− 1
κ¯− 1
)
.
Hence, we have to show
(
n
κ¯
)
= m
(
n− 1
κ¯− 1
)
.(4.5)
Since the number of vacant jobs in all firms equals the number of participants on
the market, we have m(κ¯+1) = m+n ⇔ mκ¯ = n ⇔ m = n
κ¯
. It follows by inserting
in equation (4.5)
(
n
κ¯
)
=
n
κ¯
(
n− 1
κ¯− 1
)
=
n
κ¯
(n− 1)!
((n− 1)− (κ¯− 1))!(κ¯− 1)!
=
n!
(n− κ¯)!κ¯!
.
3. Since κk = κl =: κ¯ for all k, l ∈ H \ {k
′} with κk′ =: κˆ, κ¯ 6= κˆ, and the number
of vacant jobs equals the number of participants, we have
(m− 1)(κ¯ + 1) + (κˆ + 1) = m + n
⇔ mκ¯ + m− κ¯− 1 + κˆ + 1 = m + n
⇔ (m− 1)κ¯ + κˆ = n
⇔ m =
n− κˆ
κ¯
+ 1.
For the right side of the unequation, which we want to prove, we can write
m∑
k=1
(
n− 1
κk − 1
)
= (m− 1)
(
n− 1
κ¯− 1
)
+
(
n− 1
κˆ− 1
)
.
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Now we have to distinguish between two cases.
Case 1.
(
n
κ¯
)
<
(
n
κˆ
)
, then maxk∈H
(
n
κk
)
=
(
n
κˆ
)
and we have to show
(
n
κˆ
)
> (m− 1)
(
n− 1
κ¯− 1
)
+
(
n− 1
κˆ− 1
)
>
n− κˆ
κ¯
(n− 1)!
(n− κ¯)!(κ¯− 1)!
n
n
+
(
n− 1
κˆ− 1
)
>
n− κˆ
n
(
n
κ¯
)
+
(
n− 1
κˆ− 1
)
⇔
n
n− κˆ
(
n
κˆ
)
>
(
n
κ¯
)
+
(n− 1)!
(n− κˆ)!(κˆ− 1)!
n
n− κˆ
κˆ
κˆ
>
(
n
κ¯
)
+
(
n
κˆ
)
κˆ
n− κˆ
⇔
n− κˆ
n− κˆ
(
n
κˆ
)
>
(
n
κ¯
)
⇔
(
n
κˆ
)
>
(
n
κ¯
)
.
Case 2.
(
n
κ¯
)
>
(
n
κˆ
)
, then maxk∈H
(
n
κk
)
=
(
n
κ¯
)
and we have to show
(
n
κ¯
)
> (m− 1)
(
n− 1
κ¯− 1
)
+
(
n− 1
κˆ− 1
)
(
n
κ¯
)
>
n− κˆ
n
(
n
κ¯
)
+
(
n− 1
κˆ− 1
)
⇔
n
n− κˆ
(
n
κ¯
)
>
(
n
κ¯
)
+
(
n
κˆ
)
κˆ
n− κˆ
⇔
n− (n− κˆ)
n− κˆ
(
n
κ¯
)
>
(
n
κˆ
)
κˆ
n− κˆ
⇔
(
n
κ¯
)
>
(
n
κˆ
)
.
2
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Corollary 4.1.10
From the proof of 3. in Lemma 4.1.9 it follows that given m > 2 and κk 6= κl for all
k, l ∈ H, the inequality maxk∈H
(
n
κk
)
>
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
always holds.
Proof: Given the assumptions that m > 2 and κk 6= κl for all k, l ∈ H, it follows
immediately that that
(
n
κk
)
6=
(
n
κl
)
for all k, l ∈ H, because
(
n
κk
)
=
(
n
κl
)
holds, if and
only if κk = κl or κl = n− κk is satisfied.
This proof refers to Case 1. of part 3. in Lemma 4.1.9.
We assume that maxk∈H
(
n
κk
)
=
(
n
κl
)
=:
(
n
κˆ
)
and
(
n
κˆ
)
>
(
n
κk
)
for all k ∈ H \ {l}. Be-
cause of the proof of part 3. (Case 1.) in Lemma 4.1.9, it follows that maxk∈H
(
n
κk
)
>∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
. 2
Reflecting the last results, we observe for procedure P1a that the results from
Chapter 2 cannot be taken over right away. Only if maxk∈H
(
n
κk
)
≤
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
is satisfied, we have a sufficient condition such that P1a always yields a set of ad-
missible matchings. At the same time, it is not a necessary condition. Hence, if
maxk∈H
(
n
κk
)
>
∑m
k=1
(
n−1
κk−1
)
, the solution gP1a(P ) may still only consist of admis-
sible matchings. Nevertheless, the requirement reduces the quality of the solution.
And one may ask whether it is appropriate to apply P1a at all for the given frame-
work. It is also unclear what happens if P1a selects a set of matchings consisting
of non-admissible matchings or a set of matchings consisting of non-admissible as
well as of admissible matchings. In the thesis we simply exclude these cases. We
already mentioned that we only want to focus on a particular model. If this model
is extended in such a way that firms are employed by other firms and more than
one firm can work for another one, the restriction that only admissible matchings
are allowed, vanishes. But this research direction is not part of our work. Finally,
coming back to the framework, given in this chapter, we can foreclose that the next
procedures P2 and P3a will always yield a set of admissible matchings.
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In the following, we again assume some sort of lexicographic preferences6. We restrict
the class of preferences on lexicographic admissible preferences.
Definition 4.1.11 (Lexicographic Admissible Preferences)
Participant p’s admissible preferences are called lexicographic admissible, if there is
a strict ordering H(Pp ) on H such that for all (k, D) ∈ H×D
−p
κk
, (l, D′) ∈ H×D−pκl
the following condition is satisfied:
(k, D) Pp (l, D
′) ⇔ k H(Pp ) l (k 6= l).
P lexadp is the set of all lexicographic admissible preference profiles of participant p for
all p ∈ P . We denote the set of all lexicographic admissible preference profiles with
P lexad = P lexad1 × . . .×P
lexad
m+n . If p is an agent the condition is identical to Definition
2.2.9 of lexicographic preferences in Chapter 2.
If p ∈ P is a firm one could interprete the condition such that the firm provided
that a firm or a manager/owner of the firm always mostly prefers to work in his own
firm.
Before we start to study the solution of the procedures we have to adjust Lemma
2.3.9. The content remains the same, but the subclass of preferences is different and
we now have to consider participants instead of agents.
Lemma 4.1.12
Let {p ∈ P | k H(Pp ) l, ∀ l ∈ H \ {k}} =: S˜k be the set of participants who mostly
prefer firm k. For any lexicographic admissible preference profile Pp ∈ P
lexad there
always exists at least one firm k, for which |S˜k| ≥ κ˜k.
Each firm always mostly prefers to work for itself. Focusing on the agents only,
the proof is exactly the same as the one for Lemma 2.3.9. Now, we are ready to
6Definition 2.2.9 introduces lexicographic preferences.
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concentrate on the results in the new context. It turns out that most of the results
from Chapter 3 can easily be carried over.
Theorem 4.1.13
For any lexicographic admissible preference profile P∈ P lexad each set of cliques
of any matching in the solution gP2(P ), determined on ΥtP with t = 0, 1, 2, . . .,
satisfies the clique-max-min property on ΥtP .
Theorem 4.1.14
For any lexicographic preference profile P∈ P lexad any matching in the solution
gP2(P ) is
1. Pareto efficient and
2. ta-stable.
The proof is the same as in Theorem 4.1.14. Again squeezing the firm in the agents’
model framework does not have any impact on the results.
Again we have to take care of the fact that the procedure should yield admissible
matchings. To remind the reader of procedure P2, selected firms and agents make
their offers until a set of cliques is reached. They leave the market, and again on the
reduced job market (for participants) selected participants make their offers. This
goes on, until no participants remain on the market.
Theorem 4.1.15
For any P∈ P lexad the solution gP2(P ) only consists of admissible matchings.
Proof: Each selected set of firms and agents make their offers until a set of admissible
cliques7 is determined. Admissible cliques leave the job market. The remaining
7An admissible matching consists of admissible cliques.
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firms’ and agents’ most preferred bundles are admissible. Again a set of firms and
agents is selected. Offers are made until a set of admissible cliques is reached. The
corresponding participants leave the job market. This goes on until an admissible
matching is determined. 2
Next, we discuss the third procedure. As already mentioned, it will be slightly
modified. We change some steps of the former procedure P3a. Basically, in P3a we
first choose an order of agents with equal distribution. The agent with the lowest
index then chooses his colleagues among the other selected agents in a firm. One
motivation to choose a random order was to treat the agents equally, another was
to get a rule how to determine the agent who will choose his colleagues. Now,
we are in a much better situation. We always have a participant in the selected
set of participants who seems to be a natural candidate to choose his colleagues.
Obviously, it is the firm itself. Therefore, we drop the random selection of an order
of the agents, hence step 2 of the former P3a. Step 3 does not change. In the
modified procedure the validity of Lemma 2.3.9 is checked for each firm and the
corresponding firms and agents are selected. In step 4 not the agent with the lowest
index, but the selected firm now chooses its most preferred κk colleagues (employees
at the same time) among those who where also selected for the same firm. The κk
agents together with the firm leave the market. We get a reduced job market for
participants. The procedure goes back to step 2 (step 3 in the former P3a). And
finally, it stops when no more participants are on the job market. We will call the
modified version of P3a in the following P3b.
Theorem 4.1.16
For any P∈ P lexad, the solution gP3b(P ) is
1. Pareto efficient and
2. ta-stable.
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The proof is the same as the one for Theorem 3.1.6. Theorem 4.1.16 is an appealing
result. The firms now choose their future employees among those who applied for
the jobs. Moreover, all properties of P3a remain valid for the solution of P3b.
We get a Pareto efficient matching and no two participants want to exchange their
colleagues and their firms.
It remains to verify whether the solution of P3b only consists of admissible match-
ings. Without the firms’ preferences we always get an admissible matching8. Inte-
grating the firms’ preferences in P3a does not change this result, because of Lemma
4.1.9. At latest, if all agents make their last offer, consisting of an admissible bundle,
an admissible clique is determined.
4.1.3 Comparisons
In this subsection we pause for some comparisons between the results of this chapter
and of the former Chapter 3. Therefore, we consider two simple examples. Both are
described at length in Appendix A. Example A.0.4 is exclusively given for proce-
dure P1a. No lexicographic preferences are assumed. Example A.0.5 will be used
to apply the second procedure.
Example A.0.4 discusses the framework given in Chapter 2 and in Section 4.1. In
the first setting, the firms do not have any preferences. In the second, we include
the firms’ preferences. Here, the agents’ preferences are extended by the firms and
the firms are added. Now, applying P1a to the framework of Chapter 2 (Example
A.0.4 (setting 1.)) leads to the solution M1. If we include the firms’ preferences
(Example A.0.4 (setting 2.)), the procedure P1a delivers M2. A graph theoretical
illustration of both scenarios is given in Example A.0.4.
Comparing the solutions, in M2 agent s3 is matched with a more preferred firm and
colleague than in M1. At the same time the opposite is true for agent s4. Intuitively,
8We do not call it admissible in Chapter 2.
95
4.1. PARTICIPANTS THE BASIC MODEL AND THE FIRMS
one may have expected, by ignoring the firms’ preferences, that the matching, se-
lected by P1a, were strictly preferred by all agents. But this does not - as we have
shown in the Example A.0.4 - have to be the case. The reason for that lies in the
procedure itself. Each complete graph of the matching has to be constructed before
P1a stops. In setting 1. of Example A.0.4 the procedure P1a stops after all agents
having made four offers. If we include the firms’ preferences each complete graph
of a firm increases by one vertex, namely the firm itself. Now after four offers of
all participants, only the admissible cliques {s3, h1} and {s1, s2, h2} form complete
graphs. In clique {s4, s5, h3} the firm h3 did not make its offer, yet. Hence, we do not
have a matching. After six offers the admissible matching M2 occurs such that the
procedure stops. The matching M1 is still not completed, because {s4, s5} is only
firm h3’s seventh most preferred bundle. The matching M2 occurs before. Thus we
have seen, integrating the firms’ preferences on the agents’ side may lead to a com-
pletely different solution. Nevertheless, both solutions contain at least one Pareto
efficient (admissible) matching and satisfy the agent-max-min property. Thus, the
welfare aspects remain identical.
We introduce a second example (A Example A.0.5 ) and proceed in the same man-
ner. In the first setting, the firms’ preferences are excluded, it refers to Chapter 2
and Chapter 3. In the second, they are added. All agents and then participants
have lexicographic (admissible) preferences. With the aid of this example, we can
compare the results of procedures P2, applied to the different preference settings.
Again graph theoretical illustrations are given at length in the example, too.
Applying procedure P2 to Example A.0.5 (setting 1.), we get a unique solution
M1 = ({s1, s4}, {s2, s5}, {s3}). First the clique {s1, s4} is selected in firm h1. Next,
the other two cliques are selected simultaneously.
Next, we have to apply the same procedure to participants. For this, we take
the extended version of the preferences given in Example A.0.5 setting 2. Firms
are no longer indifferent. We get a solution consisting of three admissible match-
ings, M1 = ({s1, s4, h1}, {s2, s5, h2}, {s3, h3}) (which is the same as above), M
2 =
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({s1, s3, h1}, {s4, s5, h2}, {s2, h3}) and M
3 = ({s1, s3, h1}, {s2, s5, h2}, {s4, h3}).
Both solutions (with and without the firms’ preferences) satisfy Pareto efficiency
and each clique in the reduced job market for agents ΥtS (for participants Υ
t
P ),
t = 1, 2, . . . in the matchings fulfills the clique-max-min property. But we also ob-
serve that the solution M 1 of P2 is some sort of a subset9 of the solution of P2
given the participants’ preferences. This is coincidence. A clique that would have
been matched given only the agents’ preferences, does not have to be selected at
all, given the participants’ preferences. For example assume the agents are matched
after the first round but the firms only rank these colleagues on the third rank. In
the second round two other agents and the same firm are matched because they
all have each other on their second rank of the preference list. Then, these agents
and the firm are matched, they leave the market. Therefore, the solution of P2,
given a job market for agents ΥS, cannot be a subset of the solution of P2, given
a job market for participants, ΥP . If an example yields g
P2(P ) ⊆ gP2(S), it
is again only a coincidence. In each selected set of participants we also have the
firm now. This additional participant may restrict the number of selected cliques.
For example a firm k has κ˜k = 3 jobs. If we only take the agents’ preferences into
account (with κk = 3 we have two vacant jobs in firm k) and we have three selected
agents, we may have three different complete graphs after two rounds. Now, if we
add the firms’ preferences, we only can have two complete graphs after two rounds.
Thus, the number of different paths for potential matchings, we will follow dimin-
ished by one. Hence, in the job market for agents, cliques may emerge in P2 that
are not at all selected in the job market for participants. This is the explanation
for gP2(P ) 6⊆ gP2(S). Finally, no inclusion of the two solutions holds in general.
In one example, it is better for some agents if the firms’ preferences are included in
the other it is not. This is a counterintuitive observation. It seems to be plausible
that extending the set of agents by the firms and, consequently, taking the interests
9With “some sort of a subset” we mean, the same agents working in the same firm (and with
the same firm).
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of m + n participants into account, yields a deterioration for the agents. But as
discussed above this does not have to be the case.
A comparison of the solutions of the last procedures (P3a and P3b) is more difficult
since we modified the procedure in this chapter. Instead of letting chance choose,
the agent who selects his colleagues, now the firm is a natural candidate to choose.
The solutions only coincide if the agent who will choose the clique has the same
preferences as the firm does.
4.1.4 Incentive Compatibility
Again we want to discuss incentive compatibility, because it is an important crite-
rion for the acceptance of a procedure. To give a better illustration, we base the
analysis on Example A.0.1 (setting 2.) and on Example A.0.2 (setting 2.) given in
Appendix A.
We start with procedure P1a given the lexicographic admissible10 preferences of
participants in Example A.0.1 (setting 2). It turns out that both, agents and firms,
have an incentive to misrepresent their preferences, in order to be matched to a
strictly preferred clique. Hence, the procedure P1a does not necessarily have to be
incentive compatible, even if we face a job market for participants now. Neither the
agents nor the firms may have an incentive to state their true preferences.
Next we discuss procedure P2 on the basis of Example A.0.2 (setting 2). All partic-
ipants have lexicographic admissible preferences. Analyzing the example, it turned
out that again neither an agent nor a firm may have an incentive to state his true
preferences. Both an agent s5 and a firm h1 get a better matching in Example A.0.2
(setting 2.), if they are lying. Hence, also this procedure is not incentive compatible.
10Of course, a more general framework of preferences is possible, but again to facilitate the
comparisons between the solution of different procedures, we already restricted the preferences for
P1a.
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Nothing changed with the integration of firms’ preferences.
Last, we investigate incentive compatibility for P3b, which arose as a modification
of the incentive compatible procedure P3a in ΥS. We again start to analyze the
agents and then the firms. We take Example A.0.3 to show that there exist one
agent who will be able to ameliorate his outcome by misrepresenting his prefer-
ences. As we can easily see, only the fact that now for sure the firms select their
future employees (and no longer a randomly selected agent) is sufficient to turn an
incentive compatible procedure into a non-incentive compatible one for the agents.
So, agents have incentives to misrepresent their preferences. But this statement is
not true for the firms. Each selected firm chooses its future employees among the
set of given applicants. Misrepresenting their preferences such that a less preferred
bundle gets a higher rank as it has, only results in selecting a less preferred bundle.
The firm only cheats itself. This cannot be beneficial for the firm.
Summarizing, procedure P1a is not necessarily incentive compatible for any partic-
ipant. The same holds for procedure P2. In procedure P3b lying is only worth for
the agents.
4.2 The Firms
This section seems to be a natural consequence of the former chapters. First we
only discussed the agents’ preferences, then we included the firms’ preferences and
now, we only want to focus on the firms’ preferences.
Each firm has several vacant jobs. A common way to introduce preferences over
groups of agents is to deal with responsive preferences or to restrict the analysis
on substitutable preferences, already mentioned in Chapter 1 (or see also Roth &
Sotomayor (1990)). We deviate from the classical way of preference restrictions in
this setting, because we do not want to assume agents to be substitutes in firms.
We rather want to take into account that a worker is influenced by his colleagues.
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He may have colleagues, he really get along with such that their team work is much
more productive as if one of them would be replaced by another worker. Firms
are aware of these influences. Consequently, they have preferences over groups of
agents, no particular structure is assumed. On the other hand, we totally ignore the
agents’ interests in this section.
Similar to the first part of this thesis, we set up a general framework and then
introduce the properties a matching should satisfy - but this time from the firms’
perspective. In particular, we define another notion of stability for the firms. Fur-
thermore, we discuss two procedures, similar to P1a and P3a in which matchings
are selected based on the firms’ preferences.
4.2.1 The Framework
The framework is closely related to the classical ”many-to-one” matching contexts.
In this section, we focus on the “one” side. We neglect the agents’ preferences and
discuss the firms’ preferences over groups of agents at length. The main setting is
exactly the same as in Chapter 2. Each firm k has a fixed number of vacant jobs κk
and faces all possible κk-cliques (in Cκk) it could hire, given the total number n of
agents on the job market. We have the same sets of firms H and of agents S. The
firms’ preferences are described as follows.
Each firm k has a strict preference relation Hk on Cκk . 
H
k is a linear ordering. We
write H= (H1 , . . . ,
H
m) as preference profile. P
H
k denotes the set of all possible
preference profiles of firm k, for all k ∈ H. And we denote the set of all preference
profiles with PH = PH1 × . . .× P
H
m .
Let us pause for some discussion. Roth (1985) first introduced preferences over
groups of agents. He defined responsive preferences11. In principal, a firm’s prefer-
ence relation is called responsive to its preferences over individual agents if, for any
11The forerunner of weakly responsive preferences.
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two cliques that differ in only one individual agent, it prefers the clique with the
more preferred agent. Preferences over groups can be still led back to preferences
over singles. Next, there is also the definition of substitutability12, which generalizes
the definition of responsiveness. The economic interpretation of this property is
the following. Each firm regards agents as substitutes rather than as complements.
Even if subsets of agents become unavailable, because e.g. they decided to work for
another firm, a firm still wants to employ an agent who is an element of its most
preferred subset.
Here we do not restrict the firms’ preferences over κk-cliques in such a manner.
Taking an arbitrary κk-clique, firm k always can state, according to its preferences,
whether it prefers this bundle given another one or not. But we are not able to
derive preferences over single agents or arbitrary subsets of agents. In our con-
text the idea of substitutes, which lies behind the definition of responsiveness and
substitutability is no longer applicable. This creates room for the interpretation
of complements, which we will explain next. We have two cliques only differing in
one agent, assume si in the first clique, sj in the second. The firm k prefers the
clique with si to the clique with sj. Next, we take two other cliques again only
differing in the same agents, si and sj, but the composition of the remaining κk − 1
agents is different. The firm now prefers the clique with sj instead of the clique
with si. Consequently, the different subsets of agents within the cliques cause a
reversal of the preferences on si and sj if we try to derive preference relations over
single agents. We do not regard agents as simple substitutes. Preferences over single
agents depend on the other employees in the clique. We cannot derive preferences
over single agents from preferences over cliques. Assuming responsive preferences,
this was possible. The same argumentation holds comparing our preference relation
with substitutable preferences. We have a set of the most preferred agents for a
firm. If a firm’s preferred set of agents from S includes si, so will its preferred set
of agents from any subset of S that still includes si. This is no longer the case.
12See also Roth & Sotomayor (1990), p. 174.
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An intuitive application for this preference structure is a coach’s preferences over
his soccer team. Assume, we have two κk-cliques (κk = 11, k = 1, 2) only differ-
ing in one agent, one agent is a forward the other agent is a defender. We cannot
automatically conclude that the coach always likes the κk-clique with the forward
better than the one with the defender. His preferences between the two different
individuals may vary according to the composition of the remaining κk − 1 = 10
agents. His preferences over the single agent clearly depend on the whole team.
Comparing the firms’ preferences with those of the agents and the participants in the
former models reveals a different domain. Firms only have preferences over cliques,
subsets of agents of a fixed size. Agents (in the model of Chapter 2) or participants
(in Section 4.1) have to think about whether they like the firm they work for and
whether they will get along with their colleagues. Firms only care about their future
employees/cliques. In later sections we will see what kind of impact this difference
has on the properties and the procedures.
After having introduced the basic framework of the job market that only deals with
the firms’ preferences, we summarize:
ΥH = (H, S, (κk)k∈H ,
H).
Considering the matching functions, µ or µ˜, we note that a mapping from the set
of agents into the set of firms is not the right description in this section. But if we
consider the inverse function of the mapping µ, we get a correspondence, illustrating
firms that are matched with cliques. Formalizing this observation, we get the next
definition.
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Definition 4.2.1 (Inverse Matching)
A correspondence µˆ : H ⇒ S is called inverse matching, if for all k ∈ H we have
µˆ(k) ∈ Cκk . We define Cµˆ,k := µˆ(k) as the κk-clique under µˆ for each firm k.
13
An alternative description of the inverse matching µˆ is M = (Cµˆ,1, . . . , Cµˆ,m). All
inverse matchings are given by Mˆ := {Mµˆ | µˆ is an inverse matching}.
This definition is not really new. We deal with the inverse function14 of the agents’
matching function µ. Again an alternative description of an inverse matching is
given by the equations (2.1) and (2.2).
Remark 4.2.2
Given our strict preference relation Hk on Cκk , we can deduce (weak) preferences
over matchings M, M ′ ∈ Mˆ. A matching M is strictly preferred to M ′ by firm k, if
and only if firm k strictly prefers the clique, it is matched with in M . But firm k is
indifferent between two matchings, if he always gets the same employees, regardless
of which matching, M or M ′, is given. The formal description is: Let M(Hk ) be
the preference relation on Mˆ derived from the firms’ preferences Hk on Cκk given
by M MP (
H
k ) M
′ if and only if C Hk C
′ and M MI(
H
k ) M
′ if and only if C = C ′.
Denote by MP (
H
k ) and MI(
H
k ) its strict and indifferent component. Firm k gets
clique C, if we face the matching M .15
Definition 4.2.3 (Firms’ Ranking Function)
We define a mapping vHk : Cκk → {1, . . . , |Cκk|} with v
H
k (C) > v
H
k (C
′), if and only
if C Hk C
′ is a firm’s ranking function for each k ∈ H. vHk (C) is called the rank of
C with C ∈ Cκk .
13Of course, Cµ,k = Cµˆ,k, we decided to use Cµˆ,k, because it fits better in the terminology of
this section.
14to be precise “inverse correspondence”
15C ′ if it faces the matching M ′.
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Each firm k ∈ H assigns a rank to each κk-clique C ∈ Cκk that may work for it.
We assume that the ranking function is discrete and increasing, the more preferred
a clique is, the higher the rank it gets. Furthermore, we again assume that all
firms assign their most preferred clique the same rank, their second most preferred
and so on. Depending on κk, the firms will not rank the same number of cliques.
Consequently, the highest rank must be equal to the maxk∈H |Cκk |.
4.2.2 Properties
There are several reasons why some matchings seem to be “better” for the firms
than others. To give the word “better” a more precise meaning, we introduce some
well defined properties. They already turned out to be meaningful when we only
discussed the agents preferences. We again discuss Pareto efficiency and a max-min
property, but this time from the firms’ perspective. Next, we introduce a notion of
stability. Again only two firms will be able to block a matching.
Definition 4.2.4 (Firms’ Pareto Efficiency)
A matching M ∈ Mˆ is firm Pareto efficient, if there is no other matching M ′ ∈ Mˆ,
in which no firm is worse off and at least one firm is strictly better off in the sense
of Remark 4.2.2.
If a firm k gets a strictly preferred κk-clique in another matching, then at least one
other firm l gets a strictly less preferred κl-clique. A firm Pareto efficient matching
always exists. For a proof of this claim, we refer to Theorem 2.2.2.16
The basic idea of the max-min property remains the same as in Section 2.2. Focusing
on the firms’ side, changes the definition such that we have to take the firms’ ranking
functions and the inverse matching µˆ.
16We use the fact that the set of matchings in the job market and the set of firms are finite.
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Definition 4.2.5 (Firm-max-min)
A matching M¯ ∈ Mˆ fulfills the firm-max-min property if
M¯ ∈ argmax
Mµˆ∈Mˆ
min
k∈H
vHk (Cµˆ,k).
Facing any matching, we take the minimal rank over all firms’ ranks. Then facing
all matchings, we determine the maximal rank over all such minimal ranks. This set
of matchings fulfills the firm-max-min property. The economic interpretation is the
same as in Chapter 2. Because of finiteness of Mˆ, at least one matching satisfying
the firm-max-min property always exists.
Now we come to the last property, the notion of stability. First, we give some
basic motivation. For sure, each firm is interested in avoiding high fluctuations in
manpower. To become acquainted with a new job not only takes some time but
is also costly for the firm. Another aspect, the evidence of which becomes most
enlightened, if we focus on a soccer team (or other sports teams), is the efficiency17
of a team or a group of agents. The longer a group of agents plays soccer together,
the more they can coordinate and the better - or the more successful - they become.
Even if we do not explicitly model these aspects, they still are very good motivations
why stability is a desirable property.
Before giving a precise definition of stability, we first have to introduce some further
notation. Considering two firms, we define Ek,l := {(ck, cl) | ck ⊆ C ∈ Cκk , cl ⊆
C ∈ Cκl , |ck| = |cl| ≤ min{κk, κl}}. Ek,l is the set of all pairs of subgroups of
agents in two firms with an equal amount of agents. The maximal number of agents
in |ck|
18 is always equal to the minimal number of jobs, one of the two firms is
offering. We call Ek,l the exchange set, because it consists of all possible subgroups
of agents, which two firms can exchange. Now, we consider a matching M ∈ Mˆ.
We say, a matching M is tf -blocked “blocked by trade among firms” by two firms
17demotic use of the term
18therefore also in cl
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(k, l) with k, l ∈ H, if both get a higher rank by exchanging a pair of subgroups of
agents (ck, cl) ∈ Ek,l. It immediately becomes clear, why we established the set Ek,l.
Firms cannot exchange agents, if one firm would like to exchange more agents than
the other firm has vacant jobs.
Several (economic) interpretations are at hand. Beyond the firm setting where
different departments in one firm may want to exchange their employees to increase
the team skills, one may think of a soccer team playing for a specific club. If soccer
defenders do not get along very well with the mid fielders, the coach may prefer to
exchange some players with another soccer club to “increase the soccer clubs’ rank”.
Two clubs or firms always give away and get back the same number of agents.
As long as firms can get a higher rank by exchanging subsets of their employees,
a permanent matching is not given. Therefore, we are interested in establishing
stability.
Definition 4.2.6 (tf-Stability)
A matching M ∈ Mˆ is tf -stable, if it is not tf -blocked by any two firms.
Remark 4.2.7
The set of firm Pareto optimal matchings is a subset of the set of tf -stable matchings.
We want to discuss the relation between firm Pareto efficiency and tf -stability. The
notion of tf -stability is restricted to two firms that exchange subsets of agents if
they both reach a higher rank. The notion of firm Pareto efficiency is similar. If a
matching is not firm Pareto efficient, we can make someone, i.e. a firm, better off and
no one worse off while only two firms exchange a subset of agents. But in contrast
to tf -stability, this phenomenon is not restricted to two firms. Several firms can be
involved into firm Pareto improvement. Therefore, a firm Pareto efficient matching
is in particular tf -stable whereas a tf -stable matching does not necessarily have to
be firm Pareto efficient.
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We come to another comparison. What are the differences or similarities between
ta-stability and tf -stability? The first notion of stability defines two agents who can
ta-block a matching by exchanging their jobs - and therefore their colleagues as well
- in different firms. The second notion focuses on two firms that can tf -block. The
firms exchange subsets of agents who work for them. Thus, in former models agents
(or participants) only can exchange themselves whereas in this section firms are able
to exchange all kind of subsets19 of agents working for them. Both definitions of
stability focus on an exchange of agents, once the blocking behavior is initiated by
the agents themselves, once by the firms.
Another interesting aspect is the investigation how the exchange of agents influences
other agents not involved into blocking. If a pair of agents ta-block a matching, this
changes the ranks of all agents they worked with before, too. It has no influence on
agents working in firms the ta-blocking pair of agents does not work for. But if a
pair of firms exchanges a subset of agents, this has no influence on other firms at all
and the agents’ belongings are not taken into account in this model.
Theorem 4.2.8 (Existence of tf -stable matchings)
For any preference profile H∈ PH a tf -stable matching always exists.
Proof: Assume each matching M ∈ Mˆ is tf -blocked. Since the set of matchings
is finite, there exists a cycle such that tf -blocking never ends. Denote the set of
matchings contained in this cycle by Z. Let M, M ′, M ′′ ∈ Z be matchings in the
cycle. Now, firm k tf -blocks M together with another firm. We get a matching M
′
whereas M ′ MP (
H
k ) M . In analyzing M
′, we get either k is again an element of the
blocking pair, then M ′′ MP (
H
k ) M
′ MP (
H
k ) M or k is no element of the tf -blocking
pair, nevertheless M ′′ MP (
H
k ) M . Since M ∈ Z, we come back to M after finitely
many steps. So M MP (
H
k ) M . This is a contradiction. Consequently, there always
exists a tf -stable matching. 2
19Of course, given the restriction that (ck , cl) ∈ Ek,l.
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We emphasize again that no assumption was made to restrict the class of preferences.
The key of this existence result is the fact that exchanging subsets of agents between
two firms does not affect the other firms’ ranks.
4.2.3 Procedures and Results
Again we want to discuss procedures, which select matchings. All procedures are
related to those we already introduced in former sections. But the fact that we
deal with the firms’ preferences requires adjustments. We again20 identify a pro-
cedure with an outcome correspondence (for firms). We have gˆ : PH ⇒ Mˆ with
(H1 , . . . ,
H
m) 7→ gˆ(
H
1 , . . . ,
H
m). The correspondence selects for each vector of m
firms’ preferences a set of matchings. We focus on P1a and P3a. We skip P2,
the reason for that becomes evident, once we have analyzed the results of P1a. We
start with a variation of P1a.
Procedure 1b (P1b)
1. Each firm k announces its most preferred κk-clique C ∈ Cκk it would like to
hire among those it has not announced, yet.
2. We check whether (2.1) and (2.2) are satisfied (given all announced cliques in
this round and in the former rounds).
• If so, the procedure stops, we get a set of matchings.
• If not, we reenter step 1. All announcements of former rounds remain
valid.
The solution of the procedure P1b is denoted by gˆP1b(H). The structure of this
procedure is slightly different compared to P1a. We cannot construct complete
20For comparisons see Subsection 2.3.2.
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graphs any longer. In procedure P1a agents make offers among agents. Each offer
consists of questions. To get a matching in P1a, it is necessary to ask all agents in the
clique and being asked by all agents in the clique (part of the matching). Whereas
in this model firms only announce their most preferred clique, second most preferred
and so on, they want to hire. Once each pairwise intersection between all cliques is
empty (Ck ∩ Cl = ∅ for all k, l ∈ H), such that all agents have a job, the procedure
stops. Hence, the main difference is the fact that a firm does not have to wait for
some sort of counter announcements. Procedure P1a did not stop before all offers
in a clique and in all firms were made such that a matching occurred. In procedure
P1b it suffices if all announcements in all firms constructing a matching are made.
Obviously, this may include more than one matching. A direct consequence of this
difference is that the graph theoretic illustration of complete graphs, introduced in
Subsection 2.3.1, is not applicable in this context.
Theorem 4.2.9
For any preference profile H∈ PH , the solution gˆP1b(H)
1. contains at least one Pareto efficient matching,
2. contains at least one tf -stable matching and
3. coincides with the matchings that fulfill the firm-max-min property.
Proof: 1. and 3. are analogous to the proofs of Theorem 3.1.1.
2. Assume there does not exist a tf -stable matching in the solution of P1b. Then
all M ∈ gˆP1b are tf -blocked by a pair of firms. Let (hk, hl) be such a pair of firms
that tf -blocks any matching M . By exchanging subsets of agents (ck, cl) ∈ Ek,l,
both firms get a higher rank in a new matching M ′. But this matching is already
selected by P1b. Thus, the assumption was wrong. 2
The most interesting result is for sure the fact that the solution of P1b contains
a tf -stable matching whereas the solution of P1a is not ta-stable. And even more;
109
4.2. THE FIRMS THE BASIC MODEL AND THE FIRMS
Given the most general form of preferences for P1a, a ta-stable matchings does not
have to exist at all. Why is this result so different? If a matching is ta-blocked
and, consequently, two agents exchange their jobs, they improve their ranks. But
at the same time, they also change the ranks of their former colleagues. Therefore,
a ta-blocking pair of agents may induce another pair of agents, which will ta-block
afterwards. According to Theorem 2.2.7, there does not have to exist a ta-stable
matching at all. Now, if two firms tf -block a matching, they both will get a better
rank. But the more important observation is the fact that they do not influence the
outcome of the other firms. This makes it a much easier concept of stability.
The second procedure or its modification becomes superfluous. First P1b already
generates a tf -stable matching and second the structure of the firms’ preferences is
different. To introduce lexicographic preferences in this context seems to be rather
artificial than a natural consequence.
The next obvious question is, whether the procedure P1b is incentive compatible.
A simple example shows that is not.
Example 4.2.10
We have H = {h1, h2}. Each firm has two vacant jobs, κ1 = κ2 = 2, hence we have
S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} agents on the job market. The firms’ preferences
21 are:
(s1, s2) 
H
1 (s1, s3) 
H
1 (s3, s4) 
H
1 (s1, s4) 
H
1 . . .
(s1, s2) 
H
2 (s3, s4) 
H
2 (s1, s3) 
H
2 (s2, s3) 
H
2 . . . 2
Applying P1b, we get M = ({s1, s2}, {s3, s4}). Now, if firm h2 announces the
preferences (s1, s2) 
H
2 (s2, s3) 
H
2 (s1, s3) 
H
2 . . . instead of its true preferences,
then the procedure selects the matching M ′ = ({s3, s4}, {s1, s2}) which is strictly
better for firm h2. It gets its most preferred clique. The second firm simply has to
forestall the matching M . Therefore, incentive compatibility is not satisfied.
21We forgo to give a complete description of the preferences.
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The second procedure we want to discuss in this section is a procedure proposed by
Roth & Sotomayor (1990). We call it in the following procedure P3c to stay in our
terminology and because the course of action is basically the same as in P3a and
P3b.
Procedure 3c (P3c)
We fix the order of the firms with an equal distribution. The first firm in this order
chooses the agents, which he mostly wants to hire. The firm and the chosen agents
leave the job market. The firm with the lowest index in the set of remaining firms
now chooses its future employees. Again the firm and the chosen agents leave the
job market. The procedure stops when the last firm took its choice.22
Theorem 4.2.11
Let H∈ PH be a preference profile and fix an order of firms. Then the solution
gˆP3c(H) w.r.t. to this order is
1. singleton,
2. firm Pareto efficient and
3. tf -stable.
Proof: 1. There are m firms. According to the fixed order, each firm k selects its
κk-clique. Hence, m firms are selecting
∑m
k=1 κk agents. This equals the number of
agents in one matching.
2. Assume (C1, . . . , Cm) = M ∈ gˆ
P3a(H) is not Pareto efficient. Then there exists
another matching (C ′1, . . . , C
′
m) = M
′ ∈ Mˆ such that no agent is worse off and at
least one is strictly better off. W.l.o.g let C1 be a clique chosen first by the firm with
the lowest index k in the set of firms. Then C1 = C
′
1, because if C1 6= C
′
1 firm k will
22This, of course, is not really taking its choice, since only one clique left on the market.
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be worse off. The job market is reduced by C1. W.l.o.g let C2 be a clique chosen first
by the firms with the lowest index l in the remaining set of firms. Then C2 = C
′
2,
because if C2 6= C
′
2 firm l would be worse off. He only could be strictly better off,
if C1 
H
l C2, but then firm k would be strictly worse off. This argumentation goes
on until all cliques are checked. It follows M = M ′, hence, M ∈ gˆP3c(H) is firm
Pareto efficient.
3. Assume the solution of the procedure is not tf -stable, then there are two firms
k, k′, which want to exchange a subgroup of agents (ck, cl) ∈ Ek,l. We know one
firm chose its clique in an earlier round than the other. W.l.o.g., it is k. If k
exchanges a subgroup of agents it gets a better outcome. It got this subgroup from
the firm k′ which chose in a later round, because a firm that chooses before firm k,
would already have taken the clique with the more preferred subset. But then, the
subgroup of agents was already available for it, when it had chosen its actual clique.
So, k cannot be a partner in a tf -blocking coalition. This holds for all possible
tf -blocking coalition. Therefore, the solution of P3c is always tf -stable. 2
The procedure does not fulfill the firm-max-min property. Given the fixed order of
firms, each firm selects among the remaining agents the clique it prefers most. The
fact that its choice is always restricted on the remaining agents, is the main reason
for the lack of the firm-max-min property. For example, if we have two firms H =
{h1, h2} with κ1 = κ2 = 2. h1 chooses first its most preferred clique. We assume for
firm h2 it only remains its less preferred clique, but there also exists a matching where
both firms would get their second most preferred cliques. Clearly, the matching,
determined by the procedure, cannot satisfy the firm-max-min property.
Theorem 4.2.12
The mechanism M3c is incentive compatible given a fixed order of firms.
Proof: Assume a firm misrepresents its preferences. It gets its most preferred clique
given the untruthfully stated preferences. If this is not conform with his most
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preferred bundle given his true preferences, he gets a lower rank. Hence, stating the
true preferences is incentive compatible. 2
The fact that a firm only has preferences over cliques, slightly changes the results.
We had to introduce another notion of stability and we also had to modify the
procedures P1a and P3a. P2 becomes superfluous because of the different under-
lying structure of the preferences. Nevertheless, a lot of results remain valid. The
solution of P1b contains at least one firm Pareto efficient matching and fulfills the
firm-max-min property. Furthermore, it produces a tf -stable matching. However,
P1b is not incentive compatible. The second procedure P3c delivers a singleton
solution that is firm Pareto efficient and tf -stable. Furthermore, the procedure is
incentive compatible.
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we have addressed the firms’ requests. For this, we have chosen two
different approaches. The first one integrates the firms into the agents’ side, the sec-
ond one leaves the firms on the other side. Thus on the one hand, we take all parties
into account whereas on the other hand we only focus on the firms’ belongings.
If we compare the results of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we observe that considering
agents or participants does not influence the properties of the solution gP1a. Given
a preference profile in PS or PP , the solution contains at least one Pareto efficient
matching and fulfills the agent-max-min property. The solutions of P2 in the pres-
ence of lexicographic preferences or lexicographic admissible preferences are also
identical. The same holds for the solutions of P3a and P3b, even if the procedures
are slightly different. Furthermore, given the preference profiles in PS the mecha-
nism M3a is the only one which is incentive compatible. Given the participants’
preference profiles PP , none of the procedures is entirely23 incentive compatible. In
23for all sides of the market
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this context the results are changing, if we add the firms on the agents’ side.
The second section of this chapter dealt with the firms’ preferences only. We in-
troduce another notion of stability. The procedures are also modified. The main
difference in comparison to the former models is the fact that the solution of the
procedure P1b is already tf -stable. This is caused by the different structure of
the bundles, over which the firms have preferences and, consequently, the slightly
different notion of stability. The solution gˆP3a is singleton, firm Pareto efficient and
tf -stable. Furthermore, the procedure itself is incentive compatible. Compared to
gP3a, nothing has changed.
Summarizing, different models and procedures lead to different solutions and de-
pending on what kind of properties a society judges as most important it can choose
the appropriate model.
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Concluding Comments
First, we want to give a short overview of the models, we have introduced in the
thesis. We defined new properties for the solution of a particular matching problem,
new procedures that lead to a solution were described and we investigated incen-
tive compatibility of the procedures. We briefly want to abstract and evaluate the
insights, we gained during our analysis. And finally, we will illustrate some rough
ideas about possible extensions that arose during the formation of the thesis.
In the first chapter, the literature overview illustrates the parallel evolution of al-
gorithms in the practical as well as in the theoretical world, given typical two-sided
matching problems. It is quite interesting to see that, independently from each
other, both approaches reached the same solution even if the inventors’ skills were
totally different. In addition, it is also amazing that it took ten years until prac-
tioners and theorists learned about each others’ solutions of the problem. The last
section embeds the thesis in the literature which is not obvious. There are few ref-
erences in the literature in which agents are having preferences over firms as well as
over other agents (colleagues).
The second and the third chapter belong together. A new model is introduced for
many-to-one sided matching problems, whereas we put the main emphasis on the
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agents’ side. They have preferences over firms and colleagues. In this context max-
min properties and a new notion of stability, namely ta-stability, are defined. We
judge “favoring the least” and a “durable matching on the job market” as highly
desirable properties. The new framework leads to new procedures that yield a set
of matchings. Depending on the chosen procedure, different properties are fulfilled
by the solutions (matchings). Hence according to the properties a society judges to
be most important, it (or a central planner) can choose the appropriate procedure.
Furthermore, two of the three procedures are supported by a graph theoretical rep-
resentation. This makes it especially easy to follow the course of action. Besides the
quality of the solution and an easy illustration, we also focused on the quality of the
procedures themselves. It turned out not to be trivial at all to develop procedures
inducing agents to state their true preferences, hence to be incentive compatible.
Only the third procedure satisfies this property.
Chapter 4 discusses the firms’ preferences. Firms are no longer indifferent, they do
care about their future employees which is indeed a plausible assumption. In the
first section we simply integrated the firms in the model of Chapter 2 as if they
were agents. The results only change in such a way that we have m more agents
(m firms) on the agents’ side. On the firms’ side nothing changed. The procedures
may determine different solutions, but the welfare and practical aspects are not
affected by this sort of extension. In the second section we excluded the agents’
preferences and only focused on the firms. Therefore, two modifications of the first
and the third procedure (introduced in Chapter 2) are established. The basic struc-
ture of this model remains similar, compared to the former ones. Nevertheless, we
had to adjust a couple of things. Firms only have preferences over cliques, hence
over bundles, only consisting of elements of the other side. This has various conse-
quences for the analysis. First the notion of stability becomes different. In Chapter
2 agents exchanged themselves and influenced other agents’ ranks simultaneously.
In Section 4.2 firms are exchanging subsets of agents which has no influence on
other firms. Furthermore, the existence of tf -stable matchings is given without any
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additional restrictions on the preferences. A graph theoretical representation is no
longer applicable, and a modification of the procedures becomes necessary. Finally,
the separate analysis of each side showed that they are not symmetric and revealed
a lot of differences and new insights. Regarding firms as if they were employed by
themselves is a simple way to include the agents’ and the firms’ preferences which
leads to reasonable results.
All models do not exist in the literature, yet. During their description we made
some simplifying assumptions. Dropping these restrictions, would be a first natural
extension of the models. Secondly, further ideas about possible modifications came
to our mind during the genesis of the thesis.
We always assumed a job market with equal numbers of vacant jobs and agents,
searching for a job. This clearly is an unrealistic assumption. On the one hand
nowadays, we typically have an excess supply of labor. But on the other hand, we
could as well think of an excess supply of jobs. In this case an obvious application
would be the number of vacant jobs for high qualified agents. Hence, to model an
excess of supply or demand of jobs should be one of the first next steps. Another
aspect is the fact that not every job is acceptable for an agent, i.e. the agent likes
the job at least as well as remaining unemployed, and probably not every clique is
acceptable for a firm. An agent may prefer to stay unemployed as well as the firms
could decide to leave positions unfilled instead of hiring non-qualified persons (or
groups of agents). This is a well known requirement in the marriage market prob-
lem. A man or a woman may prefer to stay alone instead of being matched with
an unacceptable mate. To include these requirements could be another extension
that further approaches the models to a representation of the real job market. Next,
uniqueness of the solution cannot be guaranteed by all procedures, yet. We did not
discuss in detail how to select a matching being an element of the solution or who
should select. This is a shortcoming, preventing the application of the models to
the real job market.
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Further research raises the question whether a more separate treatment of the two
sides of the market is possible without identifying the firms as agents. One could
try to merge the framework of Chapter 2 and Section 4.2. In this context several
problems are immediately at hand. What could be an appropriate procedure that
comprises both sides’ interests? Does there exist a set of matchings satisfying ta-
and tf -stability? Or, is it necessary to think of other properties a matching should
satisfy? Plenty of further questions arise. In this regard, we would like to close the
short summary of possible extensions and we leave the reader alone in order that he
can fantasize on his own about other interesting extensions.
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Examples
Example A.0.1 (P1a and Incentive Compatibility)
1. Let H = {h1, h2} with κ1 = 3, κ2 = 2 and S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}. The agents
have lexicographic preferences.
(h1, {s2, s3}) 
S
s1
(h1, {s2, s4}) 
S
s1
(h1, {s3, s4}) 
S
s1
(h1, {s2, s5})
Ss1 (h1, {s4, s5}) 
S
s1
(h1, {s3, s5}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s3}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s2})
Ss1 (h2, {s4}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s5})
(h1, {s1, s3}) 
S
s2
(h1, {s1, s4}) 
S
s2
(h1, {s3, s4}) 
S
s2
(h1, {s1, s5})
Ss2 (h1, {s4, s5}) 
S
s2
(h1, {s3, s5}) 
S
s2
(h2, {s3}) 
S
s2
(h2, {s1})
Ss2 (h2, {s5}) 
S
s2
(h2, {s4})
(h1, {s2, s4}) 
S
s3
(h1, {s4, s5}) 
S
s3
(h1, {s1, s2}) 
S
s3
(h1, {s2, s5})
Ss3 (h1, {s1, s4}) 
S
s3
(h1, {s1, s5}) 
S
s3
(h2, {s5}) 
S
s3
(h2, {s4})
Ss3 (h2, {s2}) 
S
s3
(h2, {s1})
(h1, {s1, s2}) 
S
s4
(h1, {s2, s3}) 
S
s4
(h1, {s3, s5}) 
S
s4
(h1, {s1, s5})
Ss4 (h1, {s2, s5}) 
S
s4
(h1, {s1, s3}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s3}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s5})
Ss4 (h2, {s2}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s1})
(h1, {s3, s4}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s2, s4}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s2, s3}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s1, s4})
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Ss5 (h1, {s1, s3}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s1, s2}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s3}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s4})
Ss5 (h2, {s1}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s2})
2. Let P = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, h1, h2} with κ˜1 = 4, κ˜2 = 3. The participants have
lexicographic admissible preferences.
(h1, {s2, s3, h1}) 
P
s1
(h1, {s2, s4, h1}) 
P
s1
(h1, {s3, s4, h1})
Ps1 (h1, {s2, s5, h1}) 
P
s1
(h1, {s4, s5, h1}) 
P
s1
(h1, {s3, s5, h1})
Ps1 (h2, {s3, h2}) 
P
s1
(h2, {s2, h2}) 
P
s1
(h2, {s4, h2}) 
P
s1
(h2, {s5, h2}). . .
(h1, {s1, s3, h1}) 
P
s2
(h1, {s1, s4, h1}) 
P
s2
(h1, {s3, s4, h1})
Ps2 (h1, {s1, s5, h1}) 
P
s2
(h1, {s4, s5, h1}) 
P
s2
(h1, {s3, s5, h1})
Ps2 (h2, {s3, h2}) 
P
s2
(h2, {s1, h2}) 
P
s2
(h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s2
(h2, {s4, h2}) . . .
(h1, {s2, s4, h1}) 
P
s3
(h1, {s4, s5, h1}) 
P
s3
(h1, {s1, s2, h1})
P3 (h1, {s2, s5, h1}) 
P
3 (h1, {s1, s4, h1}) 
P
3 (h1, {s1, s5, h1})
Ps3 (h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s4, h2}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s2, h2}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s1, h2}). . .
(h1, {s1, s2, h1}) 
P
s4
(h1, {s2, s3, h1}) 
P
s4
(h1, {s3, s5, h1})
Ps4 (h1, {s1, s5, h1}) 
P
s4
(h1, {s2, s5, h1}) 
P
s4
(h1, {s1, s3, h1})
Ps4 (h2, {s3, h2}) 
P
s4
(h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s4
(h2, {s2, h2}) 
P
s4
(h2, {s1, h2}). . .
(h1, {s3, s4, h1}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s2, s4, h1}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s2, s3, h1})
Ps5 (h1, {s1, s4, h1}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s1, s3, h1}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s1, s2, h1})
Ps5 (h2, {s3, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s4, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s1, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s2, h2}) . . .
(h1, {s2, s3, s4}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1, s2, s4}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1, s2, s5})
Ph1 (h1, {s2, s3, s5}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s2, s4, s5}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1, s2, s3})
Ph1 (h2, {s1, s3, s4}) 
P
h1
(h2, {s1, s4, s5}) 
P
h1
(h2, {s3, s4, s5})
Ph1 (h2, {s1, s4, s5}) 
P
h1
(h2, {s1, s3, s5}) . . .
(h2, {s2, s3}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s2}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s2, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s4, s5})
Ph2 (h2, {s2, s4}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s3, s4}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s3, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s3})
Ph2 (h2, {s1, s4}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s5}) 
P
h2
. . .
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Incentive Compatibility of P1a given setting 1.:
If all agents made seven offers, P1a stops. It yields the matching
M1 = ({s1, s2, s4}, {s3, s5}). But if agent s5 misrepresents his preferences, such that
(h1, {s3, s4}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s2, s4}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s2, s3}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s1, s4}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s1, s3})
Ss5 (h1, {s1, s2}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s1}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s2}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s3}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s4}),
then P1a stops after eight offers per agent. It delivers the matchings
M2 = ({s3, s4, s5}, {s1, s2}) and M3 = ({s1, s2, s5}, {s3, s4}). Both matchings have a
higher rank for agent s5 than he gets if he is telling the truth.
Incentive Compatibility of P1a given setting 2.:
Given a job market for participants and assuming all participants state their true
preferences, P1a determines the matching M ′1 = ({s1, s2, s4, h1}, {s3, s5, h2}).
If agent s5 misrepresents its preferences again such that
(h1, {s3, s4, h1}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s2, s4, h1}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s2, s3, h1})
Ps5 (h1, {s1, s4, h1}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s1, s3, h1}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s1, s2, h1})
Ps5 (h2, {s1, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s2, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s3, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s4, h2}) . . .,
P1a determines the matchings M ′3 = ({s1, s2, s5, h1}, {s3, s4, h2}) and
M ′2 = ({s3, s4, s5, h1}, {s1, s2, h2}).
If firm h2 misrepresents its preferences such that
(h2, {s1, s2}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s2, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s4, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s2, s4})
Ph2 (h2, {s3, s4}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s4}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s3})
Ph2 (h2, {s2, s3}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s3, s5}) 
P
h2
. . .,
P1a determines the matchings M ′3 = ({s1, s2, s5, h1}, {s3, s4, h2}). 2
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Example A.0.2 (P2 and Incentive Compatibility)
1. Let H = {h1, h2} with κ1 = 2, κ2 = 3 and S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}. The agents
have lexicographic preferences.
(h1, {s5}) 
S
s1
(h1, {s2}) 
S
s1
(h1, {s4}) 
S
s1
(h1, {s3}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s4, s5})
Ss1 (h2, {s3, s5}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s2, s3}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s2, s5}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s2, s4})
Ss1 (h2, {s3, s4})
(h1, {s3}) 
S
s2
(h1, {s1}) 
S
s2
(h1, {s5}) 
S
s2
(h1, {s4}) 
S
s2
(h2, {s4, s5})
Ss2 (h2, {s3, s5}) 
S
s2
(h2, {s1, s3}) 
S
s2
(h2, {s1, s5}) 
S
s2
(h2, {s1, s4})
Ss1 (h2, {s3, s4})
(h1, {s1}) 
S
s3
(h1, {s4}) 
S
s3
(h1, {s5}) 
S
s3
(h1, {s2}) 
S
s3
(h2, {s4, s5})
Ss3 (h2, {s2, s5}) 
S
s3
(h2, {s1, s2}) 
S
s3
(h2, {s1, s5}) 
S
s3
(h2, {s1, s4})
Ss3 (h2, {s2, s4})
(h1, {s3}) 
S
s4
(h1, {s2}) 
S
s4
(h1, {s1}) 
S
s4
(h1, {s4}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s3, s5})
Ss4 (h2, {s2, s5}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s1, s2}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s1, s5}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s1, s3})
Ss4 (h2, {s2, s3})
(h1, {s3}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s4}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s2}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s1}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s3, s4})
Ss5 (h2, {s2, s4}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s1, s2}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s1, s4}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s1, s3})
Ss5 (h2, {s2, s3})
2. Let P = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, h1, h2} with κ˜1 = 4, κ˜2 = 3. The participants have
lexicographic admissible preferences.
(h1, {s5, h1}) 
S
s1
(h1, {s2, h1}) 
S
s1
(h1, {s4, h1}) 
S
s1
(h1, {s3, h1})
Ss1 (h2, {s4, s5, h2}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s3, s5, h2}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s2, s3, h2})
Ss1 (h2, {s2, s5, h2}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s2, s4, h2}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s3, s4, h2}) . . .
(h1, {s3, h1}) 
S
s2
(h1, {s1, h1}) 
S
s2
(h1, {s5, h1}) 
S
s2
(h1, {s4})
Ss2 (h2, {s4, s5, h2}) 
S
s2
(h2, {s3, s5, h2}) 
S
s2
(h2, {s1, s3, h2})
Ss2 (h2, {s1, s5, h2}) 
S
s2
(h2, {s1, s4, h2}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s3, s4, h2}). . .
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(h1, {s1, h1}) 
S
s3
(h1, {s4, h1}) 
S
s3
(h1, {s5, h1}) 
S
s3
(h1, {s2, h1})
Ss3 (h2, {s4, s5, h2}) 
S
s3
(h2, {s2, s5, h2}) 
S
s3
(h2, {s1, s2, h2})
Ss3 (h2, {s1, s5, h2}) 
S
s3
(h2, {s1, s4, h2}) 
S
s3
(h2, {s2, s4, h2}) . . .
(h1, {s3, h1}) 
S
s4
(h1, {s2, h1}) 
S
s4
(h1, {s1, h1}) 
S
s4
(h1, {s4, h1})
Ss4 (h2, {s3, s5, h2}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s2, s5, h2}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s1, s2, h2})
Ss4 (h2, {s1, s5, h2}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s1, s3, h2}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s2, s3, h2}) . . .
(h1, {s3, h1}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s4, h1}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s2, h1}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s1, h1})
Ss5 (h2, {s3, s4, h2}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s2, s4, h2}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s1, s2, h2})
Ss5 (h2, {s1, s4, h2}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s1, s3, h2}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s2, s3, h2}) . . .
(h1, {s3, s5}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1, s2}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s4, s5}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s2, s5})
Ph1 (h1, {s2, s4}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s3, s4}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s2, s3}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1, s3})
Ph1 (h1, {s1, s4}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1, s5}) 
P
h1
. . .
(h2, {s1, s2, s3}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s2, s4}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s2, s5})
Ph2 (h2, {s2, s3, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s4, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s3, s5})
Ph2 (h2, {s1, s3, s4}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s2, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s3, s4, s5})
Ph2 (h2, {s2, s3, s4}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s3, s5}) . . .
Incentive Compatibility of P2 given setting 1.:
The second procedure selects all agents, since they all prefer firm h1 to h2. Af-
ter all agents having made two offers, the first emerging complete graphs in firm
h1 consist of the agents s3, s4 and s1, s2. Hence P2 selects the matchings M1 =
({s3, s4}, {s1, s2, s5}) or M2 = ({s1, s2}, {s3, s4, s5}). W.l.o.g. the outcome function
g˜ : PS →M maps the preference relation S on M1.
Now, if agent s5 misrepresents his preferences such that (h1, {s1}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s3})
Ss5 (h1, {s4}) 
S
s5
(h1, {s2}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s3, s4}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s2, s4})
Ss5 (h2, {s1, s2}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s1, s4}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s1, s3}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s2, s3})
he achieves a better rank. P2 determines the matching M3 = ({s1, s5}, {s2, s3, s4}).
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Incentive Compatibility of P2 given setting 2.:
If all participants state their preferences truthfully, the procedure determines the
matching M ′2 = ({s1, s2, h1}, {s3, s4, s5, h2}). Analyzing the example, it turns out
that we find an agent as well as a firm that gets a higher rank by not revealing their
true preferences. This time agent s3 gets a higher rank if he states the preferences:
(h1, {s5, h1}) 
P
s3
(h1, {s4, h1}) 
S
s3
(h1, {s2, h1}) 
P
s3
(h1, {s1, h1})
Ps3 (h1, {s2, s4, h1}) 
P
s3
(h1, {s1, s2, h1}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s1, s4, h2})
Ps3 (h2, {s2, s5, h2}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s4, s5, h2}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s1, s5, h2}) . . ..
We get the matching M4 = ({s3, s5, h1}, {s1, s2, s4, h2}).
Whereas firm h1 gets its most preferred rank, if it misrepresents its preferences, such
that
(h1, {s3, s5}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s4, s5}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s2, s4}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1, s4}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s2, s5})
Ph1 (h1, {s1, s3}) 
P
h1
(h2, {s3, s4}) 
P
h1
(h2, {s1, s5}) 
P
h1
(h2, {s3, s4, s5})
Ph1 (h2, {s1, s2}) 
P
h1
(h2, {s2, s3}) . . .
the solution is M ′3 = ({s1, s5, h1}, {s2, s3, s4, h2}). 2
Example A.0.3 (P3b and Incentive Compatibility)
Let P = {h1, h2, h3, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5} and κ˜1 = κ˜2 = 3 κ˜3 = 2. The lexicographic
admissible preferences of the participants are given by:
(h3, {h3}) 
P
s1
(h1{s2, h1}) 
P
s1
(h1, {s3, h1}) 
P
s1
(h1, {s5, h1}) 
P
s1
(h1, {s4, h1})
Ps1 (h2, {s2, h2}) 
P
s1
(h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s1
(h2, {s3, h2}) s1 (h2, {s4, h2}) . . .
(h1, {s1, h1}) 
P
s2
(h1, {s4, h1}) 
P
s2
(h1, {s5, h1}) 
P
s2
(h1, {s3, h1}) 
P
s2
(h3, {h3})
Ps2 (h2, {s1, h2}) s2 P (h2, {s5, h2}) s2 P (h2, {s4, h2}) s2 P (h2, {s3, h2}) . . .
(h1, {s4, h1}) s3 P (h1, {s5, h1}) s3 P (h1, {s2, h1}) s3 P (h1, {s1, h1})
Ps3 (h3, {h3}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s4, h2}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s1, h2}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s5, h2})
Ps3 (h2, {s2, h2}) . . .
(h1, {s3, h1}) 
P
s4
(h1, {s1, h1}) 
P
s4
(h1, {s5, h1}) 
P
s4
(h1, {s2, h1})
Ps4 (h2, {s2, h2}) 
P
s4
(h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s4
(h2, {s1, h2}) 
P
s4
(h2, {s3, h2})
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Ps4 (h3, {h3}) . . .
(h3, {h3}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s4, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s3, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s2, h2})
Ps5 (h2, {s1, h2}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s4, h1}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s1, h1}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s3, h1})
Ps5 (h1, {s2, h1}) . . .
(h1, {s1, s2}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s3, s4}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1, s4}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1, s5})
Ph1 (h1, {s2, s3}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s2, s4}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s2, s5}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1, s3})
Ph1 (h1, {s3, s5}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s4, s5}) . . .
(h2, {s1, s3}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s3, s5}) 
P
h2
(h3, {s2, s3}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s2, s5})
Ph2 (h2, {s3, s4}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s2}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s4, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s2, s4})
Ph2 (h2, {s1, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s4}) . . .
(h3, {s5}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s1}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s3}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s4}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s2}) . . .
Incentive Compatibility of P3b given admissible lexicographic preferences:
First, firm h1 chooses among the set of selected agents s2, s3, s4 those he mostly
prefers, namely the agents s3 and s4. The firm h3 selects agents s5, given the set of
agents {s1, s5}. Hence, we get the matching M1 = ({s3, s4, h1}, {s1, s2, h2}, {s5, h3}).
But now agent s1 can improve his situation if he misrepresents his preferences in
the following way:
(h1, {s2, h1}) 
P
s1
(h1, {s3, h1}) 
P
s1
(h1, {s5, h1}) 
P
s1
(h1, {s4, h1}) 
P
s1
(h3, {h3})
Ps1 (h2, {s2, h2}) 
P
s1
(h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s1
(h2, {s3, h2}) 
P
s1
(h2, {s4, h2}) . . .
Then agent s1 is matched with firm h1 instead of his less preferred firm h2, because
firm h1 prefers the κ˜1-clique C = {s1, s2} to C
′ = {s3, s4}. P3b selects the matching
M2 = ({s1, s2, h1}, {s3, s4, h2}, {s5, h3}). The clique working in firm h3 remains the
same (red colored). 2
Example A.0.4 (P1a and the results of Chapter 3 and Section 4.1)
1. Let S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}, H = {h1, h2, h3} and κ1 = 1, κ2 = κ3 = 2. The
agents’ preferences are given by:
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(h3, {s4}) 
S
s1
(h2{s2}) 
S
s1
(h3, {s3}) 
S
s1
(h3, {s2}) 
S
s1
(h1, ∅)
Ss1 (h2, {s5}) 
S
s1
(h3, {s5}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s3}) 
S
s1
(h2, {s4})
(h1, ∅) 
S
s2
(h3, {s5}) 
S
s2
(h3, {s4}) 
S
s2
(h2, {s1}) 
S
s2
(h3, {s1})
Ss2 (h2, {s5}) 
S
s2
(h2, {s4}) 
S
s2
(h2, {s3}) 
S
s2
(h3, {s3})
(h3, {s1}) 
S
s3
(h3, {s5}) 
S
s3
(h1, ∅) 
S
s3
(h2, {s4}) 
S
s3
(h3, {s2})
Ss3 (h2, {s1}) 
S
s3
(h2, {s5}) 
S
s3
(h2, {s2}) 
S
s3
(h3, {s4})
(h3, {s3}) 
S
s4
(h3, {s1}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s2}) 
S
s4
(h3, {s5}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s5})
Ss4 (h1, ∅) 
S
s4
(h2, {s1}) 
S
s4
(h2, {s3}) 
S
s4
(h3, {s2})
(h2, {s4}) 
S
s5
(h3, {s4}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s3}) 
S
s5
(h2, {s2}) 
S
s5
(h3, {s1})
Ss5 (h3, {s3}) 
s
s5
(h2, {s1}) 
S
s5
(h1, ∅) 
S
s5
(h3, {s2})
2. Let P = {h1, h2, h3, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5} and κ˜1 = 2, κ˜2 = κ˜3 = 3. The partici-
pants’ admissible preferences are given by:
(h3, {s4, h3}) 
P
s1
(h2{s2, h2}) 
P
s1
(h3, {s3, h3}) 
P
s1
(h3, {s2, h3})
Ps1 (h1, {h1}) 
P
s1
(h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s1
(h3, {s5, h3}) 
P
s1
(h2, {s3, h2})
Ps1 (h2, {s4, h2}) 
P
s1
. . .
(h1, {h1}) 
P
s2
(h3, {s5, h3}) 
P
s2
(h3, {s4, h3}) 
P
s2
(h2, {s1, h2})
Ps2 (h3, {s1, h3}) 
P
s2
(h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s2
(h2, {s4, h2}) 
P
s2
(h2, {s3, h2})
Ps2 (h3, {s3, h3}) 
P
s2
. . .
(h3, {s1, h3}) 
P
s3
(h3, {s5, h3}) 
P
s3
(h1, {h1}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s4, h2})
Ps3 (h3, {s2, h3}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s1, h2}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s2, h2})
Ps3 (h3, {s4, h3}) 
P
s3
. . .
(h3, {s3, h3}) 
P
s4
(h3, {s1, h3}) 
P
s4
(h2, {s2, h2}) 
P
s4
(h3, {s5, h3})
Ps4 (h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s4
(h1, {h1}) 
P
s4
(h2, {s1, h2}) 
P
s4
(h2, {s3, h2})
Ps4 (h3, {s2, h3}) 
P
s4
. . .
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(h2, {s4, h2}) 
P
s5
(h3, {s4, h3}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s3, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s2, h2})
Ps5 (h3, {s1, h3}) 
P
s5
(h3, {s3, h3}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s1, h2}) 
P
s5
(h1, {h1})
Ps5 (h3, {s2, h3}) 
P
s5
. . .
(h1, {s2}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s3}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s4}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s5}) 
P
h1
. . .
(h2, {s1, s2}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s3}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s4}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s5})
Ph2 (h2, {s2, s3}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s2, s4}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s2, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s3, s4})
Ph2 (h2, {s3, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s4, s5}) 
P
h2
. . .
(h3, {s1, s3}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s3, s5}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s2, s3}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s2, s5})
Ph3 (h3, {s3, s4}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s1, s2}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s4, s5}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s2, s4})
Ph3 (h3, {s1, s5}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s1, s4}) 
P
h3
. . .
Graph theoretic illustration of P1a given setting 1.:
Agents only have preferences over agents. They do not ask firms for joint work and
the firms have no influence on the course of the procedure. This exactly reflects the
basic model introduced in Chapter 2. Illustrating the offers until procedure P1a
stops, we get the next figure:
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Firm h1
s4
s5
s5
Firm h2 Firm h3
s5
s5
s5
s5
s1
s2
s3
s3
s2
s2
s4
s4
s1
s1
s3
s2
s3
s4
s2
s1
s3
s4
s4
s2
s4s2
s3
Each agent makes four offers until the procedure P1a stops. We observe two com-
plete graphs with loops in firm h1, one complete graph without loops in firm h2
and three complete graphs without loops in firm h3. Each complete graph in
the second and the third firm includes two vertices/agents. Checking the condi-
tions 2.1 and 2.2, we immediately realize that P1a stopped, since the matching
M1 = ({s3}, {s1, s2}, {s4, s5}) is given.
Graph theoretic illustration of P1a given setting 2.:
Next we again want to illustrate the offers until P1a stops. After six rounds the
procedure stops. We get the matching M2 = ({s4, h1}, {s1, s2, h2}, {s3, s5, h3}).
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Firm h1
s2 s1
Firm h2 Firm h3
h1 s4 s5
h2
s4
h3
h2
s1
h3
h1
h1 s4
h2 h3
h1
h2
h1 s5
h2 h3
s1
s3
s4
s5
s1 s2
s1 s3
s2 s4
s3
s3
s3
s2 s5
s3 s5
h3
129
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h2 h3
h2 h3
h2 h3
h2
h2 h3
s5
h3
s4s1 s4 s5
s3 s4 s4
s5
s1
s2
s1 s5
s2 s3
s2
s2 s3
s2
s1
2
Example A.0.5 (P1a; P2 and the results of Chapter 3 and Section 4.1)
1. Let H = {h1, h2, h3} with κ1 = κ2 = 2, κ3 = 1 and let S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}.
The agents’ lexicographic preferences are given by1:
1A bundle with different colors belongs to different matchings.
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(h1, {s2}) 
S
1 (h1, {s4}) 
S
1 (h1, {s3}) 
S
1 (h1, {s5}) 
S
1 (h2, {s5})
S1 (h2, {s4}) 
S
1 (h2, {s3}) 
S
1 (h2, {s2}) 
S
1 (h3, ∅)
(h2, {s1}) 
S
2 (h2, {s3}) 
S
2 (h2, {s4}) 
S
2 (h2, {s5}) 
S
2 (h1, {s1})
S2 (h1, {s4}) 
S
2 (h1, {s5}) 
S
2 (h1, {s3}) 
S
2 (h3, ∅)
(h1, {s1}) 
S
3 (h1, {s2}) 
S
3 (h1, {s5}) 
S
3 (h1, {s4}) 
S
3 (h3,∅)
S3 (h2, {s1}) 
S
3 (h2, {s5}) 
S
3 (h2, {s4} 
S
3 (h2, {s2}))
(h1, {s1}) 
S
4 (h1, {s5}) 
S
4 (h1, {s3}) 
S
4 (h1, {s2}) 
S
4 (h2, {s5})
S4 (h2, {s1}) 
S
4 (h2, {s2}) 
S
4 (h2, {s3}) 
S
4 (h3, ∅)
(h1, {s2}) 
S
5 (h1, {s1}) 
S
5 (h1, {s4}) 
S
5 (h1, {s3}) 
S
5 (h2, {s4})
S5 (h2, {s1}) 
S
5 (h2, {s2}) 
S
5 (h2, {s3}) 
S
5 (h3, ∅)
2. We have P = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, h1, h2, h3} participants and κ˜1 = κ˜2 = 3, κ˜3 = 2
jobs. The participants’ lexicographic admissible preferences are given by:
(h1, {s2, h1}) 
P
s1
(h1, {s4, h1}) 
P
s1
(h1, {s3, h1}) 
P
s1
(h1, {s5, h1})
Ps1 (h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s1
(h2, {s4, h2}) 
P
s1
(h2, {s3, h2}) 
P
s1
(h2, {s2, h2})
Ps1 (h3, {h3}) . . .
(h2, {s1, h2}) 
P
s2
(h2, {s3, h2}) 
P
s2
(h2, {s4, h2}) 
P
s2
(h2, {s5, h2})
Ps2 (h1, {s1, h1}) 
P
s2
(h1, {s4, h1}) 
P
s2
(h1, {s5, h1}) 
P
s2
(h1, {s3, h1})
Ps2 (h3, {h3}) . . .
(h1, {s1, h1}) 
P
s3
(h1, {s2, h1}) 
P
s3
(h1, {s5, h1}) 
P
s3
(h1, {s4, h1})
Ps3 (h3, {h3}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s1, h2}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s4, h2}
Ps3 (h2, {s2, h2})) . . .
(h1, {s1, h1}) 
P
s4
(h1, {s5, h1}) 
P
s4
(h1, {s3, h1}) 
P
s4
(h1, {s2, h1})
Ps4 (h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s4
(h2, {s1, h2}) 
P
s4
(h2, {s2, h2}) 
P
s4
(h2, {s3, h2})
Ps4 (h3, {h3}) . . .
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(h1, {s2, h1}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s1, h1}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s4, h1}) 
P
s5
(h1, {s3, h1})
Ps5 (h2, {s4, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s1, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s2, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s3, h2})
Ps5 (h3, {h3}) . . .
(h1, {s1, s2}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1, s3}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1, s4}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s1, s5})
Ph1 (h1, {s2, s3}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s2, s4}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s2, s5}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s3, s4})
Ph1 (h1, {s3, s5}) 
P
h1
(h1, {s4, s5}) . . .
(h2, {s1, s3}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s3, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s2, s3}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s2, s5})
Ph2 (h2, {s3, s4}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s2}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s4, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s2, s4})
Ph2 (h2, {s1, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s1, s4}) . . .
(h3, {s2}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s1}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s3}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s4}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s5}) . . .
Graph theoretic illustration of P1a given setting 1.:
First, we analyze procedure P1a. All agents make their offers as long as a matching
occurs. We get the matching M = ({s1, s2}, {s4, s5}, {s3}). It satisfies the agent-
max-min property, is Pareto efficient, but it is not ta-stable. Either the agents s2
and s4 or the agents s2 and s5 constitute ta-blocking coalitions.
Graph theoretic illustration of P2 given setting 1.:
Apart from agent s2, all agents mostly prefer firm h1. Therefore, the agents s1, s3, s4, s5
and firm h1 are selected by the procedure. The agents start to make their offers and
it turns out that the first complete graph consists of agents s1 and s4. Therefore,
see the next picture:
s1
s1
s5
Firm h1
s4
s3
s1
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The agents s1 and s4 are matched with the firm h1. The firm and the agents leave
the market. We get a reduced set of preferences.
(h2, {s3}) 
S
2 (h2, {s5}) 
S
2 (h3, ∅)
(h3, ∅) 
S
3 (h2, {s5}) 
S
3 (h2, {s2})
(h2, {s2}) 
S
5 (h2, {s3}) 
S
5 (h3, ∅)
On the second level the agents s2 and s5 are selected together with firm h2 and in
addition, agent s3 is selected with firm h3. This immediately yields to the solution
of the procedure. We get the matching M 1 = ({s1, s4}, {s2, s5}, {s3}). The solution
gP2(S) does not satisfy the agent-max-min property, because agent s5 gets a lower
rank than in the matching M , selected by P1a given the setting 1.
Graph theoretic illustration of P2 given setting 2.:
We select the agents s1, s3, s4, s5 and the firm h1. Now the agents start to make their
offers. In the next figure, we illustrate the offers, selected participants are making
among each other.
s1 s1s4
h1
s3
s5
h1
h1
s1 s5
h1
s4s5
h1
Firm h1
s3
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After two rounds of offers, we get two complete graphs. The first one consists of the
agents s1, s4 and firm h1, the second one of the agents s1, s3 and again firm h1. We
match s1, s4, h1. They leave the market. Hence, we get the following reduced set of
preferences on the one hand:
(h2, {s3, h2}) 
P
s2
(h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s2
(h3, {h3}) . . .
(h3, {h3}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s3
(h2, {s2, h2})) . . .
(h2, {s2, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s3, h2}) 
P
s5
(h3, {h3}) . . .
(h2, {s3, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s2, s3}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s2, s5}) . . .
(h3, {s2}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s3}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s5}) . . .
Here the s2, s5, h2 are selected on the one hand, s3, h3 on the other hand. It im-
mediately follows that after one round of offers we get the corresponding complete
graphs. The matching M 1 = ({s1, s4, h1}, {s2, s5, h2}, {s3, h3}) is composed. Next,
we briefly illustrate the round of offers.
s2 s5
h2
Firm h2 Firm h3
s3 h3
On the other hand, if we match s1, s3, h1 we get the following scenario. They leave
the market. Therefore, we get another reduced set of preferences:
(h2, {s4, h2}) 
P
s2
(h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s2
(h3, {h3}) . . .
(h2, {s5, h2}) 
P
s4
(h2, {s2, h2}) 
P
s4
(h3, {h3}) . . .
(h2, {s4, h2}) 
P
s5
(h2, {s2, h2}) 
P
s5
(h3, {h3}) . . .
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(h2, {s2, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s4, s5}) 
P
h2
(h2, {s2, s4}) . . .
(h3, {s2}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s4}) 
P
h3
(h3, {s5}) . . .
The procedure P2 selects the agents s2, s4, s5 and firm h2. These participants start
to announce the offers among each other. This is illustrated in the last figure. We
get two more matchings, M 2 = ({s1, s3, h1}, {s4, s5, h2}, {s2, h3}) or
M3 = ({s1, s3, h1}, {s2, s5, h2}, {s4, h3}).
s4
s5
s2
h2 h2
h2
s4 s5
s2
Firm h2
2
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Existing Procedures
We briefly want to give short overviews of procedures, already existing in the lit-
erature, to get a good intuition of their proceedings. The selection is based on the
comparisons, which we make in the thesis. The purpose of this appendix is to facil-
itate comprehension, if we refer in former chapters to the procedures outlined here.
For a deeper understanding or a more precise description, we kindly ask the reader
to use the references.
B.0.1 The Deferred Acceptance Procedure
The procedure is first given in Gale & Shapley (1962). For deepening see also Roth
& Sotomayor (1990).
We have two finite disjoint sets, men and women, on the market. Each man has
strict preferences over the women, and each woman has strict preferences over the
men. A woman is acceptable to a man, if he likes her at least as well as remaining
single, analogously for the women.
We cite the procedure from Gale & Shapley (1962):
“To start, each man proposes to his favorite woman, that is, to the first woman
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on his preference list of acceptable women. Each woman rejects the proposal of
any man who is unacceptable to her and each woman who receives more than one
proposal rejects all but her most preferred of these. Any man whose proposal is not
rejected at this point is kept ”engaged”.
At any step any man who was rejected at the previous step proposes to his next
choice (i.e. to his most preferred woman among those who have not yet rejected him),
so long as there remains an acceptable woman to whom he has not yet proposed.
(If at any step of the procedure a man has already proposed to and been rejected
by, all of the women he finds acceptable, then he issues no further proposals). Each
woman receiving proposals rejects any from unacceptable men, and also rejects all
but her most preferred among the group consisting of the new proposers together
with any man she may kept engaged from the previous step.
The algorithm stops after any step in which no man is rejected. At this point, every
man is either engaged to some woman or has been rejected by every woman on his
list of acceptable women. The marriages are now consummated, with each man
being matched to the woman to whom he is engaged. Women who did not receive
any acceptable proposal, and men who were rejected by all women acceptable to
them, will stay single.”
B.0.2 The Reduction Mechanism
Balinski & Ratier (1997) and Balinski & Ratier (1998) specify the marriage problem
by a directed graph defined over a grid. We have two finite disjoint sets, men and
women. Each man has strict preferences over the women, and each woman has strict
preferences over the men. A woman is acceptable to a man, if he likes her at least
as well as remaining single, analogously for the women.
The nodes of the marriage graphs are pairs of men and women, acceptable to each
other. Each row in the grid corresponds to a man, each column to a woman. The
directed arcs of the directed graph are horizontal or vertical arcs. A horizontal arc
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expresses a men’s preference for a woman over another woman. The same holds for
an vertical arc for a women.
We cite the procedure from Balinski & Ratier (1997):
”For each row and column in any order find in the row of a man the best-man node.
Eliminate all nodes preceding this node in the woman’s column; find in the column
of each woman, the woman-best node, eliminate all nodes preceding this node in
the man’s row; until every man-best node is women-worst, and every woman-best
is man-worst.”
B.0.3 Multi-Stage Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
We want to give a rough overview of the algorithm. For a detailed description of
the various restrictions on preferences see Dutta & Masso (1997).
The algorithm consists of two main stages. In stage 1 couples are treated as single
individuals. all agents (workers, single individuals=couples) have a strict preference
ordering over the set of firms. Firms have group substitutable preferences. Now, the
deferred-acceptance algorithm is used with agents proposing. We get a matching.
If all couples are matched, the procedure stops, otherwise it goes to stage 2. The
couples not matched in the former stage now have preferences over firms and their
partner. The couples matched in the former stage are again treated as single indi-
viduals. The preference structure of the in stage 1 matched couples, of the workers
and of the firms did not change at all. Again the classical deferred-acceptance algo-
rithm with agents proposing is applied. If the same set of couples is matched as in
stage 1, the algorithm stops.
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Basic Symbols
H set of firms
m number of firms
S set of agents
n number of agents
κk set of all offered jobs in firm k
κ total number of offered jobs
Cq set of subsets with q agents
C−iq−1 set of subsets of q − 1 agents and without agent i
bi = (k, C) with C ∈ C
−i
q−1 bundle of agent i
BSi set of all bundles of agent i
S agents’ preference profile
Si preference relation of agent i
PS set of all possible preference profiles
PSi set of all possible preferences of agent i
M(Si ) preference relation of agent i on M
MP (
S
i ) strict preference relation of agent i on M
MI(
S
i ) indifferent preference relation of agent i on M
P lex set of all possible lexicographic preference profiles
P lexi set of all possible lexicographic preferences of agent i
H(Si ) preference relation of agent i on H
µ matching function
Cµ,k κk-clique under µ for each firm k ∈ H
Mµ a matching under µ
M set of all matchings
vSi agent i’s ranking function
g outcome correspondence
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P set of participants
κ˜k number of offered jobs per firm
Dq+1 set of subsets of q + 1 participants
D−pq set of subsets of q colleagues without participant p
P participants’ preference profile
Pp preference relation of participant p
PP set of all possible preference profiles
PPp set of all possible preferences of participant p
bp = (k, D) with D ∈ D
−p
κk
bundle of participant p
BPp set of all bundles of participant p
Padm set of all possible preference profiles
Dk set of admissible κ˜k-cliques
µ˜ (admissible) matching function
Dµ˜,k κ˜k-clique under µ˜
Mµ˜ a matching under µ
M˜ set of all matchings under µ˜
vPp participant p’s ranking function p
P lexad set of all possible lexicographic admissible preference profiles
H firms’ preference profile
Hk preference relation of firm k
PH set of all possible preference profiles
PHk set of all possible preferences of firm k
µˆ inverse matching function
Mˆ set of all matchings under µ˜
M(Hk ) firm k’s preference relation over matchings
vHk firm k’s preference relation over matchings
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